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WHY COST/BENEFIT BALANCING TESTS DON’T EXIST: HOW TO
DISPEL A DELUSION THAT DELAYS JUSTICE FOR IMMIGRANTS
JOSHUA J. SCHROEDER*
ABSTRACT
In 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court nullified its earlier presumption that
indefinite immigrant detention without bond hearings is unconstitutional under
Zadvydas v. Davis. If Zadvydas is a nullity, those who raise due process
balancing tests during the post-removal-period in immigrant habeas review may
need to find new grounds for review. However, since Boumediene v. Bush was
decided in 2008, there are several reasons not to despair Zadvydas’s demise.
For one, Zadvydas spoke to an extremely narrow subset of cases. It
granted a concession under the Due Process Clause to immigrants detained
beyond the statutory 90-day removal period. It decided that indefinite immigrant
detention is likely unconstitutional, and that therefore the statute must have a
judge-made six-month time limit after which the government must present
evidence of reasonable cause to continue an indefinite detention.
However, in 2018, Jennings v. Rodriguez did not extend Zadvydas’s sixmonth presumption, suggesting it was arbitrary. Jennings went further to rework
constitutional avoidance doctrine in such a way that it, and the judicial duty to
say what the law is under Marbury v. Madison itself, may no longer exist.
Jennings decided that as long as a statute is clear, then it should go into force
whether or not it conflicts with the U.S. Constitution.
In other words, Jennings limited Zadvydas to its facts and failed to
address the constitutional question it was briefed to answer. Nevertheless,
several district courts began to answer this constitutional question themselves
by extending due process balancing tests to grant Zadvydas-like relief to asylum
seekers. If Zadvydas is overturned, these fractured attempts at providing
immigrant habeas corpus may be cut off by the Court.
This article will explain why there is still hope for detained asylum
seekers. The U.S. Supreme Court may unsettle stare decisis, constitutional
avoidance, and its duty to say what the law is. It might completely misinterpret
*

Joshua J. Schroeder is owner and founder of SchroederLaw in Oakland, CA where he practices
immigration law, constitutional law, and intellectual property law. He holds a J.D. from Lewis &
Clark Law School, and is admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of the United States, the United
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what is actually “due” process. But its imprudent behavior—its disrespect for
its own precedent—is causing the Court to lean directly into the Suspension
Clause, Boumediene v. Bush, and the pro-immigrant writ of habeas corpus that
existed in 1789.
Self, the sole point in which [Caesar and Brutus] both agreed,
By this Romes shackled, or by this shes Free’d,
Self Love, that stimulous to Noblest aim,
Bids Nero Light the Capital in Flame
— Mercy Otis Warren, To John Adams, Oct. 11, 1773
Cassius Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?
Brutus No, Cassius; for the eye sees not itself
But by reflection, by some other things.
Cassius ‘Tis just:
And it is very much lamented, Brutus,
That you have no such mirrors as will turn
Your hidden worthiness into your eye,
That you might see your shadow.
— WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2, ls. 51–58
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM WITH THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S
CRYSTAL BALL
In his famed Harvard Law Review article, The Path of the Law, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. defined the law as prophecy.1 He defined the
lawyer’s job as one of prophesying future costs and benefits for clients, for
judges, and for themselves.2 Mere words on a page were as nothing to Justice
Holmes—they were nothing unless or until they actualized themselves in robust,
manly consequences, which may allegedly be observed in the court’s crystal
ball.3
Obsessed with helping good triumph over evil, Justice Holmes made a
dangerous ruling in Buck v. Bell.4 After staring deeply into his crystal ball,
Holmes believed that eugenics would create progress, reduce crime, and spur
innovation; so, he papered over an injustice with a cost/benefit balancing test.5
Following Holmes’s decision in Buck, the Nazis papered over several injustices
in an attempt to create the übermensch by annihilating the Jews.6
Holmes perceived disaster for U.S. society if he let unfit women like
Carrie Buck keep their genitals intact.7 He genuinely thought that genetic atrophy
1
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457–59 (1897)
[hereinafter Holmes, Jr., The Path] (“I wish, if I can, to lay down some first principles for the study
of this body of dogma or systematized prediction which we call the law, for men who want to use
it as the instrument of their business to enable them to prophesy in their turn . . . .”).
2
Id.
3
See id.; John M. Kang, Prove Yourselves: Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Obsessions of
Manliness, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 1067, 1078–79 (2016); cf. Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the
Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1200–01 (1999) (demonstrating the accepted and ordinary use of
“gazing into the crystal ball” by the legal community that was inspired by Holmes).
4
274 U.S. 200, 206–08 (1927).
5
Id. at 207 (agreeing that the welfare “of society will be promoted by her sterilization,”
without proof, and finding that the cost/benefit balancing test “that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes”), extending Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24 (1905) (weighing the risk of injury “against the benefits coming
from the discreet and proper use of the preventive”).
6
Rodney A. Smolla, The Trial of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 214
(1994) (“The Nazi’s simply carried [Holmesian] philosophy to its natural conclusions.”); see LULU
MILLER, WHY FISH DON’T EXIST 132 (2020). Even the idea of the übermensch seems to have
originated in the writings of one of Holmes’s mentors in America. See Beniamino Soressi, 6.1
Europe in Emerson and Emerson in Europe, in MR. EMERSON’S REVOLUTION 325, 326 (Jean
McClure Mudge ed., 2015) (“[I]n Germany, Nietzsche misused central Emersonian ideas, which
Hitler and the Nazis then further perverted.”); see Adam H. Hines, Ralph Waldo Emerson and
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The Subtle Rapture of Postponed Power, 44 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 39,
42, 46–47 (2019) (“Holmes’ decision in Buck v. Bell (1927) embodied an Emersonian premium on
self-reliance.”).
7
Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (perceiving that the fertility of female “degenerate offspring” like
Carrie Buck “sap the strength of the State” and that forced, nonconsensual sterilization of unfit
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or “degeneration” would be imminent if sub-par genes were allowed to keep
fostering life in America.8 Holmes prided himself as a man of science in the law,
on keeping religion out of it, and he believed this sharpened his perception of
reality, making him an ideal judge.9
But eugenics was not scientific,10 nor atheist.11 Both eugenics, and the
Bernaysian propaganda that advertised it, had stronger ties with Puritanism than
science.12 In fact, the eugenicists refashioned Puritan cost/benefit balancing tests
in Benthamite style to justify their austerity drives as rational science.13 They
prophesied doom and expected everyone to adopt their plans for surviving an
apocalypse of foreigners, non-white people, and disabled persons.14
women like Buck would effectively “prevent our being swamped with incompetence”); MILLER,
supra note 6, at 128 (explaining how eugenicists like Jordan and Agassiz were concerned about
the “degeneration” of the human race, and thus “alert[ed] the public to the dangers of charity,
causing, as [they] believed it did, ‘the survival of the unfittest’” (quoting DAVID STARR JORDAN,
THE HUMAN HARVEST 54 (1907))).
8
Buck, 274 U.S. at 207; MILLER, supra note 6, at 128.
9
See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV.
443, 462–63 (1899) [hereinafter Holmes, Jr., Law] (longing for “a commonwealth in which science
is everywhere supreme”).
10
Id. at 444 (touting “science,” Holmes often simultaneously cited to “dogma,” which is
problematic because dogmatic claims to the truth are absolute, of the religious sort—they are held
or abandoned regardless of the scientific discourse and are thus usually considered unscientific);
MILLER, supra note 6, at 133 (“To rid a species of its mutants and outliers is to make that species
dangerously vulnerable to the elements.”); ADAM RUTHERFORD, A BRIEF HISTORY OF EVERYONE
WHO EVER LIVED: THE HUMAN STORY RETOLD THROUGH OUR GENES 219 (2017) (“It is frequently
stated that, for the average geneticist, race simply does not exist. This chapter will explore how
true that is . . . . The great irony is this: The science of genetics was founded specifically on the
study of racial inequality, by a racist.”).
11
Graham J. Baker, Christianity and Eugenics: The Place of Religion in the British Eugenics
Education Society and the American Eugenics Society, c. 1907–1940, 27 SOC. HIST. MED. 281, 288
(2014) (“[E]ugenic religion was not always viewed as a replacement for Christian faith.”); see
Holmes, Jr., Law, supra note 9, at 463 (quoting GEORGE HERBERT, The Elixer, in THE TEMPLE:
SACRED POEMS AND PRIVATE EJACULATIONS 222 (George Sampson, ed., George Bell & Sons 1904)
(1633)).
12
MILLER, supra note 6, at 25–28; EDWARD L. BERNAYS, THE BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA 206
(1965) (giving PR advice to assist “the eugenics movement”); id. at 652 (noting that Goebbels used
Bernaysian strategies to push the eugenic agenda in Nazi Germany); id. at epigraph (“‘The
grounded maxim / So rife and celebrated in the mouths / Of wisest men; that to the public good /
Private respects must yield.’” (quoting JOHN MILTON, SAMSON AGONISTES ls. 865–68)).
13
See, e.g., HARRY HAMILTON LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
454 (1922) (appending a balancing test to the beginning of Laughlin’s model eugenical sterilization
law); Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy from a Lost World, 39 PEPP. L. REV.
101, 111 (2011) [hereinafter Nourse, Buck] (“Justice Holmes was a balancer through and
through.”); cf. PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY & DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 241 (2006) (noting that Bentham’s philosophy boiled down to balancing costs and
benefits).
14
See MILLER, supra note 6, at 128; see also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206–08 (1927).
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Eugenicists were eager to study Charles Darwin’s inbred family tree as
proof of concept.15 But, nature gradually corrected the hubris of American
eugenicists about perfecting humanity through inbreeding and violence when
genetic disease appeared among the Darwin family.16 We are painfully aware
that what Holmes thought was good science, was not good for anyone; a fact
only confirmed after millions were sterilized, repatriated, or murdered in the
name of eugenics.17
Science cannot, however, correct the delusion that an uncertain future
can be secured through brittle human reason.18 Americans remain as susceptible
to this trick as we were when Carrie Buck’s fallopian tubes were snipped.19 Ever
since Justice Powell resuscitated rational cost/benefit balancing tests in Stone v.
Powell20 and Mathews v. Eldridge21 to manifest the future, progressive liberals
became the most loyal votaries of the Holmesian crystal ball.22
The Court’s majority opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis demonstrated this
reality.23 Justice Breyer led the liberal wing of the Court to “construe the statute
[8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)] to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation” rather
than overruling the statute as a suspension of the writ.24 The Court set a sixmonth presumption at which time the government should bring evidence for
cause and tasked Immigration Judges (“IJs”) to decide what “reasonable” should
mean on a case-by-case basis.25

15
See Tim M. Berra, Gonzalo Alvarez & Kate Shannon, The Galton–Darwin–Wedgwood
Pedigree of H. H. Laughlin, 101 BIO. J. LINNEAN SOC. 228, 228–30 (2010).
16
Tim M. Berra, Gonzalo Alvarez & Francisco C. Ceballos, Was the Darwin/Wedgewood
Dynasty Adversely Affected by Consanguinity?, 60 BIOSCIENCE 376, 382 (2010) (“Our answer . . .
is yes.”).
17
Apology Act for the 1930’s Mexican Repatriation Program, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8720–23
(West 2022); MILLER, supra note 6, at 138–39; JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL:
THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 35 (2017).
18
See MILLER, supra note 6, at 98–99.
19
Id. at 102–03; MARY TRUMP, TOO MUCH AND NEVER ENOUGH 211 (2020).
20
428 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976).
21
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
22
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 963
(1987) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Constitutional] (“Balancing was a progressive, up-beat, ‘can-do’
judicial attitude.”); Nourse, Buck, supra note 13, at 114 (noting that Holmes “believed that the
Constitution could be reduced to ad hoc balancing”).
23
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001); cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining
Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 378–
79 (2002) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Detaining] (predicting that Zadvydas could create grounds for
cost/benefit balancing tests).
24
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
25
Id. at 699–701.
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In 2018, Jennings v. Rodriguez limited Zadvydas’s “6-month time limit”
to its facts, without ruling upon the statute’s constitutionality.26 After Jennings,
well-meaning district judges began to assert rational cost/benefit balancing tests
to determine the constitutionality of asylum seeker detentions on an ad hoc basis
under Zadvydas.27 However, this ad hoc strategy may now be unworkable as a
result of Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez28 and Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez.29
This article will respond in six parts: Part I will explain how cost/benefit
balancing tests grew up under Zadvydas after Jennings; Part II will demonstrate
why a Suspension Clause approach is preferable for asylum seekers; Part III will
examine why cost/benefit balancing tests don’t really exist; Part IV will describe
what was lost in the age of balancing; Part V will reveal what is actually going
on when a cost/benefit balancing test is applied; and finally, Part VI will present
the common law as the proper empirical alternative to cost/benefit balancing
tests.

26

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 846 (2018), extended by Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez,
142 S. Ct. 1827, 1833–34 (2022) (applying Jennings to the same statutory provision that Zadvydas
construed, and distinguishing Zadvydas as incorrectly decided); Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252,
255 (9th Cir. 2018). Paradoxically, in Dobbs, Justice Alito wrote for the Court to imply that the
judiciary should not “flout[] . . . the rule that statutes should be read where possible to avoid
unconstitutionality”—which is exactly what he did in Jennings. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2276 (2022).
27
See, e.g., Singh v. Barr, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1020–21 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (citing both
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690); Banda v. McAleenan,
385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (developing the six-factor Jamal balancing test
under Zadvydas, inspired by Mathews), extending Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858–
60 (D. Minn. 2019); Alexandre v. Decker, No. 17-5706, 2018 WL 5619975 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(developing another new five-prong balancing test under Zadvydas despite Jennings). But see Soto
v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-02891-EMC, 2018 WL 3619727 at *3–5 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (denying habeas
relief under Zadvydas by using a Mathews balancing test).
28
Arteaga-Martinez, 142 S. Ct. at 1834–35 (refusing to decide whether a statute is
constitutional after deciding that it was impossible to construe the statute in a way that avoids a
serious conflict with the constitution), extending Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846. Arteaga-Martinez
appears to be a complete nullification of Zadvydas’s statutory construction; however, there is an
extremely slight possibility that the Court could effectively resurrect Zadvydas after the lower
courts decide the Due Process Clause issue, but this is unlikely and difficult to imagine. But see
Arteaga-Martinez, 142 S. Ct. at 1838 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]n
my view, Zadvydas applies (the Court does not hold to the contrary), and the parties are free to
argue about the proper way to implement Zadvydas’ standard in this context, and, if necessary, to
consider the underlying constitutional question, a matter that this Court has not yet decided.”).
29
Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 142 S. Ct. 2057, 2074 (2022) (appearing to paradoxically gut
classwide injunctions in the immigrant habeas context even where the court enjoins unlawful
agency action as the statute appears to require).
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PART I: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY IN ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS
Over the centuries, the American judiciary imbibed both medicines and
poisons under the name of due process.30 The spectral evidence, hearsay, and
coerced confessions that helped the Puritan judiciary secure death sentences for
the witches of Salem, Massachusetts, remain standard misapplications of due
process.31 But there are several other American miscarriages of due process that
stand out including, Dred Scott v. Sandford,32 Buck v. Bell,33 and Lochner v. New
York.34
Against a backdrop of America’s due process blunders, the decision in
Zadvydas v. Davis can appear as a ray of light.35 It can be valorized as something
like a star reaching through the vast abyss to give us hope.36 Zadvydas decided
that, under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act
of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), the U.S. government could not detain immigrants on an
indefinite basis without showing reasonable cause.37
The idea that the Due Process Clause applies to immigrants, and is not
cut off by national borders or plenary powers as the government argued, seems

30

See Victoria Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due
Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 752–53 (2009) [hereinafter
Nourse, A Tale].
31
Len Niehoff, Proof at the Salem Witch Trials, ABA (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation_journal/2020-21/fall/proofsalem-witch-trials/ (“[I]t was a bad time for justice and due process.”); see Wendel D. Craker,
Spectral Evidence, Non-Spectral Acts of Witchcraft, and Confession at Salem in 1692, 40 HIST. J.
331, 332–33, 336 (1997); cf. Bradley Chapin, Written Rights: Puritan and Quaker Procedural
Guarantees, 114 PENN. MAG. 323, 324, 334 (1990) (explaining the pre-revolutionary version of
due process developed by the Puritans and Quakers in the 1600s).
32
60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857) (enslaved party), analyzed by Blanche Bong Cook, Johnny
Appleseed: Citizenship Transmission Laws and a White Heteropatriarchal Property Right in
Philandering, Sexual Exploitation, and Rape (the “WHP”) or Johnny and the WHP, 31 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 57, 64 n.27 (2019); cf. Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 31
CONST. COMM. 253, 271 (2016) (explaining the due process blunders made in Dred Scott).
33
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); cf. Nourse, Buck, supra note 13, at 110 (noting that though Buck
“insist[ed] that procedural due process had not been violated[,] . . . the procedural due process to
which Carrie Buck was entitled was largely illusory”).
34
198 U.S. 45, 63–64 (1905), validity questioned by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963);
cf. Greene, supra note 32, at 271 (explaining the due process blunders made in Lochner).
35
See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Detaining, supra note 23, at 386 (explaining the Zadvydas
“conundrum,” that “it will be seen as an important monument to human rights,” but that “it will
have little generative power”; Zadvydas is like “the sun [positioned] directly overhead, it will shine
brightly but cast almost no shadow”).
36
See id.
37
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–701 (2001) (“[I]f removal is not reasonably
foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by
statute.”).
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to be a good thing for immigrants.38 In comparison with the prospect of no legal
process, Zadvydas moved in a positive direction.39 But if we take Justice
Holmes’s definition of the “law” as prophecy seriously, then the idea of legal
due process may not be so straight forward.40
Behind its liberal tone, Zadvydas has several problems.41 For one,
Zadvydas limited its decision to those who already “entered” the United States.42
In so doing, Zadvydas was unclear about how it meant to distinguish
Shaughnessy v. Mezei,43 and appeared to suggest that habeas jurisdiction could
be limited according to certain classes of prisoner.44 This is a fundamental
problem because habeas corpus does not run to the prisoner, but the custodian.45
Zadvydas never mentioned that Mezei was a World War II decision,46
nor that Mezei arose under officially declared World War II war powers.47
38
Id.; cf. Aleinikoff, Detaining, supra note 23, at 386 (comparing the pros and cons of
Zadvydas from the immigrant perspective).
39
Aleinikoff, Detaining, supra note 23, at 366 (noting that Zadvydas “may represent a radical
shift, a turning point for immigration law no less important than Miranda v. Arizona and Mapp v.
Ohio for criminal procedure, Baker v. Carr for equal protection, and Goldberg v. Kelly for due
process”). But see id. at 374 (noting the Zadvydas Court’s “unwillingness to reconsider Mezei
preserves a foundational case in the plenary power edifice”); id. at 388 (“[A] better Zadvydas
opinion would have held that due process applies to all immigration proceedings in the United
States.”).
40
Compare Holmes, Jr., The Path, supra note 1, at 457–59, with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
207 (1927).
41
See Aleinikoff, Detaining, supra note 23, at 366, 374, 388.
42
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693–94.
43
Id., distinguishing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); cf.
Aleinikoff, Detaining, supra note 23, at 374 (describing Zadvydas’s “unwillingness to reconsider
Mezei” as an error that “preserves a foundational case in the plenary power edifice”).
44
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693–94 (appearing to divide immigrants between those who “have
once passed through our gates” and those who have not), extending a distinction made by Mezei,
345 U.S. at 212, corrected by Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S.
at 218–19 (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
45
See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973) (“The writ of habeas
corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what
is alleged to be unlawful custody.”), extended by Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004),
refined by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008).
46
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692–93.
47
Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 n.7 (1953) (citing Act of June 21, 1941, 55 Stat.
252, Presidential Proclamation No. 2523, 6 Fed. Reg. 5821, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio
Address
Announcing
an
Unlimited
National
Emergency,
May
27,
1941,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-address-announcing-unlimited-nationalemergency). The issue of whether a declaration of war is required before the executive department
is constitutionally allowed to access legitimate war powers is still an open question. Holmes v.
United States, 391 U.S. 936, 949 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“I think we owe to those who
are being marched off to jail for maintaining that a declaration of war is essential for conscription
an answer to this important undecided constitutional question.”); cf. Joshua J. Schroeder, Leviathan
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Zadvydas failed to explain how Ahrens v. Clark,48 a World War II case similar
to Mezei, was overruled in Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ky.49 Zadvydas did not
anticipate Boumediene v. Bush,50 which extended the writ to release prisoners
from Guantanamo Bay (“GTMO”), a black site prison run by the United States
in a foreign country.51
Furthermore, Zadvydas rests on an absurdity.52 The words “limited” and
“plenary” are antonyms;53 thus, Zadvydas’s statement that “Congress has
‘plenary power’ to create immigration law . . . subject to important constitutional
limitations” is a clear oxymoron.54 The paradoxical idea that limited-plenary
power can exist is a Hegelianism that originated in Prigg v. Pennsylvania55 to

Goes to Washington: How to Assert the Separation of Powers in Defense of Future Generations,
15 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 1, 67 n.402 (2021) [hereinafter Schroeder, Leviathan] (providing context
regarding the Court’s decision not to decide the issue of whether the president can constitutionally
access war powers without an official declaration of war).
48
335 U.S. 188 (1948).
49
10 U.S. at 499–500; id. at 502 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Today the Court overrules Ahrens
v. Clark . . . .”), not mentioned by Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693–94.
50
Compare Boumediene, 553 U.S. with Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001), extended
by Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528–29 (2004) (plurality opinion), failing to inspire further
litigation as acknowledged by Al-Alwi v. Trump, 139 S. Ct. 1893, 1894 (2019) (citing Hussain v.
Obama, 572 U.S. 1079) (2014) (Statement of Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari)) (arguing
that “it is past time to confront the difficult question left open by Hamdi”); cf. Mark Joseph Stern,
Stephen Breyer Is Worried About the Forever War’s Permanent Prisoners. He’s 15 Years Too
Late, SLATE (June 10, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/06/stephen-breyer-aumfdissent-gitmo-scotus.html (connecting Breyer’s vote to apply a balancing test in Hamdi to recent
cases of indefinite immigrant detention).
51
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753 (“Guantanamo Bay is not formally part of the United
States. And under the terms of the lease between the United States and Cuba, Cuba retains ‘ultimate
sovereignty’ over the territory while the United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and
control.’”) (citation omitted); id. at 755 (noting that the United States “retains de jure sovereignty
over Guantanamo Bay”).
52
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (“Congress has ‘plenary power’ to create immigration law . . . but
that power is subject to important constitutional limitations.”).
53
Plenary, THESAURUS.COM, https://www.thesaurus.com/browse/plenary (last visited Aug. 19,
2022) (showing an antonym for “plenary” is “limited”); see also Plenary, DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/plenary (last visited Aug. 26, 2022).
54
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695; Aleinikoff, Detaining, supra note 23, at 366 (calling the
statement discussed here a “laconic, astonishingly casual phrase [that] may represent a radical shift,
a turning point for immigration law”); cf. Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 142 S. Ct. 2057, 2065–66
(2022) (arguably extending Zadvydas’s embrace of paradox by deciding that the Court’s equitable
prohibition of illegal acts is itself unlawful); id. at 11 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing this paradoxical writing: “Officials may implement a
statute unlawfully, but a statute does not operate in conflict with itself.”).
55
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
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destroy the rights of immigrant, former slaves escaping to Pennsylvania from the
South.56
Zadvydas’s paradoxical concessions to the government, especially by
not overruling Mezei, played out in DHS v. Thuraissigiam.57 Over Justice
Sotomayor’s ringing dissent, Thuraissigiam implied that immigrants held in
detention centers within the United States somehow did not physically enter the
country, as if prisoner location were relevant to habeas jurisdiction.58 Shortly
thereafter, Thuraissigiam was cited to vacate the habeas writ of a lawful
permanent resident.59
Thuraissigiam also made broad statements regarding federal plenary
powers and sovereign prerogatives to detain and deport immigrants with or
without due process.60 Thuraissigiam’s statements about the limitations of
immigrant due process were dicta, and therefore not binding law.61 However,
Thuraissigiam revealed the sole basis of its findings was the dicta it took from

56
Id. at 611; id. at 654 (Daniel, J., concurring) (quoting Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 48–50
(1820) (Story, J., dissenting)); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, THE TANNER
LECTURES ON HUM. VALUES 79, 119 (Mar. 8 & 9, 1995) [hereinafter Scalia, Common] (doctrines
that come from slave cases are suspect); see Joshua J. Schroeder, We Will All Be Free or None Will
Be: Why Federal Power Is not Plenary, but Limited and Supreme, 27 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 1,
24, 37, 59 (2021) [hereinafter Schroeder, We Will] (“the idea of absolute and limited powers is an
oxymoron” that “manifest[ed] a horror in Prigg,” in which the Court “overrule[d] a state sanctuary
law” for runaway slaves); Alan Brudner, Constitutional Monarchy as the Divine Regime: Hegel’s
Theory of the Just State, 2 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 119, 128–30 (1981) (“[T]his self-contradictoriness
of the isolated Crown is precisely the fulcrum on which hinges the key affirmation of Hegel’s
political philosophy.”); cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR ESSAYS 19–20 (1921) [hereinafter
RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR] (explaining why Hegel is absurd).
57
DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1983 (2020) (“[A]n alien who is detained shortly
after unlawful entry cannot be said to have ‘effected an entry.’ Like an alien detained after arriving
at a port of entry, an alien like respondent is ‘on the threshold.’ The rule advocated by respondent
and adopted by the Ninth Circuit would undermine the ‘sovereign prerogative’ of governing
admission to this country and create a perverse incentive to enter at an unlawful rather than a lawful
location.” (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693, Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953),
and Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)) (citations omitted)).
58
See cases cited supra note 57; Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 2012 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Fifth Amendment, which of course long predated any admissions program, does not
contain limits based on immigration status or duration in the country: It applies to ‘persons’ without
qualification.”).
59
Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 78 (2d Cir. 2019), vac’d sub nom. Pham v. Ragbir, 141 S.
Ct. 227 (2020) (exclusively citing Thuraissigiam to vacate Ragbir on a writ of certiorari).
60
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982.
61
Id. at 1975 (dismissing under Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to draft the habeas petition correctly,
not based on a new interpretation of the Due Process Clause); Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, No. 17cv-02366, 2021 WL 3931890, at *13 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (citing Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982–
83).
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Landon v. Plasencia,62 a cost/benefit balancing case, which it cited as if it were
the law.63
Finally, Zadvydas suggested that IIRIRA “liberalizes” the immigration
system,64 and it is true that there are at least two changes wrought by IIRIRA that
may be touted as beneficial to immigrants.65 But on the whole, this was an unjust
mischaracterization.66 The more pressing question after Niz-Chavez and Pereira
is whether any of IIRIRA’s mandates on the government are enforceable at all,
as the government routinely flouts them.67
Zadvydas was decided three days after INS v. St. Cyr confirmed the
constitutionality of IIRIRA under the Suspension Clause.68 In 2001, when St. Cyr
and Zadvydas were decided, the Court believed that it could regulate DHS and
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR” or “Immigration Court”)
through its appellate rulings on bond hearings.69 But this belief predated DHS

62

Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1980 (setting aside Nishimura Ekiu, Knauff, and Mezei,
among other decisions from the eugenics and WWII eras, as superseded by law, and leaving only
Landon’s dicta from the 1980s as a basis for its plenary power ideology); id. at 1982 (quoting
Landon, 459 U.S. at 32).
64
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 698 (2001).
65
The first change IIRIRA made that is touted as beneficial to immigrants was “shortening the
removal period from six months to 90 days,” as stated in Zadvydas. Id. The second change that is
touted as beneficial to immigrants is IIRIRA’s requirement that DHS include both time and
location information on all Notices to Appear, which was recently upheld in Pereira and NizChavez. Oral Argument at 00:10, Niz-Chavez v. Barr, 141 S. Ct. 84 (2020) (No. 19-863),
https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/72822/niz-chavez-v-barr/; Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct.
1474, 1478–79 (2021), extended by Rodriguez v. Garland, 15 F. 4th 351, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2021);
see Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018), extended by Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396,
401 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he clear statutory command [is] that time and place information be
included in all Notices to Appear.”) (emphasis in original); cf. Singh v. Garland, 24 F.4th 1215,
1320 (9th Cir. 2022) (prescribing “rescission pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)” wherever
a defective NTA is used to justify an order of removal in absentia).
66
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001); see Lucas Guttentag, “Court-Stripping” in the
1996 Immigration Laws: A Dangerous Precedent, 20 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 213, 218–19
(1997).
67
See, e.g., Matter of LaParra, 28 I&N Dec. 425, 436 (BIA 2022), disagreeing with Rodriguez,
15 F.4th at 354–56; cf. Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 142 S. Ct. 2057, 2065 (2022) (interpreting
the provisions of IIRIRA as a prohibition on the court from enjoining unlawful violations of
IIRIRA).
68
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 312–14 n.36 (“[W]e conclude that habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was
not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA,” because “[a]t no point . . . does IIRIRA make express
reference to § 2241. Given the historic use of § 2241 jurisdiction as a means of reviewing
deportation and exclusion orders, Congress’ failure to refer specifically to § 2241 is particularly
significant.”).
69
See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683 (using habeas corpus to only decide whether EOIR should
release immigrants “on bond or paroled,” rather than applying the traditional form of relief, which
is release pending legitimate process).
63
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and EOIR’s decades-long refusal to comply with the clear statutory text of
IIRIRA.70
As DHS and EOIR do not follow controlling U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, attempting to regulate EOIR through appellate process cannot be a
functional equivalent for habeas corpus.71 St. Cyr may have been decided
differently if the Court foresaw that Matter of LaParra would be the eventual
result.72 Boumediene confirmed that an express repeal of § 2241 was an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ,73 but the Court has not yet decided how
to resolve an inquisitorial, Star Chamber system that grows increasingly bold in
its decisions to separate from the control of both the U.S. Supreme Court and
Congress.74
Something analogous happened when the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld75 plurality
attempted to extend Zadvydas and Mathews v. Eldridge to protect a U.S.
citizen.76 In the end, the U.S. military embarrassed the court by ignoring Hamdi,
stripping a U.S. citizen of his citizenship, deporting him to Saudi Arabia, and
putting him on a no-fly list.77 The eminent American jurist Dahlia Lithwick
identified the military’s response to Hamdi as an attempt to “eras[e] the episode
from our national memory.”78

70

See cases cited supra notes 65, 67.
See cases cited supra notes 65, 67; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683; cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 764, 780 (2008) (applying a functional approach to habeas jurisdiction that allows the
direct review of “exculpatory evidence that was either unknown or previously unavailable to the
prisoner”).
72
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313–14; Matter of LaParra, 28 I&N at 436 (refusing to follow the U.S.
Supreme Court’s recitation of clear statutory law).
73
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733 (“Therefore § 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e), operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.”).
74
Matter of LaParra, 28 I&N at 436 (flouting the plain meaning of IIRIRA as recognized in
Pereira and Niz-Chavez); cf. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, OLIVIER SIBONY & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NOISE: A
FLAW IN HUMAN JUDGMENT 6–7, 91, 174 (2021) [hereinafter KAHNEMAN, NOISE] (citing JAYA
RAMJI-NOGALES & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION
90 (2007)) (explaining the arbitrary nature of Immigration Court); Deborah E. Anker, Determining
Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an
Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 496–501 (1992)
(explaining the inquisitorial nature of EOIR).
75
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
76
Id. at 528–29 (plurality opinion) (“The ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such
serious competing interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a
citizen is not ‘deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,’ U.S. Const. Amdt.
5, is the test we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge . . . .” (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683, 690,
and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976))).
77
Dahlia Lithwick, Nevermind: Hamdi Wasn’t So Bad After All, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2004),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/09/hamdi-wasn-t-so-bad-after-all.html
[hereinafter
Lithwick, Nevermind].
78
Id.
71
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Now the Court sometimes cites Justice Scalia’s Hamdi dissent as the
correct exposition of habeas law.79 Luckily, Hamdi’s sister case, Rasul v. Bush,80
was eventually extended in Boumediene v. Bush, along the lines of Felker and
St. Cyr, to overrule express suspensions of habeas corpus by Congress.81 The
reality, finally affirmed by Boumediene, was that habeas jurisdiction does not
necessarily depend upon the scope or even the existence of the due process rights
of the prisoner.82
Thus, the habeas attorney should not despair if Zadvydas is affirmatively
overruled by the Court.83 If petitioners claimed due process as the origin of
habeas corpus jurisdiction, their petitions may now be dismissed according to the
dicta strongly stated in Thuraissigiam.84 But none of this would upset or disturb
the long line of common law precedents affirming Suspension Clause
jurisdiction over the jailer that pinnacled in Boumediene.85
When taken out of the context of St. Cyr’s Suspension Clause analysis,
Zadvydas might appear to justify jurisdiction directly under the Due Process

79
DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1978 (2020) (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 563 (Scalia,
J., dissenting)); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 564 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)); cf. Stern, supra note 50 (“Scalia was right in Hamdi, and his dissent grew more
prescient with time.”).
80
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
81
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734, extending Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473 (2004); cf. Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 619–20 (2006) (explaining how “partially in response to subsequent
criticism of General Yamashita’s trial,” the Geneva Convention effectively stripped Yamashita “of
its precedential value”); id. at 593 (construing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), narrowly under
the Geneva Convention as it was later amended to protect prisoners of war).
82
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1956) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in result)) (applying a functional approach to the Court’s jurisdiction over a U.S.
military base in a foreign country, in which the petitioner’s U.S. citizenship or lack thereof was not
dispositive of the Court’s jurisdiction); id. at 762–63 (clarifying the critical factors in Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)); cf. Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95
(1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.”).
83
Cf. David Gauvey Herbert, There is an Unlikely Legal Loophole That Lets Stateless
Undocumented
Immigrants
Stay
in
the
US,
QUARTZ (Feb.
22,
2017),
https://qz.com/916027/undocumented-immigrants-hoping-to-stay-in-the-us-have-two-legalloopholes-but-theyre-longshots-at-best/ (exemplifying the way some conservatives like to bait
liberals by ranting about Zadvydas as if it were the bane of Trump’s immigration policies, when in
actuality Zadvydas is the exact minimum the court could do for detained immigrants).
84
See cases cited supra note 59.
85
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (citing INS v. St. Cyr and Felker v. Turpin, as the most recent
exemplars of the rule that habeas corpus “analysis may begin with precedents as of 1789, for the
Court has said that ‘at the absolute minimum’ the [Suspension] Clause protects the writ as it existed
when the Constitution was drafted and ratified” (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 (2001))); see also
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1969 (“[T]he [Suspension] Clause, at a minimum, ‘protects the writ
as it existed in 1789.’” (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301)).
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Clause.86 Zadvydas suggested that due process alone secured the constitutionality
of immigration law under the Suspension Clause.87 Indeed, the idea that due
process is either above or separate from a proper Suspension Clause analysis
seems to be an error with which the U.S. Supreme Court continues to struggle.88
In 2018, the Court was briefed to determine the due process rights of
immigrants according to Zadvydas in Jennings v. Rodriguez.89 But Jennings
refused to determine the constitutionality of immigrant detention, while also
limiting the implied correctives of Zadvydas that were intended to make the
statute constitutional.90 We are now living through the errors caused by the
Jennings Court that took Zadvydas out of context by unduly ignoring both St.
Cyr and Boumediene.91
After Jennings’s failure to either confirm or deny the constitutionality of
IIRIRA under the Due Process Clause, several district court judges began
asserting the Due Process Clause to give immigrants Zadvydas-like relief on an
ad hoc basis.92 They drew inspiration from Mathews cost/benefit balancing tests
to see if habeas corpus required more process in EOIR, such as bond hearings.93
This short-lived strategy seems to have run into trouble, however, as Zadvydas’s
balancing-test-based presumption of the unconstitutionality of indefinite
immigrant detention was nullified by Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez and equitably
gutted by Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez.94

86
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“But once an alien enters the country, the
legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.”); cf. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 846 (2018) (failing to consider a
Suspension Clause analysis in lieu of Zadvydas’s due process precedent).
87
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
88
Id.; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528–29 (2004) (plurality opinion); Jennings, 138 S.
Ct. at 846.
89
Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 875 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Were the majority’s suggestion correct
as to this jurisdictional question, it would have shown, at most, that we should decide the
constitutional question here and now. We have already asked for and received briefs on that
question.”).
90
Id. at 846; Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 2018).
91
Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 142 S. Ct. 1827, 1838 (2022) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (offering a slim, likely false, hope that in future proceedings “Zadvydas
[still] applies,” because the Court distinguished Zadvydas here by nullifying its statutory
construction); Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 875 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
92
See cases cited supra note 27.
93
See cases cited supra note 27.
94
See supra notes 28–29, 63 and accompanying text; Arteaga-Martinez, 142 S. Ct. at 1834
(nullifying Zadvydas’s presumption of unconstitutionality); Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 142 S.
Ct. 2057, 2065–66 (2022) (appearing to paradoxically gut class-wide injunctions in the immigrant
habeas context, in a way that potentially extends to all immigration law, even where the court
enjoins unlawful agency action), extended by Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 2528, 2538–39 (2022).
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Arteaga-Martinez and Aleman Gonzalez directly preceded several
decisions in which the Court embraced cost/benefit balancing tests in an
exceedingly paradoxical way.95 These paradoxical decisions were perhaps most
visible when Dobbs overruled Casey’s “undue burden” balancing test,96 with a
Janus five factor balancing test97:
In this case, five factors weigh strongly in favor of overruling
Roe and Casey: [I] the nature of their error, [II] the quality of
their reasoning, [III] the “workability” of the rules they imposed
on the country, [IV] their disruptive effect on other areas of the
law, and [V] the absence of concrete reliance.98
The Court used this Janus balancing test to “return the power to weigh those
arguments” regarding the costs and benefits of allowing abortions to the states,99
after Bruen overruled an over century-old state law regulating gun purchases by
referring to the Second Amendment as “the very product of an interest balancing

95
Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. 2486, 2504–05 (2022) (balancing away Native
American sovereignty that was finally reaffirmed only two years prior in McGirt v. Oklahoma and
appearing to contradict both Torres v. Dep’t Pub. Safety and Denezpi also decided in the same
term); Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2427 (2022) (supplanting the Lemon test
with a practical balancing test in a way that seems to contradict Shurtleff v. Boston); id. at 2434
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority “overrules Lemon”); Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2236, 2257, 2264–65, 2278 (2022) (overruling
Roe and Casey’s interest-balancing test with Janus’s anti-stare decisis balancing test, stating:
“Ordered liberty sets limits and defines the boundary between competing interests. . . . Our
Nation’s historical understanding of ordered liberty does not prevent the people’s elected
representatives from deciding how abortion should be regulated.” Furthermore, this decision
extended Janus’s five factor balancing test to apply to potentially all existing precedent about
fundamental human rights, in which the Court further reduced Roe v. Wade to a simple cost/benefit
balancing exercise, which it preserved for the states to apply rather than the federal judiciary—i.e.,
this decision contains balancing tests within balancing tests, wheels within wheels.); NYSRPA v.
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2131 (2022) (rejecting “interest balancing” tests, by asserting the superior
interest balancing test embodied the Second Amendment according to Heller); Vega v. Tekoh, 142
S. Ct. 2095, 2106–07 (2022) (holding that Miranda warnings are not an actual “law” under the
constitution, rather, it “should apply ‘only where its benefits outweigh its costs’”); Egbert v. Boule,
142 S. Ct. 1793, 1805 (2022) (applying a one-step, pro-government cost/benefit balancing test);
Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718, 1732, 1736 (2022) ((justifying prudential bars to habeas
jurisdiction by weighing “the many benefits . . . and the substantial costs” in order to deny habeas
review for “actual-innocence”), extended by Shoop v. Twyford, 142 S. Ct. 2037, 2044–45 (2022);
cf. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S.
21, 32 (1982) (applying a Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test)) (demonstrating how the Court used
a balancing test case to extend plenary power doctrine).
96
Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2242, 2249, 2259, overruling Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
97
Janus v. AFSCME Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
98
Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2265.
99
Id. at 2259.
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by the people.”100 As exemplified by Dobbs and Bruen, the Court frequently
claimed similar populist justifications for contradictory results, closely
resembling the French l’appel au peuple that infamously ended in a reign of
terror.101
The 2021 term pinnacled in a cluster of contradictory logic when Biden
v. Texas affirmed Secretary Mayorkas’s application of a cost/benefit balancing
test to rescind the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”).102 Paradoxically, in an
opinion issued on the same day, West Virginia v. EPA decided that the EPA’s
application of a statutorily required balancing test was constitutionally wrong.103
In direct contradiction with West Virginia v. EPA’s newly fashioned “major
question doctrine,”104 Biden v. Texas extended Aleman Gonzalez’s abdication of
the Court’s emphatic Marbury-duty to consider whether the Migrant Protection
Protocols (“MPP”) were illegal,105 and Jennings’ similar abdication of the
Court’s “emphatic province and duty” to decide whether the MPP was
unconstitutional.106

100
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2131 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Joshua J. Schroeder,
America’s Written Constitution: Remembering the Judicial Duty to Say What the Law Is, 43 CAP.
U. L. REV. 833, 860–62 (2015) [hereinafter Schroeder, America’s] (explaining the pre-Janus case
law that abandoned stare decisis prior to Justice Alito’s development of his Janus balancing test
in 2018).
101
See cases cited supra notes 94–98; Alexandre Deleyre, Opinion D’Alexandre Deleyre,
Député par le Département de la Gironde, Contre l’appel au peuple, sur le jugement de Louis XVI
1 (1793); Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (July 11, 1793),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0140 (“Is the Minister of the
French Republic to set the Acts of this Government at defiance—with impunity? and then threaten
the Executive with an appeal to the People.”).
102
Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 2528, 2537, 2543 (2022) (quoting the cost/benefit analysis
Secretary Mayorkas used to justify rescission of the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”), but
failing to rule the MPP unconstitutional in such a way that immigrants on the border will benefit
because Biden’s Title 42 replacement for the MPP remains in force).
103
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2629 (2022) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining the
cost/benefit balancing tests that the EPA is statutorily empowered to engage in to determine “the
‘best system of emission reduction which . . . has been adequately demonstrated’” (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1))); id. at 2601 (majority opinion) (ignoring Chevron and the plain meaning of
statutory text by precluding EPA from reaching a regulatory conclusion by balancing impacts of
EPA regulation in the way the statute requires—basically deciding that EPA did its balancing test
wrong).
104
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2605.
105
Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 142 S. Ct. 2057, 2063 (2022) (interpreting a law stripping the
courts of the authority to “enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions” of the Immigration &
Nationality Act (“INA”) so broadly that the courts may no longer enjoin contraventions and
violations of that law by the government), followed by Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. at 2538.
106
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 843, 851 (2018) (“Spotting a constitutional issue does
not give a court the authority to rewrite a statute as it pleases.”), followed by Aleman Gonzalez, 142
S. Ct. at 2065, and Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. at 2538.
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As disappointing as Biden v. Texas was for failing to affirmatively
invalidate the MPP under the law of nonrefoulement,107 the Hobbs Act,108 and
the separation of powers,109 the Court still managed to repudiate two of Justice
107
U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1984), S. Treaty Doc. 100–20 (1988) (“For the
purpose of determining whether there are such grounds [to require releasing immigrants into the
United States as refugees protected by CAT], the competent authorities [of the signatories
including the United States government] shall take into account all relevant considerations.”), not
followed by Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. at 2543 (noting that “section 1225(b)(2)(C) [did not]
authorize[] the District Court to force the Executive to the bargaining table with Mexico, over a
policy that both countries wish to terminate, and to supervise its continuing negotiations with
Mexico to ensure that they are conducted ‘in good faith’”—seeming to treat the existing treaties
mandating nonrefoulement that both Mexico and the United States are signatories of as optional,
and as if Congress could simply break or repeal our treaties with foreign countries at will, even
though treaties in conjunction with the president’s foreign affairs power (i.e., not Congress) govern
whether the United State can legally deport, remove, or extradite immigrants to foreign countries);
cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”); Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 641–42 (Vt. 1840),
extending Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 561 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.) (releasing an
immigrant suspected of committing murder in Canada into the United States for lack of an
extradition treaty with Canada or England).
108
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951 (West 2022). Violating the Convention Against Torture and
other treaties by establishing the MPP in an attempt to use Mexico as a dumping ground for
immigrants as a deterrent to immigration in exchange for the political and financial support of the
Trump’s base is an actual or attempted extortion affecting foreign commerce, and political and
financial support of Trump’s base is a tangible or intangible thing of value. Id., not considered by
Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. at 2538 (legitimizing the MPP as something a president may enforce or
rescind at will under current law); cf. United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 59–60 (7th Cir. 1975)
(“[T]he commerce element of a Hobbs Act violation—the federal jurisdictional fact—may be
satisfied even if the record demonstrates that the extortion had no actual effect on commerce.”);
United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1967) (extending Hobbs Act violations to
failures to act, like withholding a building permit); Ishaan Tharoor, Mexican Lawmaker Proposes
Revoking Treaties with U.S. if Trump Gets His Way, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2016, 1:44 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/09/06/mexican-lawmakerproposes-revoking-treaties-with-u-s-if-trump-gets-his-way/ (noting that a bill was proposed in
Mexico that would empower the Mexican government to “retaliate against Trump’s potentially
hostile policies . . . includ[ing] giving the Mexican Senate the power to review dozens of existing
bilateral treaties with the United States, including the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, where
Mexico ceded more than half a million square miles of its territory to the United States”).
109
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2609 (citing “separation of powers principles” to preclude
the EPA from coming to a certain cost/benefit balancing test conclusion), not followed by Biden v.
Texas, 142 S. Ct. at 2537, 2543 (endorsing Secretary Mayorkas’s conclusion that “the [MPP]
program’s ‘benefits do not justify the costs’” while ultimately falling short of answering more
important questions about whether such policies as the MPP or the newer Title 42 exclusion policy
comport with U.S. treaty obligations and the separation of powers issues broached in cases like
Curtiss-Wright about Congress’s limited role in checking the president’s foreign affairs power),
citing and following Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 23 (2015) (quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning,
573 U.S. 513, 524 (2014)), to justify not answering important constitutional questions, and rather
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Alito’s most radical and insane theories.110 First, Alito unequivocally lost his
argument that Jennings should be the final say about the law, regardless of its
constitutionality, i.e., Alito failed to wipe Marbury v. Madison111 off the map.112
Second, Alito lost his argument that Jennings should mean that immigrants can
be ordered deported to Mexico by the courts pending their asylum applications
without due process and against the will of the sitting president,113 an argument
he previously attempted to solidify through soul-crushing Thuraissigiam dicta
purporting to reverse a Ninth Circuit due process decision that the Ninth Circuit
never made.114 For the time being, this argument was deflated in Arteagadeferring to executive practice that the Noel Canning Court misappropriated from Justice
Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952));
Schroeder, America’s, supra note 100, at 850 (2015) (describing how Noel Canning “cited to the
dicta in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence [in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer] about a
‘gloss’ on presidential power without regarding the rule,” ultimately supplanting and contradicting
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown).
110
Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. at 2554 (Alito, J., dissenting).
111
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
112
Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). In Biden v. Texas, Justice Alito argued that the Government made
an inappropriate “about-face” from Jennings, because “the Government argues that ‘shall be
detained’ actually means ‘may be detained.’” Id. Thereby, Alito failed to consider whether the U.S.
Constitution either implicitly or explicitly limits the statutory language Alito relied upon in
Jennings either by the structure of the U.S. Constitution and/or by and through existing treaties
like the U.N. Convention Against Torture. Id. The U.S. Constitution and several U.S. multilateral
treaties including the U.N. Convention Against Torture appear to directly contradict the statutory
construction in Jennings by requiring its signatory governments to provide due process to
determine whether a prospective refugee is in fact a refugee or not prior to removing them from
the country, a question which would also presumably recognize the asylee/refugee legal status that
would clearly distinguish the “shall be detained” language from taking any legitimate effect at any
time even before the Government has a chance to process asylum claims. Id. Another way of saying
this is that Justice Alito improperly presumed that the U.S. Government would always act upon an
almost ethereal plenary power ideology and without any clear legal, textual support to continue
detaining, sometimes for years on end, refugees that have not yet had a chance to prove their
refugee status whether or not Trump was voted out of office. Id.
113
Id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing to the Trump administration’s moot arguments in Jennings,
Alito argued: “The Government was correct in Jennings and is wrong here. ‘[S]hall be detained’
means ‘shall be detained.’”). This was not a case challenging prolonged immigrant detentions, but
the Fifth Circuit’s decision to force the Biden administration to keep the MPP program that
removed immigrants from the United States prior to receiving any due process to decide whether
they, in fact, are in the class of immigrant that the law says “shall” be detained, and thereby in
Alito’s view, removable without due process of law. Id.
114
Joshua J. Schroeder, Conservative Progressivism in Immigrant Habeas Court: Why
Boumediene v. Bush Is the Baseline Constitutional Minimum, 45 THE HARBINGER 46, 56 (2021)
[hereinafter Schroeder, Conservative] (“The U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, overstepped its
bounds as a Court of last review, when it foreclosed Mr. Thuraissigiam’s due process rights before
the lower courts issued a decision about them. Then it compared the common law habeas remedy
of release with deportation saying, ‘the Government is happy to release him—provided the release
occurs in the cabin of a plane bound for Sri Lanka.’” (quoting DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct.
1959, 1969–71 (2020))); cf. Angelika Albaladejo, A Drunk Mechanic, Shackled Immigrants, a
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Martinez, where Justice Sotomayor, speaking for the Court, followed Jennings’s
refusal to decide constitutional questions not considered in the courts below and
thus repeated the age old principle that the Supreme Court is “‘a court of review,
not of first view.’”115
By the end of the 2021 term, though fractured on political-ideological
lines, the entire U.S. Supreme Court appeared to use cost/benefit balancing tests
to achieve conflicting political ends. The mercenary nature of cost/benefit
balancing tests emphasized the arbitrariness they represent. At the moment, the
protean nature of cost/benefit balancing approaches, though beleaguered,
appears to be the only baseline the entire U.S. Supreme Court is willing to agree
upon.
PART II: WHY JUSTICE FOR IMMIGRANTS DEPENDS ON THE SUSPENSION
CLAUSE
Cost/benefit balancing tests purportedly exist under the Due Process
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and purport to answer what process is “due.”116
Due process is meant to be of the law, but there are several examples of due
process overruling or modifying the law for violating substantive rights.117
Theoretically, the law applied in substantive due process cases is the rights and
liberties embodied in the U.S. Constitution itself as a paramount law according
to the Ninth Amendment.118

Crash Landing: the Dangers of ICE Flights, CAPITAL & MAIN (Nov. 4, 2021),
https://capitalandmain.com/a-drunk-mechanic-shackled-immigrants-a-crash-landing-the-dangersof-ice-flights (describing the ICE flights that Justice Alito wantonly described as an adequate
substitute for traditional habeas release in Thuraissigiam).
115
Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 142 S. Ct. 1827, 1835 (2022). Arteaga-Martinez followed
Jennings to make this decision, which ultimately upset Alito’s Jennings-based arguments in Biden
v. Texas, where he was finally revealed as making too much of that decision because it left legal
and constitutional questions about the statutory and constitutional construction for future courts to
decide. Id.; Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. at 2554 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting to brief written by the
Trump administration in Jennings as if Jennings required the Biden administration to make the
same arguments).
116
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
117
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 481–86 (1965); id. at 486–87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
118
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486–87 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONST. amend IX). But
see Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2301 (2022) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (contradicting the legality of his own marriage with Ginni Thomas under Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Thomas boldly stated his opinion: “The resolution of this case is thus
straightforward. Because the Due Process Clause does not secure any substantive rights, it does
not secure a right to abortion.”).
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However, conservative jurists usually reject this theory, because it
requires, in their view, an overbroad reading of “life, liberty, and property.”119
Their skepticism is premised on links they perceive between a rights-centered
due process jurisprudence and cases like Dred Scott and Lochner.120 In 2020,
they reasserted their opposition to due process–based relief for detained
immigrants in DHS v. Thuraissigiam, which signaled the narrowing of Zadvydas
v. Davis.121
However, habeas corpus law exists under the Suspension Clause, which
defines the scope of law that must be administered.122 If the habeas statute gives
anything less than what the Suspension Clause requires, the law is void.123 Unlike
due process, the Suspension Clause avoids critiques of substantive due process
and satisfies the Court’s general, prudential desire to analyze the positive law
rather than the constitution, wherever possible.124
These preferences and desires of the Court were fully expressed in
Thuraissigiam, which dismissed a habeas corpus petition for failing to request
the common law habeas remedy of release.125 The Court emphasized that it
would not remand any further required process, implicitly including cost/benefit

119

See, e.g., Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2247 (“In interpreting what is meant by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s reference to ‘liberty,’ we must guard against the natural human tendency to confuse
what that Amendment protects with our own ardent views about the liberty that Americans should
enjoy.”); cf. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 n.1 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (explaining Justice Stewart’s
dissent as “requir[ing] a more explicit guarantee than the one which the Court derives from several
constitutional amendments”).
120
See, e.g., Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2248 (“The Court must not fall prey to such an unprincipled
approach.” (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905))); id. at 2303 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857)); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 694–96
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (first citing Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61–62, and then citing Dred
Scott, 60 U.S. 393).
121
See cases cited supra note 57. But see Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 2528, 2535 (2022)
(disagreeing with dicta in Thuraissigiam that suggested immigrants must be detained and deported
without due process).
122
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008), extending INS
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“[A]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects
the writ ‘as it existed in 1789.’”).
123
See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733 (“Therefore § 7 of the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e), operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.”); see
generally Schroeder, Conservative, supra note 114.
124
See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33; cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 58 (1932)
(applying the constitutional avoidance doctrine).
125
DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969–71 (2020) (failing to assert basic release in a
habeas petition causes it to “fall[] outside the scope of the common law habeas writ”).
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balancing tests, upon EOIR to administer.126 Thuraissigiam held that requesting
more process in EOIR as the sole habeas remedy results in dismissal.127
In the past, the Suspension Clause’s requirement that Congress’s law
include a substantive privilege of habeas corpus became the source of several
other lines of common law.128 For example, in Ex parte Young, after the federal
government jailed Minnesota AG Young forcing him to file habeas corpus, the
Court denied his writ, requiring Minnesota to comply with supreme federal
law.129 This was the ideological beginning of Supremacy Clause
jurisprudence.130
Ex parte Young was unquestioned federal law until the U.S. Supreme
Court nullified Roe v. Wade in Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson in 2021.131
The Whole Woman’s Health Court did not, at first, overrule Roe v. Wade or Ex
parte Young, but Whole Woman’s Health drew Young’s validity into question for
the first time.132 Young was construed narrowly, and in the future the federal
government may need to jail state officials in order to trigger Young’s holding.133

126

Id.
Id. But see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779–80 (“Indeed, common-law habeas corpus was,
above all, an adaptable remedy. Its precise application and scope changed depending upon the
circumstances.”); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (noting that habeas corpus is
not “a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose”).
128
The list of common law precedents that habeas corpus inspired, includes Supremacy Clause
jurisprudence: Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“Ex parte Young gives life to the
Supremacy Clause.” (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S 123 (1908))); administrative law: Crowell,
285 U.S. at 58 (stating in the context of an employment law dispute that “[w]hen proceedings are
taken against a person under the military law, and enlistment is denied, the issue has been tried and
determined de novo upon habeas corpus”); and independent judicial review of immigration law
under the Due Process Clause: Yamata v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903) (requiring Article III
review of due process of the law in immigrant habeas cases) (commonly referred to as the Japanese
Immigrant Cases).
129
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S at 168.
130
See Green, 474 U.S. at 68.
131
141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021) (calling Ex parte Young into question); id. at 2498 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (noting that the Court chose not to “enjoin a flagrantly unconstitutional law”).
132
See id. at 2495 (construing Ex parte Young narrowly and not extending it to cover a case
involving a flagrantly unconstitutional state law); cf. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2022) (“We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled.”).
The order in which this occurred stands for the paradoxical idea that courts and legislatures may
disrespect constitutional holdings prior to the holding becoming overruled, which may threaten to
turn the entire government structure of the United States on its head. Id. (overruling Roe and Casey
after the Court already allowed a Texas law that directly violated Roe and Casey to go into force);
cf. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. 2486, 2492–93 (2022) (expressing disagreement with
McGirt v. Oklahoma, which was decided only two years earlier when Justice Ginsburg was alive).
133
This may include the bounty hunters Texas deputized to outlaw abortion. Texas Heartbeat
Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.207 (West 2022); cf. Young, 209 U.S at 126 (noting
that the Attorney General for the State of Minnesota Edward T. Young refused to comply with
127
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If Young was ever affirmatively overruled, the federal courts might be
required to stop enjoining state laws that conflict with federal standards,
including state sanctuary laws.134 The end of Young may signal an era of chaos
for the U.S. federal system.135 But from an immigrant’s perspective, in a field of
law where DHS and EOIR regularly flout supreme federal law,136 overruling
Young might clear up alternative state grounds an immigrant may cite for
relief.137
In a time when legal grounds for immigrant freedom suits could shift
drastically, choosing a legal basis to file immigrant habeas corpus can be a
confusing task.138 However, there are several reasons why the Suspension Clause
remains a promising avenue for immigrant relief.139 First, Boumediene v. Bush

federal railroad standards and was therefore committed to the custody of the “United States marshal
for the district of Minnesota” to be held until he complied with federal law).
134
See, e.g., California Values Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.2 (West 2017), upheld in United
States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 877 (9th Cir. 2019) (“refusing to help is not the same as
impeding”); id. at 888 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997)), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 124 (2020).
135
See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, The Court Invites an Era of Constitutional Chaos, THE ATLANTIC
(Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/12/supreme-court-texasabortion/620972/; cf. Second Amendment Preservation Act, 2021 MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.430 (West
2021) (enacted) (“All federal acts, laws, executive orders, administrative orders, rules, and
regulations, regardless of whether they were enacted before or after the provisions of sections 1.410
to 1.485, that infringe on the people’s right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Second
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 23 of the Constitution
of Missouri shall be invalid to this state, shall not be recognized by this state, shall be specifically
rejected by this state, and shall not be enforced by this state.”); Norah O’Donnell, Missouri’s
Second Amendment Preservation Act Outlaws Local Enforcement of Federal Gun Laws, CBS: 60
MINUTES (Nov. 7, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/missouri-gun-law-second-amendmentpreservation-act-60-minutes-2021-11-07/.
136
See cases cited supra notes 67, 71–74 and accompanying text.
137
See cases cited supra note 134; cf. National Federation Independent Business v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 557 (2012) (“Any police power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their
activities, remains vested in the States.”); New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 139–41 (1837) (finding
state head taxes on immigrants constitutional), overruled by Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
177 (1941) (extending a fundamental right to immigrate between the states); cf. CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 11 (“Habeas corpus may not be suspended unless required by public safety in cases of rebellion
or invasion.”).
138
Compare DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969–71 (2020), with Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 850 (2018), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
139
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (overruling an express repeal of
§ 2241 as a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus), extending INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305
n.25 (2001) (“In fact, § 2241 descends directly from § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the 1867
Act. Its text remained undisturbed by either AEDPA or IIRIRA.”) (citation omitted).
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overruled a law that violated the Suspension Clause resulting in orders that
several foreign nationals held in a foreign country must be released.140
Furthermore, recent habeas decisions on the topic of immigration habeas
corpus arose under Zadvydas’ due process grounds, and distinguished
Boumediene.141 The Thuraissigiam Court limited its decision such that it does
not cover future petitions that assert actual or qualified release under
Boumediene.142 Indeed, the consternation expressed in Thuraissigiam seemed to
derive from a feeling that Article III Courts were not equipped to oversee
administrative proceedings.143
Asking for review of jurisdiction-stripping legislation under the
Suspension Clause totally avoids these concerns.144 If the Court reaches a
determination that a statute acts as a suspension of the writ, then it must overrule
the statute under Boumediene and allow the writ to run under preexisting law.145
If this occurred, the Judiciary Act of 1789, which is still a good law and was

140

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 787 (“We do hold that when the judicial power to issue habeas
corpus properly is invoked the judicial officer must have adequate authority to make a
determination in light of the relevant law and facts and to formulate and issue appropriate orders
for relief, including, if necessary, an order directing the prisoner’s release.”), followed by
Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198–99 (D.D.C. 2008) (“ORDERED that Respondents
are directed to take all necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate the release of
Petitioners Lakhdar Boumediene, Mohamed Hechla, Hadj Boudella, Mustafa Ait Idir, and Saber
Lahmar forthwith.”), rev’d in part by Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(remanding to the district court to reconsider also releasing the sixth petitioner); Bensayah v.
Obama, No. 1:04–1166, 2014 WL 395693, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2014) (“On December 5, 2013,
Bensayah was transferred from Guantanamo to the custody of the Government of Algeria,
effectively mooting his habeas request. . . . ORDERED that petitioner’s case is DISMISSED as
moot.”).
141
See, e.g., Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982–83 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693); Jennings,
138 S. Ct. at 850; see cases at supra note 26.
142
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1975 (distinguishing Boumediene based on the fact that Mr.
Thuraissigiam did not “seek[] release from custody”) (emphasis in original).
143
Id. at 1963, 1969, 1971, 1977 (“Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from
unlawful detention, but respondent invokes the writ to achieve an entirely different end, namely,
to obtain additional administrative review of his asylum claim and ultimately to obtain
authorization to stay in this country.”) (emphasis in original).
144
Id. at 1975 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (emphasizing the adaptability of the writ));
compare Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (limiting due process review for immigrants who physically
enter the United States by maintaining a fiction that they did not somehow enter the United States),
with Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full
effect at Guantanamo Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees now
before us, Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.”
(citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
145
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33; cf. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 (noting the reasons why the
Suspension Clause required Boumediene’s eventual holding).
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never repealed, could prove useful under Boumediene’s “constitutional
minimum.”146
Furthermore, the constitutional minimum mandated by Boumediene
under the force of Marbury v. Madison,147 was already asserted in the seminal
decision Ex parte Bollman to release immigrants into the United States.148 Eric
Bollman was world famous for assisting Lafayette’s escape from a German
prison prior to immigrating to the United States.149 Thus, Chief Justice Marshall
likely found it particularly fitting when he established Bollman’s name as
synonymous with habeas corpus in America.150
The Bollman Court did not consider Bollman’s immigrant status or his
fundamental right to enter the United States as relevant when it quashed
deportation orders issued by President Jefferson against Bollman and his
compatriots.151 Rather, the Court acted swiftly to release Bollman into the
country.152 In so doing, the Court also signaled the illegality of Jefferson’s
attempt to hold the Louisiana Territory under martial law.153
As in Young, if the Court decided to extend Bollman to release
immigrants held in federal detention facilities, the new holding may be repeated
in short form across the gamut.154 The consternation felt in making Young was

146
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300–01); see, e.g., Dimitri D.
Portnoi, Resorting to Extraordinary Writs: How the All Writs Act Rises to Fill the Gaps in the
Rights of Enemy Combatants, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 296 (2008).
147
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
148
Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 105 (1807) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 14);
see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 787 (“We do hold that when the judicial power to issue habeas corpus
properly is invoked the judicial officer must have adequate authority to make a determination in
light of the relevant law and facts and to formulate and issue appropriate orders for relief, including,
if necessary, an order directing the prisoner’s release.”).
149
See James Wesley Baker, The Imprisonment of Lafayette, AM. HERITAGE (June 1977),
https://www.americanheritage.com/imprisonment-lafayette.
150
See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 110 (1866) (citing Bollman, 8 U.S. at 75).
151
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 136, quashing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Wilkinson (Feb. 3,
1807), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-5012, and Letter from
Thomas
Jefferson
to
William
C.C.
Claiborne
(Feb.
3,
1807),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-5008; cf. Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas.
1099, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (“Emigration is, undoubtedly, one of the natural rights of man.”);
Paul Sweet, Erich Bollmann at Vienna in 1815, 46 AM. HIST. REV. 580, 582, 586 (1941)
(explaining how and why “Bollmann cut loose from the United States,” and did not return after
defeating Jefferson in court).
152
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 136 (“[T]he crime with which the prisoners stand charged has not been
committed, the Court can only direct them to be discharged.”).
153
Id.; cf. ARTHUR JAMES WEISS, THE SWARTWOUT CHRONICLES 325 (1899) (“Martial law was
proclaimed.”).
154
See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S 123
(1908)).
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only experienced once for all time’s sake.155 Thuraissigiam itself reiterated
Boumediene’s constitutional minimum and cited to Bollman as an example of
habeas corpus “as it existed in 1789,” so Thuraissigiam cannot stand in the
way.156
Despite Zadvydas’s recent nullification, Boumediene remains a viable
avenue for immigrant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.157 As long as the Court is
dedicated to upholding the long line of precedent requiring a constitutional
minimum of habeas review “as it existed in 1789,” the Suspension Clause should
be an open opportunity for immigrants.158 It will remain more stable than
cost/benefit balancing tests, especially after they were rendered ineffective
several times in recent cases like Thuraissigiam, Arteaga-Martinez, Aleman
Gonzalez, Egbert, Vega, Bruen, Dobbs, Castro-Huerta, Kennedy v. Bremerton
School District, West Virginia v. EPA, and Biden v. Texas.159
In summation, liberal cost/benefit balancing tests are being overruled or
set aside by conservative cost/benefit balancing tests. The Court appears satisfied
to “us[e] liberal-progressive tactics against liberalism,” rather than opposing
balancing tests on apolitical principles.160 This strategy can only reverse previous
interpretations of the Due Process Clause, leaving Suspension Clause
jurisprudence wholly distinguishable, and fair game in future habeas suits.

155

Id.
DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969 n.12 (2020) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
2; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746-47 (2008); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001);
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 95) (“[T]he [Suspension] Clause, at a minimum, ‘protects the writ as it existed
in 1789.’”).
157
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33 (overruling an express repeal of § 2241 habeas jurisdiction
under the Suspension Clause); cf. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 (refusing to imply a repeal of § 2241
habeas jurisdiction); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 573–76 (2006) (refusing to imply a repeal
of § 2241 habeas jurisdiction); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473–74 (2004) (refusing to imply a
repeal of § 2241 habeas jurisdiction).
158
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746, extending St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
a 307 (“[A]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ ‘as it existed in
1789.’”); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33 (overruling an express repeal of § 2241 as a suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus), extending St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 (“In fact, § 2241 descends directly
from § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the 1867 Act. . . . [i]ts text remained undisturbed by
either AEDPA or IIRIRA.”). The basis of this minimum traces back through Felker v. Turpin to
Ex parte Yerger. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 (1996) (citing Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85,
87–89, 104 (1868)).
159
See cases cited supra notes 94–96; cf. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. 2486, 2525–
26 (2022) (Gorsuch, J. dissenting) (“This Court has no business usurping congressional decisions
about the appropriate balance between federal, tribal, and state interests. . . . Additionally, nothing
in the ‘Braker balancing’ test the Court employs foreordains today’s grim result for different Tribes
in different States.”).
160
Logan Stagg Istre, Theodore Roosevelt and the Case for a Popular Constitution, 4 AM. AFFS.
191 (2020), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2020/08/theodore-roosevelt-and-the-case-for-apopular-constitution/; Schroeder, Conservative, supra note 114, at 51 n.13.
156
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PART III: WHY COST/BENEFIT BALANCING TESTS DON’T EXIST
Cost/benefit balancing tests seemed to self-destruct when DHS v.
Thuraissigiam cited Landon’s dicta as a holding in order to deny immigrants
access to a Landon balancing test.161 The chaotic and unpredictable nature of
cost/benefit balancing tests, including their propensity to destroy themselves
over time, does not make them cease to exist.162 But there is an area of
bourgeoning research that arguably caused cost/benefit balancing tests to slip
into a void of nonexistence.163
In 2002, Israeli American psychologist Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel
Prize for his work with Amos Tversky unsettling rationalism, especially hedonic

161
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)).
Several examples of how balancing tests self-destruct have become apparent after Thuraissigiam,
including NYSRPA v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2131 (2022), which gutted the state’s power to
regulate guns under an idea that the Second Amendment itself is the product of interest balancing,
and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2236, 2257, 2264–65, 2278
(2022), which overruled Roe v. Wade and Casey for balancing interests by nonetheless asserting a
newly fashioned five-factor balancing test to decide whether to overrule cases going forward, as
well as Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1805 (2022), which rejected a Ziglar two-step balancing
test based on Mathews v. Eldridge to instead assert a new one-step pro-government balancing test
in the name of Ziglar and Mathews, and finally Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 2106–07 (2022),
which balanced away the court’s jurisdiction to hear suits alleging Miranda warning violations
under § 1983. Examples of this kind of judicial behavior are presently intensifying and
proliferating in an almost whimsical way, cannot easily be tracked with completeness, and are, in
short, broadening to an extreme never seen before in America. See, e.g., Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct.
at 2501 (using a balancing test to unsettle over 200 years of precedent symbolized by Worcester v.
Georgia—a case that expounded the founders’ concept of Native American sovereignty in order
to decide that Georgia sending the Cherokee down the Trail of Tears was illegal, unjust, and
precluded by the federal constitution, as well as treaties with and laws regarding the sovereign
Cherokee people—by unsettling McGirt v. Oklahoma, which was decided only two years prior);
id. at 2518 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court makes no effort to grapple with the backdrop
rule of tribal sovereignty.”); id. at 2521 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (lamenting the Court’s assertion
of “raw power to ‘balance’ away tribal sovereignty”).
162
Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2236, 2257, 2264–65, 2278 (overruling Roe and Casey’s interestbalancing test, and adopting a new five-factor balancing test that could potentially be extended to
supplant or ironically overrule common law stare decisis as it was understood for the past several
centuries); Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2131 (rejecting “interest balancing” tests by asserting the superior
interest balancing test embodied the Second Amendment as “the very product of an interest
balancing by the people” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982
(quoting Landon, 459 U.S. at 32); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing
Costs or Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 UNIV. CHI.
L. REV. 1895, 1908 (2007) [hereinafter Sunstein, Cost-Benefit] (complaining about this reality, and
yet still advocating for the application of cost/benefit balancing tests).
163
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 377–78, 381 (2011) [hereinafter
KAHNEMAN, THINKING] (ruining hedonic rationalism); MICHAEL LEWIS, THE UNDOING PROJECT
261, 266, 272–73, 277 (2016) (“‘[E]xpected utility theory is wrong.’”).
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rationalism, also known as utilitarianism.164 Hedonic rationalism or
utilitarianism is premised on the idea that human beings inherently understand
pain and pleasure.165 Specifically, it requires that human beings can inherently
remember how much pain and/or pleasure past experiences caused so they can
correctly order their future choices.166
Through years of rigorous study, Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated
that human beings do not inherently remember experiences of pain and pleasure
accurately.167 Humans are prone to misremember and inaccurately rank
experiences of pain and pleasure.168 This results in our general inability to know
exactly what decision will cause the most pleasure and the least pain, requiring
us to engage in secondary strategies to reason what action is most utilitarian.169
The founder of modern utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, promulgated
cost/benefit balancing tests that he lifted from Hobbes and the Puritans.170
Bentham’s system depended on humanity’s inherent ability to weigh pain versus
pleasure, costs versus benefits, i.e., hedonic rationalism.171 This should be fatal
for Benthamite utilitarianism because Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that
hedonic rationalism is simply not baked into the stuff of humanity and, that any

164

KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 377–78, 381; LEWIS, supra note 163, at 295
(noting Amos Tversky’s observation that “‘the economists felt that we are right and at the same
time they wished we weren’t because the replacement of utility theory by the model we outlined
would cause them no end of problems’”); cf. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: A
Perspective on Intuitive Judgment and Choice, NOBEL PRIZE LECTURE, 459 (Dec. 8, 2002),
https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/kahnemann-lecture.pdf [hereinafter Kahneman,
Maps] (“The impossibility of invariance raises significant doubts about the descriptive realism of
rational-choice models . . . .”).
165
1 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1–
2 (1823) [hereinafter BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION]; cf. KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at
377–78, 381 (debunking Benthamite rationalism).
166
1 BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 165, at 1–2; cf. KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra
note 163, at 377–78, 381 (debunking Benthamite rationalism).
167
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 381 (“The remembering self is sometimes wrong,
but it is the one that keeps score and governs what we learn from living, and it is the one that makes
decisions. What we learn from the past is to maximize the qualities of our future memories, not
necessarily of our future experience. This is the tyranny of the remembering self.”).
168
Id. at 378–81.
169
Id.; cf. Kahneman, Maps, supra note 164, at 473 (“Because the intuitive impression comes
first, it is likely to serve as an anchor for subsequent adjustments, and corrective adjustments from
anchors are normally insufficient.”).
170
SCHOFIELD, supra note 13, at 241; cf. 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
501 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter BENTHAM, THE WORKS] (explaining his inspiration was
the Puritan dictator Oliver Cromwell); James E. Crimmins, Bentham and Hobbes: An Issue of
Influence, 63 J. HIST. IDEAS 677, 678–79 (2002).
171
1 BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 165, at 1–2.
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system that presupposes that it is, will likely fail to maximize pleasure and
minimize pain.172
Nevertheless, after Tversky’s death, Kahneman developed a close
friendship with Cass R. Sunstein, a cost/benefit balancer. 173 Sunstein and
Kahneman even wrote a book together that suggested that human beings should
continue using cost/benefit balancing tests applied through “noiseless” computer
algorithms.174 Kahneman’s alliance with a modified hedonic rationalist
demonstrated that even Kahneman is subject to an irrational slant, with a blind
eye toward Benthamite, hedonic rationalism.175
Sunstein is a bureaucrat, not a psychologist.176 Sunstein served as head
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) for most of
President Obama’s first term.177 As the administrator of OIRA, Sunstein made
enemies of liberals in the Democratic Party for several reasons including: (1)
using cost/benefit analyses to encourage global warming and inhumane

172

See KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411 (“Although Humans are not irrational,
they often need help to make more accurate judgments and better decisions, and in some cases
polices and institutions can provide that help.”).
173
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 22–23, 72, 108 (2018) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, THE COST]; see also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: THE FINAL
EDITION 166–68, 312, 331 (2021); cf. KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 412 (appearing to
approve of Sunstein’s work).
174
KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74, at 224 (paradoxically suggesting that costs and benefits
should still be measured even though Bentham’s premise that utility is an inherent sort of rational
knowledge human beings possess is entirely disproven); id. at 123–24 (“sophisticated and
impenetrable machine algorithms, can outperform human judgment”); id. at 377 (“Imagine . . .
us[ing] algorithms either to replace human judgment or to supplement it . . . . Our aim in writing
this book has been to draw attention to this opportunity. We hope that you will be among those
who seize it.”). In the immigration system such algorithmic, noiseless “improvements are possible
but that some cures would be worse than the disease.” RAMJI-NOGALES & SCHRAG, supra note 74,
at 5–6, 97 (“[T]he cure of a quota system would be worse than the disease of random
adjudication.”).
175
KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74, at 224; Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker & Rakesh
Sarin, Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375, 397 (1997)
[hereinafter Kahneman, Back] (suggesting that “experienced utility” can be “a measure of
outcomes [that] turns utility maximization into an empirical proposition, which will probably be
found to provide a good approximation to truth in many situations”); cf. Amanda Perreau-Saussine,
Bentham and the Boot-Strappers of Jurisprudence: The Moral Commitments of a Rationalist Legal
Positivist, 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 346, 348 (2004) (noting Bentham was a rationalist, not an
empiricist).
176
Helen G. Boutrous, Regulatory Review in the Obama Administration: Cost-Benefit Analysis
for Everyone, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 243, 244, 253–54 (2010); cf. KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note
163, at 412 (calling Sunstein a “jurist”).
177
Mike Allen, Sunstein Returning to Harvard, POLITICO (Aug. 3, 2012, 7:40 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2012/08/sunstein-returning-to-harvard-079347.
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treatment of the elderly;178 (2) seriously endorsing a new wave of Bernaysian
government propaganda programs;179 and (3) being a “repetitious bore” that
suffers from mental “laziness” and “fogginess” and an acute “refusal to look
deeply into the causes of historical change.”180
Likely due to these reasons, and perhaps others,181 Sunstein’s time as the
OIRA head was cut short.182 When Biden won the presidency and overcame the
Trump led insurrection of January 6, 2021, progressive warnings from outfits
like The American Prospect went largely unnoticed.183 Ignoring these warnings,
178

Tom Hamburger & Christi Parsons, Obama Pick Comes Under Scrutiny, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
26, 2009), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-jan-26-na-sunstein26-story.html
(“Sunstein . . . reiterated his belief in ‘defending a strong regulatory state.’ . . . But environmental
activists say his published views on cost-benefit analysis are more aligned with what they would
expect from a George W. Bush or Ronald Reagan appointee.” Sunstein also “embraced a
controversial ‘senior death discount’ that calculates the lives of younger people as having a greater
value than those of the elderly.”).
179
Glenn Greenwald, Obama Confidant’s Spine-Chilling Proposal, SALON (Jan. 15, 2010, 1:16
PM), https://www.salon.com/2010/01/15/sunstein_2/ (“Covert government propaganda is exactly
what Sunstein craves.”), referring to Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Conspiracy Theories:
Causes and Cures, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 202, 224–25 (2009) (“We suggest a role for government efforts,
and agents, in introducing cognitive diversity. Government agents (and their allies) might enter
chat rooms, online social networks, or even real-space groups and attempt to undermine percolating
conspiracy theories by raising doubts about their factual premises, causal logic, or implications for
action, political or otherwise.”). Sunstein’s work was also recently cited favorably in the Court’s
controversial Second Amendment decision in NYSRPA v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2132 (2022)
(quoting Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 773 (1993)
[hereinafter Sunstein, On Analogical]).
180
Aaron Timms, The Sameness of Cass Sunstein, NEW REPUBLIC (June 20, 2019),
https://newrepublic.com/article/154236/sameness-cass-sunstein.
181
Boutrous, supra note 176, at 259 (“Justice Sotomayor and Professor Sunstein have sharply
contrasting views of the value and meaning of cost-benefit analysis . . . . [Sunstein] holds views
closer to those of Justice Scalia than to the views of Justice Sotomayor, President Obama’s first
appointee to the Supreme Court.”); Justice Delayed: The Human Cost of Regulatory Paralysis,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Federal Rights and Agency Action of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 26 (2013) (statement of Peg Seminario, Director of
Safety and Health, AFL-CIO); Jonathan Stein, Cass Sunstein: A Supreme Court Non-Starter?,
MOTHER JONES (Apr. 9, 2009), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/04/obamasregulatory-czar-radical-animal-rights-activist/.
182
Jeffrey Zients, A Regulatory Reformer Leaves His Mark, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 3, 2012,
8:29 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/08/03/regulatory-reformer-leaveshis-mark.
183
Robert Kuttner, Red Alert: The Return of Cass Sunstein, THE AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://prospect.org/blogs/tap/red-alert-the-return-of-cass-sunstein/;
Miranda
Litwak,
Progressives Vehemently Object to Cass Sunstein’s Plans to Return to Government, REVOLVING
DOOR PROJECT PROJ. (Jan. 29, 2021), https://therevolvingdoorproject.org/progressivesvehemently-object-to-cass-sunsteins-plans-to-return-to-government/; Celia Wexler, Who’s Afraid
of Cass Sunstein?: Progressives Want to Make Sure that Sunstein Doesn’t Return to Power in the
Biden
Administration,
BLUETENT
(Feb.
5,
2021,
10:02
AM),
https://bluetent.us/articles/governing/cass-sunstein-biden-white-house-oira/.
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Biden hired Sunstein as senior counselor at DHS, where Sunstein continues to
lead Biden’s failed efforts to roll back Trump’s immigration policies.184
Hiring a conservative like Sunstein to do a progressive’s job was
destined for failure.185 In fact, it now seems that President Biden tapped Cass R.
Sunstein to expand Stephen Miller’s Trump-era policies, while only making it
seem as if they were being rolled back.186 Sunstein was the perfect pick for this
job, because he had already convinced us that he was a liberal progressive
inspired by Kahneman and Tversky, when the reality was quite the opposite.187

184
Rebecca Beitsch, Biden Relies on Progressive Foe to Lead Immigration Rollbacks, THE HILL
(Apr. 7, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/546827-biden-relies-onprogressive-foe-to-lead-immigration-rollbacks.
185
Id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J.L. STUD. 1059, 1059–60
(2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Cognition] (disagreeing with then Senator Biden’s accusation of soon
to be Justice Stephen Breyer of presumptuousness and elitism for endorsing cost/benefit analyses);
Timms, supra note 171; Boutrous, supra note 176, at 259; Hamburger & Parsons, supra note 169;
see Cass R. Sunstein, Five Books to Change Liberals’ Minds, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Oct. 11, 2016,
5:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-10-11/five-books-to-changeliberals-minds [hereinafter Sunstein, Five] (presenting his reading list as a conservative Democrat
for the express purpose of making Democrats more conservative).
186
Beitsch, supra note 184; The Reimplementation of MPP is Betrayal of President Biden’s
Campaign
Promises,
AM.
IMMIGR.
COUNCIL
(Oct.
15,
2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/news/reimplementation-mpp-betrayal-presidentbiden%E2%80%99s-campaign-promises; Ryan Bort, Biden Channels Stephen Miller to Deport
Haitian Asylum Seekers, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 21, 2021, 11:38 AM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/biden-administration-title-42-haitianrefugee-expulsions-1229299/.
187
Jonathan Blitzer, Why Biden Refused to Pay Restitution to Families Separated at the Border,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 22, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-biden-refusedto-pay-restitution-to-families-separated-at-the-border (“The worst part is that Biden has said over
and over what he thinks is right; then he chooses to do something else entirely.”); Luis Chaparro,
Families Trapped at the Border Say Biden Has Betrayed Them, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 17, 2021,
12:05
PM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/families-trapped-at-the-border-say-biden-hasbetrayed-them.
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Sunstein maintains a long record of obstinately ignoring Kahneman and
Tversky’s research, resulting in completely tone-deaf policies based on old
information from the long dead New Deal era.188 Sunstein’s successful efforts to
charm himself into the good graces of Kahneman and Thaler does not change the
fact that Sunstein’s claims about cost/benefit balancing tests were undermined
by Kahneman and Tversky’s research.189 While swearing he would never,
Sunstein always defended the status quo by gilding the lily of the researchers that
threatened it most.190
Kahneman and Tversky’s discovery is a tectonic shift in economics,
arguably destroying Milton Friedman’s laissez-faire rationale.191 However,

188
Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1065 was undermined by KAHNEMAN, THINKING,
supra note 163, at 377–78, 381, even while Sunstein later claimed to base his technocratic
cost/benefit balancing systems upon Kahneman and Tversky’s research in THALER & SUNSTEIN,
supra note 173, at 26 (arguing that their system is supported by, rather than subverted by, an insight
made “by two of our heroes, the psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky”), which was
later lauded by Kahneman in KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 412 after Tversky’s death,
and without confirming it actually comported with Kahneman and Tversky’s research. Cf. Peter
L. Strauss, Sunstein, Statutes, and the Common Law—Reconciling Markets, the Communal
Impulse, and the Mammoth State, 89 MICH. L. REV. 907, 911 (1991) (reviewing a book Sunstein
wrote that was premised upon New Deal era ideology).
189
Cass R. Sunstein, Governing by Algorithm? No Noise and (Potentially) Less Bias, 71 DUKE
L.J. 1175, 1180 (2022) [hereinafter Sunstein, Governing]; KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74, at
123–24, 333–34, 341.
190
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 188, at 911 (“Sunstein’s book presents an argument for the
status quo”); compare THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 36–38 (explaining status quo bias),
with id. at 40–45 (gilding Kahneman and Tversky’s lily, meaning that this passage decorated that
which was already beautiful), and id. at 166–68, 312, 331 (defending the status quo of cost/benefit
balancing tests virtually unchanged by Kahneman & Tversy’s research). Most people, including
Michael Lewis, took Sunstein at his word that he was following, rather than contradicting,
Kahneman & Tversky’s theories. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 163, at 342–43. Sunstein’s timing
for adopting a focus on Kahneman and Tversy after Tversky’s death was impeccable, because as
Michael Lewis described, Tversky was the personality who would have vigorously checked
Sunstein for his endorsement of the cost/benefit balancing heuristics Tversky and Kahneman
disproved, while Kahneman would be much more interested in befriending Sunstein to see if “the
man might be in the grip of some mind-warping emotion” and to attempt “a sit down together” to
see if Kahneman “might lead him to reason.” Id. at 336. Kahneman also famously undervalued and
underestimated the value and reach of his own research. Id. at 286 (“Danny, for his part, claimed
that it wasn’t until 1976 that he woke up to the effects their theory might have on a field he knew
nothing about. His awakening came when Amos handed him a paper written by an economist. The
paper opened, ‘The agent of economic theory is rational, selfish, and his tastes do not change.’ The
economists at Hebrew University were in the building next door, but Danny hadn’t paid any
attention to their assumptions about human nature. ‘To me, the idea that they really believed in
it—that this is really their worldview—was incredible.’”).
191
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411–12. Kahneman expressly noted how his
studies subverted Milton Friedman’s version of laissez-faire economics that was earlier asserted
in ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 485 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) [hereinafter SMITH, THE
WEALTH] (asserting the inherent rationality of humankind by positing “an invisible hand” of
rational self-interest), and arguably also in JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE
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Kahneman and Tversky’s effect is not limited to economics, as the basic
presupposition they disproved, i.e., that humans are inherently rational, underlies
utilitarian ethics,192 Puritanical religion,193 and eugenics.194 So too, Kahneman
and Tversky’s studies must be recognized as undoing the very existence of
cost/benefit balancing tests in American courts.195
20 (1926) (dismissing “the economic dogma of laissez-faire” but preserving and secularizing
Smith’s “famous passage about ‘the invisible hand’”).
192
3 BENTHAM, THE WORKS, supra note 170, at 19 (attempting “to make good the general
principle, that no man of ripe years and of sound mind, ought, out of loving-kindness to him, to be
hindered from making such bargain in the way of obtaining money, as, acting with his eyes open,
he deems conducive to his interest”) (emphasis in original), unsettled by KAHNEMAN, THINKING,
supra note 163, at 411–12; cf. Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in 2 BENTHAM, THE
WORKS, supra note 170, at 482 (“In every human breast . . . self-regarding interest is predominant
over social interest: each person’s own individual interest, over the interests of all other persons
taken together.”), unsettled by KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411–12.
193
MILTON, supra note 12, at ls. 865–68. John Milton attempted to warn men from ever having
sex with women because, in the end, women (represented by Dalila) will betray men by using a
rational cost/benefit balancing test to decide what is in their best interest instead of remaining loyal
according to the emotion of love, but this was unsettled by KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163,
at 411–12, which shows that human beings are far more compliant with their emotions including
love than cold, Machiavellian rationalizations. Similarly, several Puritanical treatises appealed to
human reason to justify the hunting and hanging of witches. See JOSEPH GLANVIL & HENRY MORE,
SADUCISMUS TRIUMPHATUS 78 (1681) (asserting that humans are inherently “rational Creature[s],”
and that sin and Satan worked to destroy his inherent, natural access to reason); BENJAMIN
COLMAN, GOD DEALS WITH US AS RATIONAL CREATURES: AND IF SINNERS WOULD BUT HEARKEN TO
REASON THEY WOULD REPENT 3–4 (1722) (“HE made us rational creatures.”); COTTON MATHER,
MEMORABLE PROVIDENCES, RELATING TO WITCHCRAFTS AND POSSESSIONS 2, 14 (1689) (calling
witches and demons “a spiritual and a rational substance”). Kahneman appears to suggest that any
such appeal to individual reason is disproven, groundless, and irrational. See KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, supra note 163, at 411–12; cf. Peter Harrison, Adam Smith and the History of the
Invisible Hand, 72 J. HIST. IDEAS 29, 37 (2011) (noting that rational self-interest adopted by the
economic models of Bentham and Smith were originally developed by the Puritans).
194
Famed eugenicist Harry Laughlin claimed a “rational purpose behind” eugenic vasectomies
and that since they were reasonable, they could not be a cruel and unusual punishment. LAUGHLIN,
supra note 13, at 123. Furthermore, Laughlin argued that allowing disabled persons to exist freely
in society would be “a crime against society” such that imprisoning them and sterilizing them “is
the only rational course left open.” Id. at 294 (emphasis added). He characterized eugenics “as a
rational and undoubted protection to society” in order to conclude that it does not “violate our
constitutional guarantee.” Id. at 327. But Kahneman and Tversky’s research proved that human
beings cannot know exactly what course will secure our future interests through individual reason
alone. KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411–12.
195
Kahneman and Tversky’s research unsettled the use of a cost/benefit balancing test in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976), and other sources that attempted to use individual
reason to vindicate the Mathews cost/benefit balancing approach. E.g., Sunstein, Cognition, supra
note 176, at 1065, 1087–88. Kahneman and Tversky’s research proved that human beings,
including judges, cannot automatically perceive the actual costs and benefits of certain courses of
action through reason alone. KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411–12; cf. LEWIS, supra
note 163, at 278 (noting Amos Tversky’s observation that “‘the economists felt that we are right
and at the same time they wished we weren’t because the replacement of utility theory by the model
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Individuals cannot measure facts and circumstances accurately in terms
of pain or pleasure, and therefore they cannot accurately balance costs and
benefits.196 In so much as Cass R. Sunstein thought weighing costs and benefits
would inherently solve legal problems as “a natural corrective,” he was
objectively disproven.197 Sunstein may yet search out the old common law
strategies for adhering to “the golden and sacred rule of reason,” since Kahneman
and Tversky’s research already confirmed that cost/benefit balancing ideas failed
the test of time,
“Sapientissima res tempus,” says the profound Lord Bacon, in
one of his aphorisms concerning the augmentation of the
sciences—Time is the wisest of things. If the qualities of the
parent may, in any instance, be expected in the offspring; the
common law, one of the noblest births of time, may be
pronounced the wisest of laws.198
Unfortunately, Sunstein never accessed this wing of legal precedent and ancient
literature, and rather asserted a legal positivist definition for the common law.199
Legal positivists do not believe in a common law developed through time and
community involvement, rather, they believe that when people say “common
law” they mean potentially any judge-made law.200 Cost/benefit balancers like
Sunstein consistently supported this outlook, agreeing with problematic figures

we outlined would cause them no end of problems’”); id. at 281 (marking how Richard Thaler took
a job “teaching cost-benefit analysis to business school students,” and that Thaler later asserted
this was irrational).
196
See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 37
J.L. STUD. S253, S258–59 (2008) (“[W]ell-being reduces to pains and pleasures—to negative and
positive affect.”).
197
Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1065.
198
2 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 749–50 (2007); cf. KAHNEMAN,
NOISE, supra note 74, at 367 (“There is a limit to the accuracy of our predictions, and this limit is
often quite low. Nevertheless, we are generally comfortable with our judgments. What gives us
this satisfying confidence is an internal signal, a self-generated reward for fitting the facts of the
judgment into a coherent story.”); id. at 373 (almost endorsing common law stare decisis when he
said: “The average of a noisy group may end up being more accurate than a unanimous
judgement.”).
199
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 956 (1995) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Problems] (citing GERALD J. POSTEMA, JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 403–13 (1986)); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 220–21
(1990) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, AFTER].
200
See, e.g., Scalia, Common, supra note 56, at 80 (“Holmes’s book is a paean to reason, and to
the men who brought that faculty to bear in order to create Anglo-American law.” (citing OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter HOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON])).
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like Scalia and Bentham; and Kahneman and Tversky’s iconoclasm seems to
have only caused these cost/benefit balancers to redouble their efforts.201
Meanwhile, 2021 Nobel laureate David Card supplied us with
secondary, reliable means to understand the actual costs and benefits of
immigration to the United States.202 Card’s counterintuitive research proved that
the immigration of unskilled laborers does not create a cost to destination
countries,203 which was reconfirmed by Michael A. Clemens’ study finding that
Trump’s anti-immigration policies cost the United States around $11.1 billion
each year.204 This unsettles over a century of public charge based precedent and
propaganda, and it buttresses Kahneman and Tversky’s research that U.S. judges,
like all humans, are inherently irrational.205

201

LEWIS, supra note 163, at 342 (“Old economists never change their minds.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (applying cost/benefit
balancing), extended by DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (denying an
immigrant’s due process rights); Sandra Day O’Connor, They Often Are Half Obscure: The Rights
of the Individual and the Legacy of Oliver W. Holmes, 29 UNIV. SAN DIEGO L. REV. 385, 385–87
(1992) (quoting HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON, supra note 200, at 1); id. at 390–91 (quoting Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)) (rehabilitating Holmes despite the injustice of using a cost/benefit
balancing test in Buck and similar opinions); see Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,
142 S. Ct. 2228, 2257, 2264–65, 2270–71 (2022); NYSRPA v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2131 (2022)
(calling the Second Amendment “the very product of an interest balancing by the people” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 2132 (quoting Sunstein, On Analogical, supra note 179, at 773);
Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 2106–07 (2022); Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1805 (2022).
See also Sunstein, Problems, supra note 199, at 956; Sunstein, On Analogical, supra note 179, at
765 (“Scalia’s response is perhaps the best that can be offered.”); Boutrous, supra note 176, at 259.
202
Carlos Vargas-Silva, David Card, the Academic Who Showed Us How to Estimate Impacts
of
Immigration,
Wins
Nobel
Prize,
COMPAS
(Nov.
10,
2021),
https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2021/david-card-the-academic-who-showed-us-how-to-estimatethe-impacts-of-immigration-wins-nobel-prize/.
203
David Card, The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market, 43 INDUST. &
LAB. REL. REV. 245, 256 (1990) (“[T]his study shows that the influx of Mariel immigrants had
virtually no effect on the wage rates of less-skilled non-Cuban workers . . . there is no evidence of
an increase in unemployment.”); see also Vargas-Silva, supra note 202.
204
Michael A. Clemens, The Economic and Fiscal Effects on the United States from Reduced
Numbers of Refugees and Asylum Seekers 2 (Ctr. For Glob. Dev., Working Paper No. 610, 2022),
https://www.cgdev.org/publication/economic-and-fiscal-effects-united-states-reduced-numbersrefugees-and-asylum-seekers (the “missing refugees [caused by Trump’s anti-immigration
policies] cost the overall U.S. economy over $9.1 billion each year . . . and cost the public coffers
at all levels of government over $2.0 billion each year . . . .”).
205
LEWIS, supra note 163, at 324–26 (“In overwhelming numbers doctors made the same [fatal
error of logic] as undergraduates.”). The classic health and welfare police power based premises
for the inherent, plenary power to exclude immigrants asserted in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581, 608 (1889) (referring to state laws for “[t]he exclusion of paupers, criminals, and
persons afflicted with incurable diseases” to justify the constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion
Act), that was originally drawn from the public charge doctrine established by New York v. Miln,
36 U.S. 102, 133 (1837) (affirming state laws that provided for the deportation of immigrants in
order “to prevent them from becoming chargeable as paupers”), is unsettled by Card, supra note
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Another way of putting Kahneman and Tversky’s findings is that the
future of humanity is inherently uncertain, and that, therefore, Justice Holmes
was wrong to define the law as prophecy made discernable by weighing costs
and benefits.206 This is so because any test that purports to secure the future
through inherent reason is foiled by Kahneman and Tversky’s studies.207
Possibly in anticipation of this eventual scientific result, Holmes escaped into
mystic poetry to defend his prophetic legalism.208
Holmes’s hard pivot into religion and art to romanticize his loveless
logic was nothing new.209 As commemorated by the Pulitzer Prize winning play
Wit,210 the Puritan poet John Donne was known for his ability to make sense of
the most irrational behaviors of human beings.211 And John Milton, who was “of
the Devil’s party without knowing it,”212 specifically vindicated cost/benefit
balancing tests by appropriating the voices of women like this:

203, at 256, and KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411–12. Similarly, Chief Justice
Taney’s slavery era opinion in Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 466 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting)
(intuiting that governments have a right to “remove from among its citizens any person . . . whom
it regards as injurious to their welfare”), is unsettled by Card, supra note 203, at 256, and
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411–12.
206
Compare RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 56, at 208 (“Long calculations that certain evil
in the present is worth inflicting for the sake of some doubtful benefit in the future are always to
be viewed with suspicion, for, as Shakespeare says: ‘What’s to come is still unsure.’”), id. at 27
(“The genuine Liberal does not say ‘this is true,’ he says ‘I am inclined to think that under present
circumstances this opinion is probably the best.’ And it is only in this limited and undogmatic sense
that he will advocate democracy.”), id. at 74 (making light of Hegel’s attempts to lay hold of the
future with almost magical calculations), and KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411–12,
with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), and sources cited supra notes 1–6.
207
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 381.
208
Anne C. Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind, 48 DUKE L.J. 429, 498–502 (1998)
(“Holmes’s theory of the unconscious reflected a Romantic view of the inability of scientific
thought to comprehend the hidden and chaotic depths of subjective life.”); id. at 436 (Holmes’s
“relationships with Emerson and his father, his sporadic references to the ‘infinite’ and the
‘universe,’ and his notion of heroic greatness have from time to time prompted critics to question
the degree of Holmes’s commitment to scientific empiricism.”); id. at 451, 492; cf. 12 THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 275 (1904) (citing MILTON, supra note 12); Joshua
J. Schroeder, The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I, A Hard Look at Penumbral Rights and
Cost/Benefit Balancing Tests, 53 ST. MARY’S L.J. 323, 347 n.109 (2022) [hereinafter Schroeder,
The Dark] (citing MILTON, supra note 12, at ls. 865–68) (“In Buck, the old Puritan version of due
process balancing between private and public interests was applied.”)
209
See Dailey, supra note 208, at 498–99.
210
See generally MARGARET EDSON, WIT (1995).
211
See, e.g., JOHN DONNE, Holy Sonnet XIV, reprinted in THE POEMS OF JOHN DONNE: THE
DIVINE POEMS 10 (Herbert J.C. Grierson, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1951) (1633) [hereinafter THE
DIVINE] (asking God to batter and rape him into purity, because reason was not sufficient to guide
him to right action).
212
WILLIAM BLAKE, THE MARRIAGE OF HEAVEN AND HELL 6 (1868); cf. C.S. LEWIS, THE GREAT
DIVORCE vii (2009) (“Blake wrote The Marriage of Heaven and Hell. If I have written of their
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Only my love of thee held long debate,
And combated in silence all these reasons
With hard contést: at length that grounded maxim
So rife and celebrated in the mouths
Of wisest men; that to the public good
Private respects must yield, with grave authority
Took full possession of me and prevailed213
Milton’s cost/benefit balancing test became a justification unto itself.214 His
Machiavellian logic for using cost/benefit balancing tests seems to run like this:
if you don’t use them against your enemies first, your enemies will use them
against you, and love is no defense.215 Milton’s loveless logic presaged Justice
Holmes’s defense of eugenics in Buck v. Bell that was considered progressive
and pragmatic in its day, but was actually regressive and impractical.216
Understanding the problematic nature of Miltonic rationalism, Phillis
Wheatley wrote: “But, lo! in him Britannia’s prophet dies.”217 The romantic

Divorce, this is not because I think myself a fit antagonist for so great a genius, nor even because
I feel at all sure that I know what he meant.”).
213
MILTON, supra note 12, at ls. 863–69; cf. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 47, at 158 (noting
how “Milton appropriated women as his champions of the freedom of mind”); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (using a balancing test to justify the yielding of private
interests to the Government’s interest).
214
MILTON, supra note 12, at ls. 863–69.
215
Id.; cf. Michael Bryson, A Poem to the Unknown God: Samson Agonistes and Negative
Theology, 42 MILTON Q. 22, 32 (2008) (quoting NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 24 (Robert
Maynard Hutchins ed., W. K. Marriott trans., 1955)) (“[T]he Chorus is both so desperate, and so
inept in its attempt to ‘justify’ God that it ends up describing him as a Machiavellian prince . . . .
Both the Chorus and Manoa posit a violent God. Thus, each seems to approve of Samson’s
violence, thinking of it as being undertaken at God’s prompting.”).
216
Compare MILTON, supra note 12, at ls. 863–69, with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927),
John Kang, The Soldier and the Imbecile: How Holmes’s Manliness Fated Carrie Buck, 47 AKRON
L. REV. 1055, 1057 (2015), and supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
217
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, Phillis’s Reply to the Answer (Dec. 5, 1774), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF PHILLIS WHEATLEY 143–45 (John C. Shields ed., 1988) [hereinafter THE
COLLECTED] (referring to Milton as the “British Homer” and “Europa’s bard”); cf. Jennifer
Billingsley, Works of Wonder, Wondering Eyes, and the Wondrous Poet: The Use of Wonder in
Phillis Wheatley’s Marvelous Poetics, in NEW ESSAYS ON PHILLIS WHEATLEY 170 (John C. Shields
& Eric D. Lamore eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (“The trial of Wheatley illustrated this issue.
Even the attestation of such eminent men could not convince everyone of Wheatley’s literary
achievement. Like Hume and Jefferson demonstrated, reason could not answer this question
adequately, and further application of reason could not repair the inadequacies of reason. To avoid
confronting established beliefs, reason became a vehicle of doubt . . . . In contrast, Wheatley
successfully employs a strategy beyond the limitations of reason. For Wheatley wonder is that
subjective faculty that can breach the gap between man and the world and help negotiate a new
understanding of race and reality after reason fails.”); id. at 179 (“Whereas Hobbes defied the
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poets who followed after Wheatley properly romanticized love,218 and exposed
Justice Holmes’s loveless errors.219 The romantic movement in England and
America roundly reaffirmed Wheatley’s central assertions that reason is a servant
to the emotion of love and the capacity of human imagination.220
Human emotion (i.e., the “common sense”) and the imagination
eventually led England and America to the gradual adoption of the common
law.221 This fabric of law is the foundation of government in England and
America, and confirms “the same equal right, law, or justice, due to persons of
all degrees.”222 As such, the common law was used in 1772, despite the staunch
resistance of the lordly powers, to set an African slave free in Somerset’s Case.223

ability of men to realize the meaning of a work of wonder, Wheatley recognizes this very power
in Ethiopians.”).
218
John Rochfort, The Answer by the Gentleman of the Navy (Dec. 2, 1774), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 141–43 (noting how Wheatley led the poets to “kindle[] friendship
and make[] love divine”); see JOHN C. SHIELDS, PHILLIS WHEATLEY AND THE ROMANTICS 62–63
(2010); see also id. at 8–9, 57 (discussing Wheatley’s treatment of natural human love as a female
representation of God); PHILLIS WHEATLEY, To the Right Honorable William, Earl of Dartmouth,
His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for North America, &c. (1773), THE COLLECTED, supra
note 217, at 73–75 (noting that her “wishes for the common good” are “by feeling hearts alone best
understood”); Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 47, at 159–60; cf. JAMES OTIS, COLLECTED
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES OTIS 63–64 (Richard Samuelson ed., 2015) (“The Love of our
Neighbour is an evident Principle of natural as well as revealed Religion.”). My view that the
romantics are Wheatley’s progeny is chronologically sound and supported by the evidence Shields
examined. SHIELDS, at 62–63; see PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY, A DEFENCE OF POETRY 12 (1845)
(defending the role of imagination in human thought that Wheatley originally set forth: “Reason is
to imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the spirit, as the shadow to the
substance.”); HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, VOICES OF THE NIGHT 9 (1887) (containing
several marvelous themes inspired by Wheatley’s work: “I heard the trailing garments of the Night
/ Sweep through her marble halls!”); Letter from John Keats to Benjamin Bailey (Nov. 22, 1817),
in THE LETTERS OF JOHN KEATS 53 (H. Buxton Forman ed., 1895) (“The imagination may be
compared to Adam’s dream—he awoke and found it truth.”).
219
Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. Holmes was apparently open to this critique, and it seemed to succeed
by influencing his jurisprudence once or twice. Dailey, supra note 208, at 458 (“Holmes, unlike
others of his generation, never renounced the psychological insights of Romanticism.”); see, e.g.,
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91–92 (1923); Note: Lumley v. Wagner Denied, 8 HARV. L. REV.
172, 172–73 (1894), examined by Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley
Doctrine: Binding Men’s Consciences and Women’s Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775, 779, 838 n.335
(1992).
220
See sources cited supra notes 217–218; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, Thoughts on the Works of
Providence (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 43–50; PHILLIS WHEATLEY,
On Imagination (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 65–68.
221
2 WILSON, supra note 198, at 749; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 157 (“The whole structure of our present jurisprudence stands upon the
original foundations of the common law.”).
222
2 WILSON, supra note 198, at 749–50.
223
Somerset v. Stewart [1772] 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 82 (Eng.).

(CORRECTED) SCHROEDER TO PUBLISHER WITH PAGE BREAKS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

220

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

11/9/22 1:20 PM

[Vol. 125

This common law was real and effective, and its appearance in
Somerset’s Case represents the writ of habeas corpus “as it existed in 1789” that
was applied in Boumediene v. Bush and mandated in immigrant habeas pleadings
by DHS v. Thuraissigiam.224 As a part of the common law, Somerset’s Case was
a product of “common reason—that refined reason, which is generally received
by the consent of all.”225 By great contrast, cost/benefit balancing tests may be
correctly recognized as the opposite of the common law, i.e., the product of
individual reason—that unrefined reason, which only received the
unaccountable consent of only one person, the judge.226
Just because judges don black robes does not make them more rational
than other human beings.227 Yet, cost/benefit balancing tests presume that, out of
a dogmatic belief in individual reason, a court can override the common,
discourse-confirmed reason of a whole society and thus render itself
unreviewable and absolute.228 Nevertheless, as Kahneman and Tversky’s studies
prove, the idea that judges can easily consider their own experienced costs or
benefits is a delusion.229
It is perhaps humanity’s grandest delusion that an individual human
could reason out what is best for all humanity.230 Individuals among us are prone
to believe that their own innate senses give them an accurate picture of the whole
human experience that should be applied as a natural law, without engaging in a

224

Id., extended by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 747 (2008) (“We know that at common
law a petitioner’s status as alien was not a categorical bar to habeas corpus relief.”), and
distinguished by DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1973 (2020). According to the Court, had
Mr. Thuraissigiam requested release, then Somerset would have applied, and “a collateral
consequence” may be that he could have been “allowed to remain” in the United States. Id. The
decision in Thuraissigiam is worrisome because another case that distinguished Somerset was the
infamous Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 611–12 (1842) (distinguishing Somerset v. Stewart,
[1772] 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 82 (Eng.), and interpreting the Slave Trade Clause to implicitly preclude
the application of Somerset).
225
2 WILSON, supra note 198, at 750.
226
Cf. Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1065, 1087–88 (exemplifying this sort of
individual reason); Sunstein, Cost-Benefit, supra note 162, at 1908 (also exemplifying the sort of
individual reasoning that claims no accountability to the reason of other individuals).
227
LEWIS, supra note 163, at 223, 324–27 (demonstrating that sophisticated people are liable to
make the same cognitive errors as unsophisticated people); cf. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S.
304, 346 (1804) (“State courts are, and always will be, of as much learning, integrity, and wisdom
as those of the courts of the United States (which we very cheerfully admit)”).
228
Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1065, 1087–88.
229
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 381.
230
See, e.g., Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1065, 1087–88 (dogmatically asserting that
a certain rational program for solving societies biggest problems has no rivals).
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common discourse with others.231 This wing of law, inspired by Hegelian
philosophy, is ruled by its primary maxim that the ends justify the means.232
Humanity’s best despots, including Cromwell, Napoleon, and Hitler,
arose from this type of dogmatic thinking.233 It is the origin of the frontispiece of
Thomas Hobbes’s book Leviathan, king of all the children of pride.234 Each
human being ruled by pride thinks they could know what is best for everyone
else by following their own internal compass without engaging with others in a
common discourse.235
Cost/benefit balancing tests tend to isolate the individual mind to a point
of ignorance of all else.236 Pure hedonic rationalist dogma is the only thing that
says weighing and balancing costs and benefits from a state of pure, individual
ignorance could create rational results.237 Therefore, as Kahneman and Tversky’s

231

Id.; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918) [hereinafter
Holmes, Jr., Natural] (asserting Social Darwinism as a natural law stating: “A dog will fight for its
bone.”); see Martin B. Hickman, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Reappraisal, 5 WEST. POL. Q. 66, 69–73,
83 (1952) (considering Buck v. Bell at length and noting how Holmes “rejects the natural law of
Cicero but embraces that of Hegel”).
232
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 120–24 (S.W.
Dyde trans., 2001) (“To this place belongs the famous sentence, ‘The end justifies the means.’”),
following and adopting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 123 (A. R. Waller ed., 1904) (“whosoever
has right to the End, has right to the Means”); see Hickman, supra note 231, at 69–73 (explaining
the Hegelian roots of Holmes’s thinking in Buck v. Bell); cf. RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 53,
at 19–20 (analyzing Hegel); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 541 (1842) (“The fundamental
principle applicable to all cases of this sort would seem to be that, where the end is required, the
means are given, and where the duty is enjoined, the ability to perform it is contemplated to exist
on the part of the functionaries to whom it is entrusted.”). Prigg, a predecessor of Buck, is a
Hegelian slick of ends-justify-the-means rationalizations. Id.; Robert Meister, Reviewed Work: The
Partial Constitution by Cass R. Sunstein, 23 POL. THEORY 182, 187 (1995) (observing that Sunstein
adopted a Hegelian ends-justify-the-means principle for constitutional interpretation: “in
Sunstein’s view the appropriate test for judging a theory of constitutional interpretation is the kind
of society that would be produced by practicing it”).
233
BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY xxii (1945) [hereinafter RUSSELL,
A HISTORY].
234
Id.; Norman Jacobson, The Strange Case of the Hobbesian Man, 63 REPRESENTATIONS 1, 1–
2 (1998) (describing the frontispiece of Leviathan).
235
See, e.g., Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1065, 1087–88; Richard Epstein,
Leviathan’s Apologists, L. & LIBERTY: BOOK REV. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://lawliberty.org/bookreview/leviathan-administrative-state-sunstein-vermeule/, reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN (2020); cf. HOBBES, supra note 232, at 231 (Leviathan is defined
as the king over all the children of pride); LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 1–3 (1999)
(offering a theory of law inspired by Hobbes’s attempts to dominate the imagination with reason).
236
Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1065, 1087–88; Sunstein, Cost-Benefit, supra note
162, at 1908.
237
It all appears to go back to this: 1 BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 165, at 1–2; cf.
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 377 (acknowledging the strong pull of Bentham’s
happiness principle, while explaining that it is not rational and lacks evidentiary support).
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research destroyed the idea that a principle of utility can be rationally considered
by humans, cost/benefit balancing tests literally cannot exist.238
Lulu Miller addressed the persistence of such delusions in her book Why
Fish Don’t Exist, after which this article is styled.239 Similarly, Mary Trump
labeled these type of delusions “toxic positivity” linking them to Norman V.
Peale’s self-help styled Christianity presented in his book The Power of Positive
Thinking.240 Lulu and Mary both explained that no one can force another to
engage in discourse to learn about reality or to let go of their harmful delusions.241
As surely as the self-help industry will continue to thrive, and fish will
stay on the menu, so too, nobody can force any other person to discover that
humans are incapable of inherent rational balancing of pain and pleasure.242
Sunstein can maintain a very close relationship with Kahneman himself, and still
defend cost/benefit balancing tests.243 Scientific discovery will never
automatically download itself into our brains, and it will always be hard for old
dogs to learn new tricks;244 but for any of us to discern justice for immigrants it
will require engaging in a discourse with others, rather than engaging in
inherently isolating cost/benefit balancing exercises.245

238

KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 381; LEWIS, supra note 163, at 278 (noting that
“the economists felt that we are right and at the same time they wished we weren’t because the
replacement of utility theory by the model we outlined would cause them no end of problems”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Kahneman actually misdescribes Bentham’s theory, which is
that experienced pain and pleasure automatically inform the rational mind so that it can make
reasonable choices without help from empirically proven sources. Id. at 377 (citing 1 BENTHAM,
AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 165, at 1–2); Kahneman, Back, supra note 175, at 397
(misdescribing Bentham’s utilitarianism as an empirical).
239
MILLER, supra note 6, at 97–106.
240
TRUMP, supra note 19, at 211.
241
MILLER, supra note 6, at 97–106; TRUMP, supra note 19, at 211. This is something Daniel
Kahneman wisely realized during the course of his work with Amos Tversky. LEWIS, supra note
163, at 323 (“‘Amos wanted to crush the opposition,’ said Danny. ‘It just got under his skin more
than it did mine. He wanted to find something to shut people up. Which of course you can never
do.’”).
242
I can’t force you to read this: KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 381; or this: 1
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 165, at 1–2.
243
See generally KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74.
244
Id.; compare Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1065, 1087–88, with KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, supra note 163, at 381.
245
Amy H. Kastely, Cicero’s De Legibus: Law and Talking Justly Toward a Just Community,
3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 3 (1991) (expounding the Ciceronian definition of “law as public
discourse about justice”).
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PART IV: REMEMBERING WHAT WAS LOST IN THE AGE OF BALANCING
According to Professor T. Alexander Aleinikoff, around fifty or so years
ago liberal jurists stopped objecting to cost/benefit balancing tests and America
entered an “age of balancing.”246 Aleinikoff’s view of balancing tests may be too
optimistic, but he still managed to perceive some of the fundamental problems
seething underneath.247 It is worth remembering the almost nostalgic view of
cost/benefit balancing received by the Boomers, presented by Aleinikoff here:
Balancing entered constitutional law like wild clover, not poison
ivy. It appeared in disparate fields, adding color to dreary
doctrinalism. Once rooted, however, it spread, ultimately
changing the hue of the landscape. Harlan Fiske Stone applied
the new methodology with creativity and vigor to commerce
clause, intergovernmental immunity, and civil liberties cases.
Chief Justice Hughes in 1934 balanced the interests of the
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law in Home Building &
Loan Association v. Blaisdell. In 1939, Justice Roberts wrote the
first explicit balancing opinion in a free speech case, Schneider
v. State. In 1944, the Court, through Justice Black(!), ruled that
government actions that discriminated on the basis of race or
national origin could be constitutional if supported by
“[p]ressing public necessity.”248
These were the representative cases perceived by the academy as the “formative
years” of balancing, believed to exist prior to balancing tests entering into
questions of constitutional law.249 It is also a general belief that it was not until
the 1980s that balancing tests became commonplace in constitutional law,
following Justice Powell’s opinions in Mathews v. Eldridge and Stone v.
Powell.250 Cost/benefit balancing tests are now considered, as Professor
Aleinikoff noted, “the central metaphor for procedural due process analysis.”251
However, cost/benefit balancing tests entered into constitutional law
before the 1970s and 80s in Buck v. Bell, involving forced surgical castrations,
and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, involving government vaccine mandates.252
They were directly connected with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s

246

Aleinikoff, Constitutional, supra note 22, at 944, 1005.
Id. at 975.
248
Id. at 963–64.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 964–65 n.126.
251
Id. at 965.
252
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206–08 (1927), extending Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 24 (1905) (applying a cost benefit balancing test).
247
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definition of law as prophecy.253 In fact, cost/benefit balancing tests were clearly
appended to prior eugenics propaganda to justify state adoptions of the model
eugenics law.254
Also, cost/benefit balancing tests, and Holmes’s definition of law itself,
derived from the prior practice of the witch-hanging Puritans.255 In fact, the first
witch hanged in Massachusetts violated a quarantine not unlike the old vaccine
mandates.256 It is an actual historical fact that the tradition of hanging witches in
Massachusetts began as a health law policy to deal with those who failed to
cooperate with safety precautions in the midst of a plague.257
Even though several cycles of cost/benefit balancing preceded the
present age, Professor Aleinikoff’s observation that we are living through an age
of balancing was correct.258 He was also correct that the prevalence of balancing
tests to answer all sorts of questions, including constitutional questions, created
several problems for the American legal establishment.259 Indeed, cost/benefit
balancing tests can seem to create more questions than they answer.260
The biggest of these questions is, perhaps, how to address violations of
substantive rights mandated under the Ninth Amendment.261 For example, the
flagship balancing case Mathews v. Eldridge only stated that: “We conclude that
an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability
253
Id.; see sources cited supra notes 1–3; cf. Hickman, supra note 231, at 69–73 (perceiving
and explaining Justice Holmes’s prophetic contributions in a negative light).
254
LAUGHLIN, supra note 13, at 454 (“Thus, the lawmaker must balance evidence in favor and
against the policy of eugenical sterilization.”); see, e.g., Buck, 274 U.S. at 206–08.
255
See sources cited supra notes 1–6; Nourse, Buck, supra note 13, at 110–12 (“Justice Holmes
was a balancer through and through.”); MILTON, supra note 12, at ls. 865–68; Kay Schriner & Lisa
A. Ochs, Creating the Disabled Citizen: How Massachusetts Disenfranchised People Under
Guardianship, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 494–95 (2001) (“Consistent with the limited heed paid to
private interest were the limitations placed on individual freedom. People could do as they pleased
only so long as their actions were congruent with the greater good.”); cf. 4 BENTHAM, THE WORKS,
supra note 161, at 501 (“Behold what was said in his day by Cromwell! In my eyes, it ranks that
wonderful man higher than anything else I ever read of him:—it will not lower him in yours.”);
AUSTIN WOOLRYCH, COMMONWEALTH TO PROTECTORATE 271–73, 300 (1982).
256
2 JOHN WINTHROP, WINTHROP’S JOURNAL 344–45 (James Kendall Hosmer ed., 1908)
(discussing the witch trial of Margaret Jones, the first person convicted and hanged of witchcraft
for having the “malignant touch” and allegedly causing an epidemic in 1648); 2 RECORDS OF THE
GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 237 (Nathaniel B.
Shurtleff ed., 1853) (recording the first apparent American quarantine law enacted in what appears
to be March of 1648, just before Margaret Jones was convicted of witchcraft); cf. Schriner & Ochs,
supra note 255, at 494 (explaining the origins of ableism in Puritan-American law).
257
See sources cited supra note 256.
258
Aleinikoff, Constitutional, supra note 22, at 944, 1005.
259
Id. at 975.
260
See, e.g., id.
261
Id. at 969; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citing U.S. CONST. amend.
IX); id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
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benefits . . . .”262 Mathews explained only what was not required; it did not
explain how to address alleged violations of actual rights, but only stated that an
evidentiary hearing was not required to do so.263
In the area of indefinite immigrant detention Zadvydas agreed with the
method but disagreed with the result, and required an evidentiary hearing to show
reasonable cause for indefinite detention.264 Jennings v. Rodriguez undermined
this finding, citing a strict reading of the statutory text that aligned more closely
with Mathews’ finding.265 Then in DHS v. Thuraissigiam, the Court appeared to
require dismissal of all habeas corpus writs that did not actually request release—
again slanting in favor of Mathews’ anti-evidentiary-hearing decision.266
But none of these cases, concerned with the existence of administrative
evidentiary hearings, answer the question of how to address violations of
substantive rights.267 Especially in the habeas context, they do not answer the
question of how to address Suspension Clause violations that are inevitably
attached to violations of the basic right to liberty secured under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.268 To answer these questions, one must turn to
Boumediene v. Bush.269
In the run up to the Court’s decision in Boumediene, the U.S. Supreme
Court attempted to extend Zadvydas in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld by answering merely

262

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
Id.
264
Id., partially extended and partially distinguished by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 694
(2001) (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–34 (1982)).
265
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 850 (2018) (refusing to extend Zadvydas to an asylum
seeker petition); see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
266
DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969–76 (2020); see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
267
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1969–76; Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 850; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
694; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349; cf. KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74, at 333–34, 341 (appearing
to argue in favor of Mathews’ holding that “individualized hearing[s]” that fail a cost/benefit
balancing test should be abolished in favor of “noiseless” artificial intelligence algorithms, and
suggesting that computers rather than people should determine whether a person has access to an
individual hearing), expressing disagreement with Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976) (overruling a law for “treat[ing] all persons convicted of a designated offense not as
uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death”).
268
See cases and sources cited supra note 267; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976).
269
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (overruling an express repeal of § 2241
as a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus), extending INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 n.25
(2001) (“In fact, § 2241 descends directly from § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the 1867
Act. . . . Its text remained undisturbed by either AEDPA or IIRIRA.”). But see Nasrallah v. Barr,
140 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (2020) (addressing changes to the IIRIRA that were enacted in 2005 without
addressing the U.S. Constitution’s strong prohibition against suspensions of habeas corpus that
was explicitly extended to non-U.S. citizens in Boumediene v. Bush in 2008 under the original
Judiciary Act of 1789 that is not superseded, repealed, overruled, or otherwise set aside by any law
or U.S. Supreme Court decision).
263
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whether further administrative proceedings could secure Hamdi’s due process
rights in lieu of a common law treason trial.270 The plurality opinion concluded
that though “the ‘process’ Hamdi has received is not that to which he is entitled
under the Due Process Clause,” that it was still possible “that the standards we
have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly
constituted military tribunal.”271 The Court used a balancing test to punt the
question of what to do to secure Hamdi’s rights to a military tribunal in a black
site that is legally not supposed to exist.272
The military tribunal embarrassed the U.S. Supreme Court by ignoring
Hamdi, deporting Hamdi, stripping him of his U.S. citizenship, and putting him
on a no fly list.273 There was no possible way, after punting the issue, for the
Court to reclaim its time.274 The decision to punt was the decision on Hamdi’s
rights, and thus, Hamdi stands as an affirmative decision to ignore a U.S.
citizen’s right to a treason trial prior to being punished for treason.275
However, Hamdi was not the final say on the issue.276 Hamdi’s sister
case, Rasul v. Bush, required review in federal court under the Suspension Clause
to decide, at the very least, whether Congress unconstitutionally suspended
habeas corpus.277 Rasul led to Hamdan, which finally resulted in Boumediene v.

270
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528–29, 538 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)).
271
Id. at 538.
272
Id. Dahlia Lithwick initially felt this move was “more right than wrong.” Dahlia Lithwick,
More Right Than Wrong, SLATE (June 28, 2004, 2:04 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2004/06/more-right-than-wrong.html [hereinafter Lithwick, More].
273
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
274
Id.
275
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276
See id. at 510 (plurality opinion) (arising under the Authorization for Use of Military Force
of 2001, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224), superseded by statute Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of
2005, Pub. L. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3474; Military Commission Act (MCA) of 2006, Pub. L. 109366, 120 Stat. 2600, as recognized in Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 996–98 (9th Cir. 2013);
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008) (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution
has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.” (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting))); cf.
Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1028–29 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (explaining the congressional and
judicial events that led from Hamdi’s sister case Rasul v. Bush to Boumdiene v. Bush’s vindication
of the rights of alleged non-U.S. citizen enemy combatants).
277
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472–73 (2004); see Aamer, 742 F.3d at 1028–29 (“The story
starts with Rasul v. Bush,” a decision which led to “Congress pass[ing] the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 (DTA), which contained a provision designed to abrogate Rasul and strip federal courts of
jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees’ claims,” which resulted in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which
narrowly construed the DTA, to which “Congress responded by passing the MCA, the statute at
issue in this case, whose jurisdiction-stripping provisions unequivocally applied to all claims
brought by Guantanamo detainees” and finally to the Court’s final response and decision “in
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792, that “MCA section 7 ‘operates as an unconstitutional suspension of
the writ.’”).
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Bush, after further amendments to the statute by Congress in an attempt to
preclude the Court from answering the constitutional question by suspending the
writ.278
Even though Boumediene produced an exhaustive exposition of the
constitutional minimum of the common law privilege of habeas corpus that
Congress is mandated to extend to every person, the Boumediene precedent
remains largely dormant.279 In the age of balancing, the legal community seems
to have forgotten how to apply stare decisis to similar facts before the court.280
Thus, remedies for immigrants under Boumediene were not requested in
Thuraissigiam.281
The natural argument that flows from Boumediene is this: if the writ runs
to a black site in a foreign country to release foreign nationals, then it should also
extend to immigrants detained within the United States.282 But this argument was
not generally pursued in Thuraissigiam.283 Instead, in the age of balancing and
with the best of intentions, Boumediene was misused in attempts to justify more
process in administrative proceedings.284

278

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33, 792; see Aamer, 742 F.3d at 1028–29.
See DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969–76 (2020) (distinguishing Boumediene
based on the fact that Mr. Thuraissigiam did not “seek[] release from custody”) (emphasis in
original); Salahi v. Obama, No. 05-0596, 2015 WL 9216557, at *4–5 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2015);
Salahi v. Obama, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2010) (extending Boumediene to decide: “The
petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. Salahi must be released from custody.”), vacated and
remanded, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (boldly flouting Boumediene); Bostan v. Obama, 662 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 3–4 (D.D.C. 2009) (balancing away petitioner’s common law rights despite
Boumediene); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207–08 (D.D.C. 2009) (misinterpreting
Boumediene’s critical factor test as a multifactor balancing test), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84, 98–99 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (using the district court’s misinterpretation of Boumediene to apply only two factors as
sufficient to deny habeas corpus); cf. THE MAURITANIAN (STX Films 2021) (dramatizing the
judiciary’s disappointing reluctance to apply Boumediene in Salahi v. Obama).
280
See, e.g., Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32
(1982)); Salahi, 625 F.3d at 750–51 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534); Bostan, 662 F. Supp. 2d at
3–4; cf. Lee Kovarsky, Habeas Privilege Origination and DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 121 COLUM. L.
REV. F. 23, 24 (2021) (misconstruing Boumediene as a balancing test case).
281
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1976 (distinguishing Boumediene based on the fact that Mr.
Thuraissigiam did not “seek[] release from custody”) (emphasis in original).
282
See Schroeder, Conservative, supra note 105, at 47, 61 (“[T]he Writ does not have a
geographic limitation and may be asserted against any custodian the U.S. Courts have jurisdiction
over including U.S. military officers that run black sites in foreign countries.”).
283
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1976.
284
Id. (arising after Boumediene was decided, when immigration attorneys attempted to use
Boumediene to get more process in EOIR without asking for common law release); cf. cases at
supra note 27 (demonstrating well-meaning attempts by district court judges to vindicate the rights
of immigrants to more process in EOIR through cost/benefit balancing tests).
279
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We know these efforts in the immigration arena are collapsing and yet
we fail to reevaluate.285 Kahneman and Tversky proved humanity’s inherent
inability to understand their own pain and pleasure,286 and yet Kahneman
endorsed the famed cost/benefit balancer Cass R. Sunstein.287 We have the
cautionary tale of Hamdi,288 and yet the Hamdi strategy was renewed when
Boumediene was magically reinterpreted as a balancing test case in the lower
courts.289
We can objectively know that we are being irrational, and yet this
knowledge obviously does not force human beings to reevaluate their
behavior.290 Knowledge alone is not a salve for the delusions that plague us in
the age of balancing.291 It was, therefore, not a trick of knowledge that caused
the delusions we face.292 Rather, judges apply cost/benefit balancing tests
because they promise control over the future—which feels right—it soothes their
anxieties.293
Judges lose their freedom to act in the present when they soothe their
anxieties about the uncertain future with cost/benefit balancing tests.294 In

285

See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191–196 and accompanying text.
287
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 144, 351, 412 (noting Sunstein’s influence); see
generally KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74.
288
See cases and sources cited supra note 276 (noting how Hamdi is superseded by law and
replaced by Boumediene); see also Lithwick, Nevermind, supra note 77.
289
See cases and sources cited supra note 279.
290
LEWIS, supra note 163, at 223 (“[T]he most sophisticated minds [are] prone to error . . . ‘their
intuitive judgments are liable to similar fallacies.’”); id. at 342 (“‘People tried to ignore it,’ said
Thaler. ‘Old economists never change their minds.’”); see supra note 279 and accompanying text.
291
Compare Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1068 (expressing a desire, perhaps borne
of his own anxieties, to collect the pros and cons of risk regulations “by placing the various effect
on-screen”), with MILLER, supra note 6, at 14–15, 97–106 (the activity of collecting knowledge
had more to do with the emotional state of the collector than the intrinsic value of the knowledge).
292
MILLER, supra note 6, at 14–15, 97–106.
293
Id. at 14–15 (noting that David Starr Jordan’s obsessive collecting of fish likely had to do
with soothing his stress and anxiety); id. at 98–99 (“[I]t became widely accepted that a dash of
self-deception . . . was good for the bones.”); id. at 102–03 (“Maybe David Starr Jordan is proof
that a steady dose of hubris is the best way of overcoming the odds.”); see also TRUMP, supra note
19, at 211.
294
Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1068 (advocating without evidence that putting costs
and benefits “on-screen” has an inherent value). For example, the Hamdi Court’s attempt to put
Mr. Hamdi’s interests “on-screen” precluded it from securing Hamdi’s right to a common law
treason trial. Id.; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528–29 (2004) (plurality opinion); Lithwick,
Nevermind, supra note 77. In another example, when the Landon Court put the government’s
interests “on-screen,” it enabled the Thuraissigiam Court to use that information as if it were a
holding to dismiss future cases without considering costs or benefits. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140
S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)); cf. JOHN ADAMS,
DISCOURSES ON DAVILA 62 (1790) [hereinafter ADAMS, DISCOURSES] (explaining why human
286

(CORRECTED) SCHROEDER TO PUBLISHER WITH PAGE BREAKS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

WHY COST/BENEFIT BALANCING TESTS DON’T EXIST

11/9/22 1:20 PM

229

Hamdi, the Court could have ordered the suspected terrorist’s release pending a
constitutional treason trial, and then presumably Hamdi would have been given
his trial rather than being released.295 But the Court was deluded; it thought
ordering release of a potentially dangerous terrorist might reflect badly on it.296
Perhaps images of the World Trade Center burning tormented their
minds, and thus they feared releasing any alleged enemy combatant.297 If Hamdi
was such a dangerous traitor, however, the U.S. Supreme Court should not have
feared, because the U.S. government would have easily detained him until his
actual trial.298 But irrational fears won out on the U.S. Supreme Court, and so it
punted to the military who punished Hamdi as a traitor without having to prove
it first.299
The delusion that requiring a common law treason trial before punishing
a U.S. citizen for treason might cause a catastrophe convinced the Court to
delegitimize itself in Hamdi.300 The Court accomplished exactly the kind of
delegitimization that it was trying to avoid.301 The same kind of delusion caused
the Court to dismiss Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, which appeared
to implicitly accept former President Donald Trump’s false claim that asylum
seekers were an invading force.302
Some jurists likely fear that if the court released immigrants into the
country pending legitimate process, it could create a catastrophe.303 We have the
Nobel Prize winning research of David Card proving that no such catastrophe
awaits destination countries with open borders, and that excluding immigrants

beings support systems they objectively know are unjust: “‘Neither is our deference to their
inclinations founded chiefly, or altogether, upon a regard to the utility of such submission . . . .’”
Rather, utility “‘is the doctrine of reason and philosophy; but not the doctrine of nature.’” (quoting
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 74 (1892) [hereinafter SMITH, THE THEORY])).
295
See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296
Id. at 529 (believing that using Mathews made its decision moderate).
297
Cf. Andrew Cohen, Crying Wolf in the War Against Terror, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2004,
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-aug-16-oe-cohen16-story.html
(expressing one view about how the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Hamdi played out badly after
the federal government deported Hamdi without a trial).
298
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
299
Id. at 528–29 (plurality opinion); Lithwick, Nevermind, supra note 77.
300
Lithwick, Nevermind, supra note 77.
301
See cases and sources cited supra notes 296–299.
302
Compare DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969–76 (2020), with Jack Herrera, One
Way Trump May Have Changed Immigration Forever, POLITICO (Mar. 2, 2021, 4:30 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/03/02/biden-immigration-trump-legacy-asylumrefugees-472008 (noting that “Trump’s obsessive tweeting led many of his supporters to
understand the arrival of two caravans of asylum seekers from Central America as an ‘invasion’”).
303
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1970 (expressing extreme fear of releasing immigrants in a
radical and draconian redefinition of what habeas release is).
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costs the U.S. government billions of dollars every year.304 We also know that
when the U.S. government illegally repatriated around two-million people of
Mexican descent in the 1930s, it extended the very economic depression that it
was trying to end.305
We can know that austerity doesn’t work, and that taking a more
generous approach toward immigrants and asylum seekers might actually benefit
our society by making us rich and happy, but this knowledge does not change
behavior.306 Our emotions leave us susceptible to even simple manipulations.307
The illogical and absurd lengths that even the most elite Americans are willing
to take to protect bigoted dogmas are written on the pages of recent U.S. Supreme
Court precedent.308
For example, in Thuraissigiam, Justice Alito wrote: “While respondent
does not claim an entitlement to release, the Government is happy to release
him—provided the release occurs in the cabin of a plane bound for Sri Lanka.”309
Justice Alito knows that to legally conflate habeas release with deportation, he
would not only need to get a majority of the Court to overrule Boumediene and
Bollman in a future case, but he would also have to prevail upon the sitting

304

See sources cited supra notes 202–203.
Apology Act for the 1930s Mexican Repatriation Program, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8720–23
(West 2006); Jongkwan Lee et al., The Employment Effects of Mexican Repatriations: Evidence
from the 1930’s 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23885, 2017) (“We find that
cities with larger repatriation intensity, driven by a larger initial Mexican community, performed
similarly or worse in terms of native employment and wages, relative to cities which were similar
in most labor market characteristics but which experienced small repatriation intensity. This
finding is robust across specifications, subsamples and estimation methods. Not only did
politicians’ claims not hold true, but the opposite seems closer to what happened in reality.”).
306
Cf. Herrera, supra note 302 (showing how Trump’s behavior of degrading immigrants
publicly has become widely accepted in America as a valid point of view).
307
Id. (“Having successfully made opposition to Muslim refugees mainstream two years earlier,
during the 2018 midterms, Trump’s obsessive tweeting led many of his supporters to understand
the arrival of two caravans of asylum seekers from Central America as an ‘invasion.’” (quoting
@realdonaldtrump,
TWITTER
(Oct.
29,
2018,
10:41
AM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22invasion%22 (“Many Gang Members and
some very bad people are mixed into the Caravan heading to our Southern Border . . . . This is an
invasion of our Country and our Military is waiting for you.”)); cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2
(allowing Congress to suspend habeas corpus in cases of “Invasion”).
308
See cases cited supra notes 94–96; cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206–08 (1927)
(demonstrating that one of the most beloved jurists of our time, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
defended and established draconian policies premised on misogyny and bigotry).
309
DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1970 (2020).
305
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president to make it so.310 Nevertheless, this knowledge failed to moderate
Alito’s wild rhetoric steeped in presumptuous, self-flagellating sarcasm.311
Yet again, knowing the limits of the U.S. Supreme Court will not change
the behavior of those that sit on the bench.312 Their anti-immigrant dogmas are
threatened.313 Justice Alito sensed that his impious religious dogmas might be
overwrought by the immigration rights that Saint Paul asserted at the Court of
Festus in Caesarea to appeal his case against the Sanhedrin of Jerusalem, which
were unanimously reaffirmed by Johnson v. Eisentrager.314
Foreign Jews do not threaten the basis of the U.S. republic.315 Antiimmigrant dicta issued by weak men in an attempt to defend impiety in the name
of Jesus, who was himself a Jew, is not enough to overrun the baseline
constitutional minimum affirmed in Boumediene v. Bush.316 As messy as the
illogical tantrums of Justice Alito are,317 even when they manage to carry a

310
Id. at 1969 n.12, 1975, 1981 (distinguishing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Ex
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807)); see, e.g., Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 2528, 2552–53 (2022)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (noting his disagreement with President Biden’s order undoing the MPP, but
struggling with his own logic that was extended in Aleman Gonzalez that disclaimed the Court’s
jurisdiction to meddle with the president’s administration of immigration law).
311
See cases cited supra notes 309–310; see, e.g., CNN, See Moment Justice Alito Mocks
Foreign
Critics
of
Abortion
Ruling,
YOUTUBE
(July
29,
2022),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Bwt8E7kTFw (stating that Justice Alito’s speech at Notre
Dame’s 2022 religious liberty summit in Rome, Italy “was so classic Samuel Alito . . . he exudes
a sense of aggrievement all the time even as he is winning,” and noting that “he cannot help but
engage in sarcasm, that’s his way”).
312
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1970.
313
Id.
314
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950) (citing Acts 25:10–11); id. at 798 (Black,
J., dissenting) (citing Acts 25:16); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008)
(modifying and limiting Eisentrager’s critical factor test); Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1975
(distinguishing Boumediene).
315
See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 769 (inspired by Paul of Tarsus’s appeal from Caesarea to Rome
to place the ultimate functional limit on habeas corpus as far out as possible); cf. HANNAH ARENDT,
ON REVOLUTION 215 (1965) (vindicating the revolutionary basis of the U.S. republic as a precious
treasure, worth remembering).
316
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 769, extended and modified in Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766; cf.
ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION 10–11 (1644) (decrying “[t]he bloody
irreligious and inhumane oppressions and destructions under the mask or veil of the Name of
Christ”).
317
See sources cited supra notes 309–311; see, e.g., Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1970; see also
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 850 (2018) (attacking the dissent as unrestrained in
comparison to the majority opinion, while explicitly refusing to consider whether the statute as
interpreted by the Court would necessarily be overruled by the U.S. Constitution); id. at 875
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “we should decide the constitutional question here and now,”
because “[w]e have already asked for and received briefs on that question”). The imprudence of
Justice Alito’s opinion in Jennings consists in the fact that if the Court, in a future case, decides
that Justice Alito’s statutory construction in Jennings violates the U.S. Constitution and must be
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majority of the Court they only speak to the emotional manipulation at the heart
of the age of balancing.318
PART V: PARTING THE VEIL – WHAT ARE COST/BENEFIT BALANCING TESTS
REALLY?
A recent utilitarian study applying cost/benefit balancing tests concluded
“we find that veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good.”319 After
Kahneman and Tversky’s research, this is little more than the Wizard of Oz
shouting: “Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain!”320 For Kahneman
and Tversky proved that self-interest is irrational and that humans tend to pursue
satisfaction over happiness, and yet the utilitarians are still rationally weighing
and balancing outcomes.321

overruled, then potentially several thousand cases of immigrant detention prosecuted under
Jennings may be suable in such a way that the U.S. Supreme Court may be visibly implicated as a
primary cause of the unconstitutional injustices experienced by immigrants. Id.; see Johnson v.
Arteaga-Martinez, 142 S. Ct. 1827, 1834 (2022) (admitting that Jennings was a rejection of, rather
than an application of, constitutional avoidance doctrine); id. at 1835 (noting that ArteagaMartinez’s constitutional claims regarding release are still at play and implying that these claims
may, in time, reverse Jennings).
318
See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text; cf. LEWIS, supra note 163, at 261 (“When
they made decisions, people did not seek to maximize utility. They sought to minimize regret.”
(emphasis in original)). The basic structure of Suspension Clause jurisdiction still survives. U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766; cf. ERIC M. FREEDMAN, MAKING HABEAS
WORK 7 (2018) (explaining habeas corpus fundamentals, including the common law origins of
habeas corpus).
319
Karen Huang, Joshua D. Greene & Max Bazerman, Veil-of-Ignorance Reasoning Favors the
Greater Good, 116 PROCS. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. OF THE U.S. 23989, 23990 (2019)
(applying the veil-of-ignorance to utilitarian cost/benefit analyses).
320
THE WIZARD OF OZ (MGM 1939).
321
LEWIS, supra note 163, at 261, 266, 272–73, 277; see Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton,
High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but not Emotional Well-Being, 107 PROCS. OF THE NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCIS. OF THE U.S. 16489 (2010) (“We conclude that high income buys life satisfaction
but not happiness.”); KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 377–78, 381 (debunking
utilitarianism by showing that human beings are incapable of rationally pursuing utility). Compare
RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 56, at 31 (“Dogma demands authority, rather than intelligent
thought, as the source of opinion; it requires persecution of heretics and hostility to unbelievers; it
asks of its disciples that they should inhibit natural kindliness in favour of systematic hatred.”),
with 1 BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 165, at 1–2 (“The principle of utility recognizes
this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the
fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law.”) (emphasis in original).

(CORRECTED) SCHROEDER TO PUBLISHER WITH PAGE BREAKS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

WHY COST/BENEFIT BALANCING TESTS DON’T EXIST

11/9/22 1:20 PM

233

It is commonplace for human beings to pursue reason, even where it is
objectively unreasonable to do so.322 For example, Amos Tversky’s “love affair”
with Daniel Kahneman began in 1969 over Tversky’s attempts to prove inherent
human rationalism—a proposition Kahneman and Tversky proceeded to spend
their careers dismantling.323 Then, against the evidence he himself produced,
Kahneman endorsed Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein’s book Nudge.324
Nudge unscientifically presupposed the inherent rationality of society’s
choice architects. 325 It promised that choice architects could overcome the
inherent irrationality of humankind through subtle manipulations, and
specifically concerned itself with fixing the Homer Simpsons of society.326
However, Thaler and Sunstein expressly admitted that they too are subject to
“biases in human decision making,” and that even geniuses like Beethoven were
imbeciles.327
This admission was mere good humor to charm an audience; it was not
a pledge to adopt a “humbler approach” going forward.328 In fact, Thaler and
Sunstein subsumed everything into the preexisting cost/benefit balancing test
heuristics of Justice Holmes, applied to disastrous effect in Buck v. Bell and
beyond.329 They did not encourage choice architects, including the members of

322

See generally, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, THE AGE OF REASON (1794) [hereinafter PAINE, THE
AGE]. Paine’s Age of Reason discussed the inherent rationality of human beings amid the French
Revolution, even as strong evidence of the inherent irrationality of humans unfolded all around
him. Id. In fact, this treatise was split into two parts, because Paine almost lost his head at the
Guillotine in an absurd procession of political trials that punished criminals and innocents alike,
and even in this context Paine was not convinced to walk away from his project. Id.
323
Daniel Engber, The Irony Effect: How the Scientist Who Founded the Science of Mistakes
Ended
Up
Mistaken,
SLATE
(Dec.
21,
2016,
12:17
PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2016/12/kahneman-and-tversky-researched-the-science-of-errorand-still-made-errors.html.
324
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at cover (including an endorsement from Kahneman);
see LEWIS, supra note 163, at 286 (“To Danny the whole idea of proving that people weren’t
rational felt a bit like proving that people didn’t have fur.”).
325
Robert Sugden, Do People Really Want to be Nudged Towards Healthy Lifestyles?, 64 INT’L
REV. OF ECON. 113, 122 (2017); Slavisa Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, 17 J. DES ECONOMISTES
ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES 1, 15 (2011).
326
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 45, 52–53 (“[L]et’s design policies for Homer
economicus.”).
327
Id. at xii, 26, 40–43 (“We are supposedly experts on biases in human decision making, but
that definitely does not mean we are immune to them! Just the opposite.”).
328
Sugden, supra note 325, at 122; Tasic, supra note 325, at 15.
329
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 166–68, 312, 331; Nourse, Buck, supra note 13, at
111–14.
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the U.S. Supreme Court, to humbly consider their own irrational nature as a
proven fact.330
Instead, they advocated judicial hypocrisy.331 Thaler and Sunstein
acknowledged that Kahneman and Tversky were correct, that all humans are at
some level a Homer Simpson, and their solution was that the Homers at the top
should manipulate the behavior of those at the bottom presupposing that the
result will be rational.332 In fact, they implicitly hope that society might stop
thinking about the choice architects at the top as Homers or even as humans at
all.333 They seriously suggested that computer algorithms may be used to govern
humanity better than humans.334
The idea that machines would be better at governing us than we would
be seems to ignore the basic lesson of The Matrix.335 In fact, Thaler and Sunstein
appear to ignore the idea that the arts have any role in human decision making at
all—positing that all decision making should be reduced to clean math.336
Barring the possibility that Thaler and Sunstein are secret transhumanists,337 it
seems that they fell for the very biased heuristics that they sought to avoid.338
In the pages of Nudge where Kahneman and Tversky’s work is paid
tribute, Thaler and Sunstein unloaded an embarrassing story about one of
Kahneman’s parenting strategies.339 They wrote that in order to manipulate his
son to stop asking for toys, Kahneman told his son that he has two systems of

330

THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 45; Sugden, supra note 325, at 122.
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 45; Sugden, supra note 325, at 122; Tasic, supra
note 316, at 15.
332
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 40–45.
333
Id. at 45; Sugden, supra note 325, at 122.
334
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 45, 124, 132, 147; Sunstein, Governing, supra note
189, at 5; see supra note 174 and accompanying text.
335
See generally THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999).
336
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 45, 124, 132, 147, 166–68, 312, 331; Richard H.
Thaler, Nobel Prize Banquet Speech (2017), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economicsciences/2017/thaler/speech/ (hoping to hone economic theories “just as those fancy microscopes
improve the resolution of images in biochemistry”); Sunstein, Governing, supra note 189, at 5; see
supra note 174 and accompanying text.
337
Cf. BBC, I’m Transhuman. I’m Going to Become Digital – BBC, YOUTUBE (May 14, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qOcktbXSfxU (explaining transhumanism, a fringe point of
view that could explain why Thaler and Sunstein feel so strongly that humanity’s irrational nature
is a problem that needs to be fixed).
338
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 26–29, 102, 189; cf. Tasic, supra note 325, at
15 (arguing that “our ignorance is fundamental” and therefore “resistant to rectification by an even
higher expert”); Sugden, supra note 325, at 122 (noting strong reasons why Thaler and Sunstein’s
claims about nudging are “misleading” and arguing that “[a]dvocates of nudging should come
clean about the paternalism of their position and defend it directly”).
339
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 42–43.
331
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thinking—fast and slow.340 Kahneman used his slow thinking to manipulate his
son’s fast thinking by inspiring emotions of pride and dejection.341
The benefit was solely Kahneman’s, and the cost solely borne by his
son—the choice architect made it seem that it would be stupid to go get more
toys.342 So, the chooser decided to stop asking for toys because he perceived his
father would find him a dunce if he kept asking, that is, Kahneman convinced his
son that if he kept asking for toys he would wear the scarlet letter of being a bad
cost/benefit balancer—he would be seen as a Homer Simpson.343 Thaler and
Sunstein hailed this as proof of concept—that Kahneman’s theory of thinking
fast and slow can and should be used to manipulate others to make choices that
the choice architect finds rational.344
Thaler and Sunstein’s choice architects are allowed to subtract
themselves from the cost/benefit equation.345 The irrationality of their inquiries,
including the question of whether applying a cost/benefit analysis is rational at
all, is not considered; only the irrationality of the subjects they apply their tests
to is analyzed.346 Choice architects may also assume that all people want to be
manipulated into making better choices as defined by choice architects.347
So, without proving cost/benefit balancing tests are rational and without
so much as a referendum to confirm that people actually want to be subject to
government administered manipulations based upon cost/benefit balancing tests,
Thaler and Sunstein’s choice architects may presuppose it would still be a good
idea, on the whole, to weigh and balance costs and benefits.348 In other words,
the findings of Kahneman and Tversky do not apply to Thaler and Sunstein’s

340

Id.
Id. (One day Declan “asked ‘Daddy, do I even have a System Two?’”). After Kahneman’s
parenting technique, his son thought perhaps he was more of a lizard brain than a human. Id.
342
Id. (“[T]he explanation seemed to work, and Declan could pass by toy stores without uttering
a word.”).
343
Id.; cf. LEWIS, supra note 163, at 261 (“People did not seek to avoid other emotions with the
same energy they sought to avoid regret.”).
344
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 42–43.
345
Id. at 312; cf. LEWIS, supra note 163, at 261 (explaining how cost/benefit balancers failed to
calculate the psychology of emotions into decision making heuristics, and how Daniel Kahneman
began to address this problem by explaining the central role of human emotions such as the feeling
of regret in human decision-making).
346
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 42–43, 312; Sugden, supra note 325, at 122; Tasic,
supra note 325, at 15.
347
Sugden, supra note 325, at 122; cf. Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1059–60 (arguing
that all people would want cost/benefit balancing tests to determine their choice architecture “if in
fact they were aware of the cost-benefit analysis”), quoting and disagreeing with Joseph Biden,
Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 310 (1994) (statement of Sen.
Joseph Biden, Chairman).
348
See sources cited supra notes 345–347.
341
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choice architects.349 Therefore, choice architects are homo economicus, i.e., not
humans, and do not need to “accept that wherever there is judgement, there is
noise.”350
The cost/benefit balancing test itself is a Benthamite Panopticon by
another name.351 Instead of making its subjects feel seen, the cost/benefit
balancing test makes its subjects feel heard—and out of this hearing, the
decision-maker is dogmatically presumed just, the same way as God is presumed
just—without evidence.352 This is strikingly similar to Bentham’s claim that if all
humans felt seen by the government, then they would presume the government
omniscient and therefore omnipotent (a claim James Otis wisely preempted prior
to the American Revolution).353
When Thaler and Sunstein disclose to the masses that we are all in some
sense a Homer Simpson, they are asking us to be ashamed of our irrational way
of thinking—telegraphing through our emotions that our irrationality is a
problem that needs to be solved.354 When they teach us of how we think fast and
slow, and that with this knowledge we can overcome our shameful lizard brains,
they are asking us to take pride in this knowledge—to feel smug about their
promise that through knowledge we can fix our brains.355 What we need, Thaler

349
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 42–43; Sugden, supra note 325, at 122; Tasic, supra
note 325, at 15.
350
Evan Nesterak, A Conversation with Daniel Kahneman About “Noise”, BEHAV. SCIENTIST
(May 24, 2021), https://behavioralscientist.org/a-conversation-with-daniel-kahneman-aboutnoise/; Sugden, supra note 325, at 122.
351
1 JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON 3 (1791) [hereinafter BENTHAM, PANOPTICON]; see
Jacques-Alain Miller, Jeremy Bentham’s Panoptic Device, 41 MIT PRESS 3, 3–6 (Richard Miller
trans.) (1987); compare Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976), with Lewis F. Powell Jr.,
Habeas Corpus Committee – Report, Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, Box 777/Folder 6, at 7–27 (1990)
[hereinafter Powell Report] (advocating the virtual suspension of habeas corpus by statute without
engaging in the ruse of cost benefit balancing), adopted by Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; cf. Confidential Memorandum from
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Mr. Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Chamber of Com. Educ.
Comm.
(August
23,
1971),
https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf [hereinafter Powell Memo]
(advocating that pro-corporation ideologues engineer the success of corporations by using rational
systems that take advantage of humankind’s general lack of reason), generally inspired by
BERNAYS, supra note 12, at epigraph (quoting MILTON, supra note 12, at ls. 865–68).
352
See sources cited supra notes 345–350; Stone, 428 U.S. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
353
See sources cited supra notes 345–350; Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 46, at 9–10
(“Bentham’s Panopticon was directly preempted by James Otis.”).
354
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 45.
355
Id. at 42, 45. “Humans sometimes go with the answer the lizard inside is giving without
pausing to think”—the manipulation of calling part of our brain “lizard” is similar to Mill’s
evidence-less ad hominem assertion that Bentham was a swine. Id.; see source cited infra note 380.
Within the insult is the presupposition that lizards are unwise or stupid, which is reminiscent of the
eugenicists’ quasi-religious ladder to heaven. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 143–45.
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and Sunstein say, to overcome our shameful irrationality, is a paternalistic
government to trick us into making better choices.356
This emotional manipulation that lies behind Nudge also lies behind
cost/benefit balancing tests.357 It is not an application of Kahneman and
Tversky’s empirical research; rather, it is repackaged Hobbesian pride and
dejection to manipulate the masses to adopt strong centralized governments and
to consequently abandon the common law.358 It is an old populist manipulation,
a play on human emotion that long predates Kahneman and Tversky’s work, but
which also seems to be malleable enough to corrupt almost any good idea.359
In the language developed by Kahneman and Tversky, when a judge uses
a cost/benefit balancing test, that judge is using his or her slow brain to
manipulate the fast part of other people’s brains to get what the judge wants.360
It is like telling a boy that he is using his fast brain whenever he complains about
not getting to go to the toy store, which is the same as dressing him down for
being a human.361 Cost/benefit balancing tests make some claims about science
and positive outcomes, but ultimately it is a dogmatic justifier for dismissal of a
complaint.362
In the end, the boy may be entranced by a feeling of pride that derives
from knowing the theory of how his inner brain is working or how some greater
societal good is being served by his suffering.363 In the moment, this feeling,
along with the feeling of making one’s father proud, may be perceived as more

356

THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 45.
Compare id., with Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1059–60; MILLER, supra note 6,
at 14–15, 97–106; see supra note 293 and accompanying text.
358
Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 47, at 143; MILLER, supra note 6, at 143–45.
359
See HOBBES, supra note 232, at 46–48.
360
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 42–45.
361
Id.
362
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927);
cf. Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1068 (naming the supposed benefits of putting costs and
benefits “on-screen” without considering the costs of delays caused by gathering and analyzing
this knowledge).
363
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 42–43 (suggesting that Declan should be and
presumably is comforted by the knowledge of his lizard brain); see ADAMS, DISCOURSES, supra
note 294, at 62 (“Our obsequiousness to our superiors more frequently arises from our admiration
for the advantages of their situation, than from any private expectations of benefit from their good
will. Their benefits can extend but to a few; but their fortunes interest almost everybody. We are
eager to assist them in completing a system of happiness that approaches so near to perfection; and
we desire to serve them for their own sake, without any other recompense but the vanity or the
honor of obliging them. Neither is our deference to their inclinations founded chiefly, or altogether,
upon a regard to the utility of such submission, and to the order of society, which is best supported
by it. Even when the order of society seems to require that we should oppose them, we can hardly
bring ourselves to do it.” (quoting SMITH, THE THEORY, supra note 294, at 73–74) (internal
quotations omitted)).
357
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rewarding than the prospect of more toys.364 However, in the long run, children
grow up and may question their upbringing because new adults sometimes
realize when their parents told them something just to get them to shut up.365
New feelings are piled on top of the old ones—perhaps a child has an
epiphany later in life that a parent, or an aunt or uncle, had a tendency to misuse
their knowledge of psychology to abuse them.366 Once such a child learns that
the source of the abuse he or she experienced was a psychological trick, it is not
the underlying knowledge or research about psychology that they consider the
trick—the knowledge is only a chaser to help the medicine go down.367 At some
point, when knowledge doesn’t inspire compliance, violence is employed.368
Nevertheless, Cass R. Sunstein somehow convinced others to fudge the
line between the choice architect and the chooser.369 It is as if Sunstein defined
human choice as informing everyone they are irrational, and then manipulating
them to get the results the choice architect desires.370 Call it “libertarian
paternalism,” call it whatever you like, it is no different from a bid to transform
the U.S. Government into a Bernaysian public relations operation that engineers
consent.371
In fact, Thaler and Sunstein’s central, defining term for their movement
“libertarian paternalism” seems to be a mere talking point for them to distract
from the propaganda justification they put forth.372 Nobody takes the idea of

364

THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 42–43; cf. HOBBES, supra note 232, at 46–48
(explaining his theory of inherent human madness premised upon the co-occurring emotions of
pride and dejection).
365
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 42–43; see generally HARPER LEE, GO SET A
WATCHMAN (2015) (demonstrating the lengths American parents went through in order to pass
down their racism and elitism to future generations).
366
LEE, supra note 365, at 260, 271 (“She slammed down the drunk lid, snatched out the key,
and straightened up to catch Dr. Finch’s savage backhand swipe full on the mouth. Her head jerked
to the left and met his hand coming viciously back . . . . ‘Don’t you tell me you can’t, girl! Say that
again and I’ll take this stick to you, I mean that!’”); cf. MILLER, supra note 6, at 111, 123
(explaining how David Starr Jordan may have murdered Jane Stanford for getting in his way).
367
LEE, supra note 365, at 261 (“Jean Louise drank and choked. ‘Hold your breath, stupid. Now
chase it.’”).
368
See sources cited supra notes 366–367.
369
Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1059–60.
370
Id.
371
Id.; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 6; Edward Bernays, The Engineering of Consent,
250 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 113, 113–14 (1947); BERNAYS, supra note
12, at epigraph (quoting MILTON, supra note 12, at ls. 865–68 (giving the Puritan version of
cost/benefit balancing tests)).
372
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 6 (“We are keenly aware that this term is not one
that many readers will find immediately endearing.”).
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libertarian paternalism seriously, including Thaler and Sunstein.373 It actually
appears that they raised this oxymoron, as all good Hegelians do, just to exhaust
everyone before they are able to fully comprehend what they are actually
saying.374
Cass R. Sunstein, the bureaucrat among them, is famously unconcerned
with government form.375 Given the rare opportunity to pass down a serious
canon of constitutional theory to future generations, Sunstein decided to ruin Star
Wars instead.376 To take a line from Professor Victoria Nourse, Sunstein
“believe[s] that the Constitution could be reduced to ad hoc balancing,” i.e.,
Sunstein doesn’t care about the Constitution as long as it supports The CostBenefit State.377
Much more could be said about the specific delusions that must be held
by these men.378 It is strange to see them spend the last portion of their careers
lamenting the death of rationalism rather than pressing forward into new
questions of behavioral psychology.379 There is still much work to be done to see

373
Id. (putting down their own movement as “somewhat off-putting, weighed down by
stereotypes from popular culture and politics that make them unappealing to many”).
374
But see id. at 6–8 (maintaining that libertarian paternalism makes sense, because the ends
justify the means). As beheld by Bertrand Russell, Hegel’s philosophy was dressed up in so many
contradictions and paradoxes that few who engaged with it ever succeeded in reaching the bottom
of the theory, which is that the ends justify the means. RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 56, at 20;
RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 233, at 774 (noting that Hegelian philosophy is “defective”
because it “does not take account of the distinction between ends and means”).
375
Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 185, at 1059–60; Epstein, supra note 235.
376
Cass R. Sunstein, How Star Wars Illuminates Constitutional Law 2, 6, 12–13 (May 11, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2604998; see
William Baude, Star Wars Destroyed, THE NEW RAMBLER (May 31, 2016),
https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/film-media-studies/star-wars-destroyed (reviewing
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE WORLD ACCORDING TO STAR WARS (2016)); cf. Meister, supra note 232,
at 186, 193 (“As a historical account of American democracy, Sunstein’s view is idiosyncratic, and
somewhat weakly supported.”). Professor Meister commented on the “incompleteness” of
Sunstein’s constitutional analysis, and noted that “the most original aspect of Sunstein’s argument”
is a sort of Hobbesian social compact theory that defines what constitutions are without finding
adequate support from the founding generation of Americans. Id.
377
Nourse, Buck, supra note 13, at 114 (speaking of Justice Holmes); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Cost-Benefit State 1, 6 (Univ. of Chi. L. Sch.: Chi. Unbound, Working Paper No. 39, 1996)
[hereinafter Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit] (interpreting U.S. government form according to the
principles of the New Deal rather than the “checks and balances” of the U.S. Constitution); id. at
42 (“[A] general background requirement of cost-benefit balancing—a substantive
supermandate—should be enacted.”).
378
Cf. MILLER, supra note 6, at 97–106 (explaining differing views of psychologists regarding
whether delusions are good or bad, and why they are important to think about).
379
See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler, From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 133, 140 (2000) (guessing that idealized economic structures premised on homo
economicus can rationally be remodeled around the actual characteristics of homo sapiens);
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 45 (proposing that choice architects can re-create
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whether Bertrand Russell’s theories about natural human love, kindliness, and
humanity’s aversion to cruelty make a better center for economies than rational
self-interest.380
It will be disappointing, if unsurprising, for powerful Boomers like Cass
R. Sunstein to leave all the real work to Millennial scientists after they hobble
the scientific discourse with paternalistic government censors.381 Lulu Miller’s
observations of David Starr Jordan’s hubris seem to be reflected throughout
American society in 2022.382 Cost/benefit balancing tests are disproved, and yet
they will continue on as long as enough people believe they are not disproven—
as long as their propagandistic allure still holds influence over the popular
mind.383
PART VI: ON THE PURSUITS OF LOVE, NATURAL KINDLINESS, AND MUTUAL
FORBEARANCE
Willful ignorance of Kahneman and Tversky’s discoveries seems to
illustrate “the tyranny of the remembering self.”384 Kahneman and Tversky
upended Bentham’s central presuppositions, but this does nothing to dispel
delusive beliefs about cost/benefit balancing in the judiciary.385 At the very least,
Kahneman and Tversky revealed that cost/benefit balancing tests are a preestablished psychological anchor in feeling-based intuition that may continue on
regardless of reason.386
economic programs around the least common denominator of humanity and unscientifically
presupposing without evidence that this lowest common denominator would consistently match
the “fast” thinking that humans engage in); KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74, at 48–49.
380
Thaler, supra note 379, at 139; RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 56, at 175 (“Universal love
is an emotion which many have felt and which many more could feel if the world made it less
difficult.”); Peacefulness, Bertrand Russell – “Love is Wise, Hatred is Foolish” (Message To
Future Generations), YOUTUBE (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WIoAwxxbmI.
381
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 45; cf. BRUCE CANNON GIBNEY, A GENERATION OF
SOCIOPATHS: HOW THE BABY BOOMERS BETRAYED AMERICA 103 (2017) (calling Boomers “homo
sociopathicus”).
382
Compare MILLER, supra note 6, at 102–03, with TRUMP, supra note 19, at 211.
383
KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74, at 48–49; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 312,
331; see sources cited supra notes 191–196 (noting the tectonic shift caused by Kahneman and
Tversky’s Nobel Prize winning research that showed why self-interested rationalism does not
exist).
384
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 381.
385
Id. at 377 (citing 1 BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 165, at 1–2).
386
Id. at 473; Kahneman, Maps, supra note 164, at 473; cf. KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74,
at 48–49 (Kahneman and Sunstein’s attempts to vindicate cost/benefit heuristics that reduce or
eliminate “noise” are due to “an internal signal of judgment completion, unrelated to any outside
information”); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 26 (discussing the anchoring bias originally
developed by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman).
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Kahneman and Tversky theoretically ruined several rational theories that
came after Bentham as well, especially those of John Stuart Mill, John Rawls,
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.387 Mill, for one, thought even pigs were rational
enough to know what pleasured them.388 After Kahneman and Tversky, it is
possible that pigs may be more rational than humans if further experimentation
reveals that Mill’s central presupposition about pigs still follows.389
As Mill demonstrated, Bentham’s idea of rational ordering of experience
under our two masters of pain and pleasure was considered so low as to be
animal.390 Thus, every rationalist after Mill seemed to use Bentham as a baseline
from which to build from, as synonymous with animal reason, that is,
rationalism’s lowest form.391 For example, Rawls presupposed that ableist white
men can know, without engaging in a discourse with others, what it would be
like to be a woman or black or disabled.392 And Holmes—perhaps the most
extravagant of all—believed he could rational-balancing-test a land of supermen
into being.393
Cicero preempted Mill when he wrote that animals generally do not try
to “comprehend[] the chain of consequences” to change the course of future
events like humans.394 Several notable empiricists and common law jurists were
inspired by Cicero’s concept of practical justice arising from public discourse
about the law rather than sheer human reason.395 These thinkers, several of whom
387

See KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411 (citing generally MILTON FRIEDMAN &
ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980)) (“[F]aith in human rationality is closely linked to an
ideology in which it is unnecessary and even immoral to protect people against their choices.”).
388
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 10–11 (1861) [hereinafter MILL, UTILITARIANISM].
389
Id. at 6–7 (“The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty.”); id. at 14 (calling
Benthamism “a doctrine worthy only of swine”); id. at 95 (“[W]e ought to shape our conduct by a
rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective interest.”) (emphasis in
original).
390
Id. at 10; 1 BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 165, at 1–2. The accusation of
animalistic thinking to influence an audience to adopt a solution for it, as Mill did, was repurposed
by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein in the comments about “lizard” brains. THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 42.
391
MILL, UTILITARIANISM, supra note 388, at 10–11; cf. Sunstein, Problems, supra note 199, at
956, 958 (similarly using Bentham as a foil to create a baseline for Sunstein’s legal ideas).
392
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION 85, 92, 124–25, 136, 154, 443 (1999).
393
See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); Nourse, Buck, supra note 13, at 114
(“Holmes . . . believed that the Constitution could be reduced to ad hoc balancing.”); cf.
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 575 U.S. 542, 574 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (decrying
“the bestiary of ad hoc tests and ad hoc exceptions that we apply nowadays”).
394
CICERO, DE OFFICIIS WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 1.11.4 (Walter Miller, ed., trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1913), http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3
Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D11.
395
See, e.g., 2 WILSON, supra note 198, at 778–80 (quoting CICERO, PRO CAECINA 26.74–75);
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 453–55 (1793) (quoting CICERO, DE REPUBLICA 6.13),
precedential value examined by Schroeder, We Will, supra note 56, at 28 (“In Franchise Tax Bd.
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were American Revolutionaries, were vindicated by Kahneman and Tversky’s
research.396
Kahneman and Tversky proved that Bentham’s center does not hold, and
so too that any rational philosophy premised on the same cannot stand.397 From
Ayn Rand to Max Weber, there are several rational theories that cannot exist
without the pre-existing, inherent capacity to know one’s own self-interest.398 In
short, Kahneman and Tversky’s research ruins any theory premised on rational
self-interest, because Kahneman and Tversky proved that the pursuit of selfinterest is inherently irrational.399
Rational self-interest theories were upended by Kahneman and
Tversky’s studies, and yet Kahneman himself appeared not to recognize it.400
Kahneman is not an epistemologist, and it is not Kahneman’s job to explain the
intricate ways his research has an effect in related fields.401 However, in several
places Kahneman, along with several of his colleagues, appeared to mistake the
epistemology of Bentham, who was a devout rationalist, for empiricism.402
This is a common mistake, and for Kahneman it appears to have caused
him to misconstrue utilitarians like Cass R. Sunstein as friends of empirical
analysis.403 This is like mistaking a bulldog for a butterfly, because Benthamites
are self-avowed radicals characterized by the “rejection of any philosophical

of California v. Hyatt, the Court disparaged Chisholm v. Georgia as incorrectly decided . . . .”);
Kastely, supra note 236, at 31; THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 15 (1776) [hereinafter PAINE,
COMMON] (exhorting readers to “examine the passions and feelings of mankind” to discern “the
touchstone of nature”).
396
See sources cited supra note 395; sources cited infra notes 422–429; KAHNEMAN, THINKING,
supra note 163, at 411; cf. [Jeremy Bentham,] Short Review of the Declaration, in [JEREMY
BENTHAM & JOHN LIND,] AN ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 131–32
(1776) (demonstrating that Bentham was a staunch counterrevolutionary).
397
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411. There were also several world-shaping preBentham theories that should be reconsidered in the light of Kahneman & Tversky’s research,
including the dispute between Hugo Grotius’s The Free Sea and John Selden’s The Sea is Closed
that created New York. Compare generally id., with HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA (Richard
Hakluyt trans., 2004), and JOHN SELDEN, THE SEA IS CLOSED (Marchamot Nedham trans., 1652).
398
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411; see generally AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF
SELFISHNESS (1964); MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1905).
399
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411.
400
Id. (connecting his studies to the unsettling of laissez-faire economics that call for a weak
central government but seeming not to perceive the same unsettling effect on rationalist theories
that call for a strong central government).
401
Id.
402
Id. at 377; Kahneman, Back, supra note 175, at 397 (misdescribing Bentham’s utilitarianism
as empirical).
403
Perreau-Saussine, supra note 175, at 349–50. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note
163, at 141–45.
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notion of moral authority.”404 Bentham appealed to reason to justify radical moral
ambiguity by attacking the imagination as the cause of whimsy and caprice.405
Thus, Amanda Perreau-Saussine correctly characterized “Bentham’s
jurisprudence as exemplifying ‘enlightenment rationalism in its utilitarian
dress.’”406 Strictly speaking, empiricism rejects the epistemological idea of
knowledge from innate reason, which is called “dogma”—even innate
experiential knowledge must be rejected until proven through a scientific
discourse.407 Bertrand Russell, and not Bentham, best represented these “Liberal
beliefs” of the empiricist.408
An empiricist must accept that Bentham is debunked by Kahneman and
Tversky even if the empiricist does not perceive a viable alternative heuristic for
decision making.409 Real empiricism requires doubt, even doubt that, in the
absence of evidence, human beings can be rational.410 In the light of empirical
evidence that human beings can exercise reason, the empiricist does not conclude
the capacity to reason is inherent, but must leave open the possibility that reason
is learned or developed.411

404

Perreau-Saussine, supra note 175, at 383.
H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 15, 65 (1982) (“Bentham insisted that . . . the doctrine
of inalienable specific rights . . . belong to Utopia: that is, nowhere or an imaginary world.”).
Bentham’s claims regarding the imagination were extremely ironic because Bentham’s
utilitarianism was a cause of the French Reign of Terror and several whimsical despotisms in
Spanish America. See M. DUMONT, PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION: FROM THE MS. OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 120 (John Neal trans., 1830) (1789) (“If it be better for the greatest happiness of the
greatest number that a man should die, whoever he may be, and whatever he may be, cut him
[down] without mercy. And so with his liberty, and so with his property.”); see also id. at 148–57
(noting the role Bentham had in the French Revolution); MIRIAM WILLIFORD, JEREMY BENTHAM
ON SPANISH AMERICA 87 (1980) (noting how “Bentham planned, schemed, [and] worked for the
establishment of a New World utilitarian utopia”); cf. Gertrude Himmelfarb, Bentham’s Utopia:
The National Charity Company, 10 J. BRIT. STUD. 80, 113 (1970) (noting how Bentham “had
described his work as ‘the Romance, the Utopia’—which, he hastened to add, meant not that it was
unrealizable but only that it had not yet been realized”).
406
Perreau-Saussine, supra note 175, at 348 (quoting POSTEMA, supra note 190, at 319); see
WILLIFORD, supra note 405, at xiv (“Believing that men everywhere were alike, i.e., rational,
[Bentham] did not bother to acquaint himself with the traditions, customs, or life-styles of the
people for whom he made these plans. In actuality, he virtually ignored the existence of the
indigenous peoples of Spanish America.”).
407
RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 56, at 33–34.
408
Id.
409
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411; RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 56, at 27
(“The genuine Liberal does not say ‘this is true,’ he says ‘I am inclined to think that under present
circumstances this opinion is probably best.’ And it is only in this limited and undogmatic sense
that he will advocate democracy.”).
410
RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 56, at 27.
411
Id.; KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411.
405
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The final result of Kahneman and Tversky’s studies is that selfishness is
not rational.412 Choosing self-interest as a pole star of a philosophy, an economic
or legal system, or even as a lifestyle is not rational.413 It is whimsical.414 Whimsy
can be an extremely attractive character trait in a friend or lover, but not in a
judge.415 Thus, judges should not adopt cost/benefit balancing heuristics based
on “rational” self-interest, because self-interest is proven irrational—its center
will not hold.416
An empirical proof of the irrationality of self-interest philosophers,
economists, and jurists is their frequent disagreements.417 To give one extreme
example, Rawls thought that judges should make decisions behind a veil,418

412
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411. Selfishness is irrational in the
epistemological sense of the term “rational,” which indicates a priori knowledge, i.e., Kahneman
proved that one’s own self-interest is not a priori knowledge and is therefore irrational. Id.
413
Id.
414
Id.
415
See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 287 (2000)
[hereinafter ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY] (“Pope flattered tyrants too much when he said, ‘For
forms of government let fools contest / That which is best administered is best.’ Nothing can be
more fallacious than this. But poets read history to collect flowers, not fruits; they attend to fanciful
images, not the effects of social institutions.” (quoting ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON MAN 80
(1763))).
416
Id. at 291–92; LEWIS, supra note 163, at 321 (demonstrating how Kahneman and Tversky
leveled Oxford Professor L. Jonathan Cohen’s dogmatic argument that “as man had created the
concept of rationality he must, by definition, be rational”); cf. JOAN DIDION: THE CENTER WILL
NOT HOLD (Netflix 2017) (paying homage to Didion’s written work that examined how America’s
attempts to rationalize the delusions of its citizenry is a center that will not hold).
417
For example, John Maynard Keynes hailed Newtonian Rationalism as a great inspiration to
his work, but Keynes disagreed with Isaac Newton about what actually is rational. JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 74 (1923); John Maynard Keynes, Newton, the Man, in
JMK/PP/60, The Papers of John Maynard Keynes, King’s College, Cambridge (1946); JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES, The End of the Gold Standard, Sept. 27, 1931, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 288
(1932); Isaac Newton, Sir Isaac Newton’s Report on the Gold and Silver Coin in 1717, Dec. 30,
1717, in 11 THE NUMISMATIC CHRONICLE AND JOURNAL OF THE NUMISMATIC SOCIETY 181–85 (Apr.
1848 – Jan. 1849). Another example is how Jeremy Bentham both hailed Adam Smith as “the
father of political economy” and betrayed Smith’s economic theories. See JEREMY BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF REWARD 71 n.* (1825); Jeremy Bentham, Circulating Annuities [1800], reprinted
in 2 W. STARK, JEREMY BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS 337–38 n.* (1954); Jeremy Bentham,
The True Alarm (1801), reprinted in 3 W. STARK, JEREMY BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS 112
n.* (1954). In yet another example, J.S. Mill put lipstick on the Benthamite pig in his book
Utilitarianism, which defended Jeremy Bentham saying that it was actually his detractors that held
a dim view of human nature, while Mill vastly disagreed with Bentham about the value of his
systems of Puritanical control and appeared to be oblivious of his paradoxical departure from
Benthamite Rationalism, of which he claimed to be a disciple. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, supra note
388, at 10–11; J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 168 (1863).
418
RAWLS, supra note 392, at 136.
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while Bentham preferred judgments made in absolute transparency. 419 If these
men were expounding rational thought, as they both claimed, rational humans
must agree with both—but to adopt both Bentham and Rawls is to embrace
paradox.420
From the almost perfectly diametric contradictions of Rationalists alone
we can suppose,421 as the American Revolutionaries supposed,422 that rationalism
is not rational.423 Kahneman and Tversky’s studies added scientific proof to this
pre-existing empirical rebuttal in America against rational dogma.424 In the law,
this rebuttal took place in several centuries’ long disputes that the common law
maintained against legal realism and positivism.425
Rational self-interest is disproven, including cost/benefit balancing tests,
but empiricism is not.426 The Scottish empiricists James Beattie and Thomas Reid
drew upon the sensus communis of Cicero and inspired the American Revolution
as commemorated by Justice Wilson’s exceptional opinion in Chisholm v.
Georgia.427 The desire to love and to be loved in return as the actual basis of
419
1 BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, supra note 351, at 3; see Miller, supra note 351, at 3–6 (“The
Panopticon is not a prison. It is a general principle of construction, the polyvalent apparatus of
surveillance, the universal optical machine of human groupings . . . . The Panopticon is an area of
totalitarian control . . . . [T]he Panopticon is the model of the utilitarian world . . . .”).
420
Compare source cited supra note 418, with sources cited supra note 419. To adopt Thaler &
Sunstein is also to embrace paradox. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 6 (calling their
position “libertarian paternalism,” which is an oxymoron).
421
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 417, 420.
422
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, Thoughts on the Works of Providence (1773), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 43–50 (vindicating love’s place over reason); PAINE, COMMON,
supra note 395, at 23 (basing his arguments of 1776 upon “those feelings and affections which
nature justifies, and without which we should be incapable of discharging the social duties of life,
or enjoying the felicities of it”); id. at 44 (noting that those who can ignore their emotions in the
face of injustice “hath forfeited his claim to rationality—an apostate from the order of manhood”);
G.W. SNYDER, THE AGE OF REASON UNREASONABLE 8 (1798); THE FOLLY OF REASON 8, 20, 23
(1794); ELIAS BOUDINOT, THE AGE OF REVELATION 30 (1801).
423
G.K. CHESTERTON, THE PARADOXES OF MR. POND 41 (2008) (noting that paradox is the “truth
standing on her head to attract attention”).
424
Compare KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 141–45, with PHILLIS WHEATLEY,
Thoughts on the Works of Providence (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 43–
50, SNYDER, supra note 422, at 8, and THE FOLLY OF REASON 8, 20, 23 (1794).
425
2 WILSON, supra note 198, at 808 (“The proceedings of the common law are founded on long
and sound experience; but long and sound experience will not be found to stand in opposition to
the original and genuine sentiments of the human mind.”); WOOLRYCH, supra note 255, at 271–73,
300; CHRISTOPHER HILL, GOD’S ENGLISHMAN: OLIVER CROMWELL AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION
171, 273 (1970).
426
Kahneman, Back, supra note 175, at 397 (suggesting the adoption of an empirical model to
confirm reason).
427
JAMES BEATTIE, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND IMMUTABILITY OF TRUTH; IN OPPOSITION TO
SOPHISTRY AND SKEPTICISM 80 (1825) (“When reason invades the rights of common sense, and
presumes to arraign that authority by which she herself acts, nonsense and confusion must of
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human happiness was also affirmed by Adam Smith and Thomas Paine, each of
whom inspired the Americans with Ciceronian discourse.428
However, the boldest enlightenment representatives of the emotional
backbone of the American Revolution were James Otis and Phillis Wheatley.429
In agreement with Otis, Wheatley set forth an empirical theory for how the
human mind works.430 She summarized that the leader of the mental train is the

necessity ensue; science will soon come to have neither head nor tail, beginning nor end;
philosophy will grow contemptible; and its adherents, far from being treated, as in former times,
upon the footing of conjurors, will be thought by the vulgar, and by every man of sense, to be little
better than downright fools.”); THOMAS REID, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN MIND 19 (1810) (“[I]n
reality, Common Sense holds nothing of Philosophy, nor needs her aid. But, on the other hand,
Philosophy (if I may be permitted to change the metaphor) has no other root but the principles of
Common Sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them: severed from this
root, its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots.”); id. at viii (quoting WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 4, sc. 1, ls. 151, 156) (wielding Shakespeare to encapsulate
Hume’s fatalism, that Reid says is “a hypothesis, which, in my opinion, overturns all philosophy,
all religion and virtue, and all common sense: and finding that all the systems concerning the
human understanding which I was acquainted with, were built upon this hypotheses, I resolved to
inquire into this subject anew, without regard to any hypothesis”); id. at 8, quoted by Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 453–54 (1793); id. at 463 (quoting Reid’s paraphrase of Shakespeare from
page viii of the dedication of An Inquiry into the Human Mind, where Reid uses Shakespeare to
resist the fatalistic idea that seems to flow from Hume’s philosophy, i.e., that human beings do not
really exist); cf. CICERO, DE ORATORE 1.12 (J.S. Watson, ed., trans., 1860),
https://pages.pomona.edu/~cmc24747/sources/cic_web/de_or_1.htm
(presenting
thoughts
regarding the common sense or sensus communis as it was originally conceived in ancient Rome).
428
PAINE, COMMON, supra note 395, at 15; SMITH, THE THEORY, supra note 294, at 53, 236
(“Humanity does not desire to be great, but to be beloved.”); id. at 56 (“[T]he chief part of human
happiness arises from the consciousness of being beloved.”); id. at 165 (“What so great happiness
as to be beloved, and to know that we deserve to be beloved?”); cf. id. at 73–74 (providing strong
evidence regarding why rational cost/benefit balancing tests cannot work), quoted by ADAMS,
DISCOURSES, supra note 294, at 62.
429
OTIS, supra note 218, at 63–64; id. at 119 (quoting Virgil, Aeneid 11.320–24) (noting that
love is the impetus for the creation of a society); id. at 123–24 (noting that love, especially sexual
and maternal love, is the basis of human societies); PHILLIS WHEATLEY, On Friendship [July 15,
1769], reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 136 (In Ciceronian Latin, Wheatley wrote:
“Let Amicitia in her ample reign / Extend her notes to a Celestial strain.”); PHILLIS WHEATLEY, To
the Right Honorable William, Earl of Dartmouth, His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for
North America, &c. (1773), THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 73–75 (noting that her resistance
to tyranny is “By feeling hearts alone best understood”); cf. CICERO, DE AMICITIA 14.51, 21.80–81
(W.A.
Falconer,
trans.,
Harvard
Univ.
Press
1923),
https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/Laelius_de_Amicitia/text*.html
(providing thoughts about natural human love inspired by the ancient Roman playwright Terence).
430
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, On Imagination (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217,
at 65–68; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, Thoughts on the Works of Providence (1773), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 43–50; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, On Recollection (1773), reprinted in
THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 62–64.
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imagination, which contains both wonders and horrors, both the real and the
fantastic.431
Wheatley presaged Kahneman and Tversky’s theory of thinking fast and
slow when she presented a vision of humanity swaying back and forth between
day and night, imagination and reality.432 Human beings retreat into the realm of
their imaginations to rest, to heal, to be entertained, to tell stories, to have sex,
and to pray—in the dreaminess of night, human beings prepare to make their
choice.433 Then after resting and dreaming, they turn and swing into the reality
of day as if on a trapeze, rushing into the city square to submit their ideas to a
public discourse with others, to make their decisions known in the burning heat
of the sun.434
Wheatley noted that reason, the “king of day,”435 is not implanted in
humans as God’s “viceroy,”436 but rather that God implanted love as his
431
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, On Imagination (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217,
at 65–68.
432
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, Thoughts on the Works of Providence (1773), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 43–50; see LEWIS, supra note 163, at 307, 312. Kahneman and
Tversky began working on studies reminiscent of the themes in Phillis Wheatley’s poetry regarding
the human imagination and recollection entitled The Psychology of Possible Worlds by Daniel
Kahneman and The Theory of Alternative States by Amos Tversky. Id.
433
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, Thoughts on the Works of Providence (1773), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 43–50; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, An Hymn to the Morning (1773),
reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 56–57; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, An Hymn to the
Evening (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 58–59.
434
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, Thoughts on the Works of Providence (1773), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 43–50; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, On Recollection (1773), reprinted in
THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 62–64.
435
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, An Hymn to the Morning (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra
note 217, at 56–57; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, An Hymn to the Evening (1773), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 58–59 (observing the diurnal nature of humanity and concluding
that the God “who gives the light” also “draws the sable curtains of the night”). Wheatley’s
personifications of the moon as “the silver queen of light” who assists our memory and imagination
and the sun as the “king of day” who assists our reasoning and capacity for action exists throughout
her poetry, but is most clearly elucidated in her poems Thoughts on the Works of Providence, On
Recollection, and especially in her poem for Reverend Amory. Id.; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, To a
Gentleman and Lady on the Death of the Lady’s Brother and Sister, and a Child of the Name Avis,
Aged One Year (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 84–85; PHILLIS
WHEATLEY, Thoughts on the Works of Providence (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note
217, at 43–50; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, To the Rev. Dr. Thomas Amory on Reading His Sermons on
Daily Devotion, in which that Duty is Recommended and Assisted (1773), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 90–91; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, On Recollection (1773), reprinted in
THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 62–64; cf. John C. Shields, Phillis Wheatley’s Struggle for
Freedom in Her Poetry and Prose, in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 241–43 (guessing at the
African origins of Wheatley’s writings about the sun and moon, and explaining the old, classical
terms Wheatley used for sun and moon like “Apollo and Phoebus”).
436
JOHN DONNE, Holy Sonnet XIV, reprinted in THE DIVINE, supra note 211, at 10. Phillis
Wheatley’s disagreement with the Puritans, especially John Milton who was cited most forcefully
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representative in us.437 Humans obviously do not need to listen to God’s love or
natural human love generally—so it is also not a viceroy or any sort of dictator.438
Rather, God “pervades the sable veil” and sent recollection “the regent of the
night” to assist human beings in their pursuit of love.439
All humans feel the siren call of love.440 Those who follow love into
societies receive rewards of sex, children, sustenance, and community—which
can be summed up in one word: pleasure.441 The maximization of pleasure and
minimization of pain is not the center of human thought, but a secondary result
of love.442 And natural love, a profound emotion, is discovered and retained
through the imagination and recollection, each of which guide human beings to
the choice of whether to create societies.443

by the founders to exclude women from their rights on the basis of their sex, is explained further
in my article Leviathan Goes to Washington. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 47, at 158–59; see
id. at 141 (quoting Wheatley’s assessment of John Milton in order to observe how “the Puritan
Revolution sank England into ‘the great depth . . . hell’s profound domain’” (quoting PHILLIS
WHEATLEY, Phillis’s Reply to the Answer (Dec. 5, 1774), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note
217, at 143–45)).
437
JOHN DONNE, Holy Sonnet XIV, reprinted in THE DIVINE, supra note 211, at 10 (dubbing
reason God’s viceroy, but lamenting that he, Donne, is unreasonable and thus believing that he is
sinfully out of God’s plan), refuted by PHILLIS WHEATLEY, Thoughts on the Works of Providence
(1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 43–50 (denying that reason is a
representation of God, and demonstrating that reason is properly the servant of love); see also
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, On Friendship [July 15, 1769], reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217,
at 136.
438
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, Thoughts on the Works of Providence (1773), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 43–50 (settling the dispute over whether love or reason best
represents the God in favor of love), refuting JOHN DONNE, Holy Sonnet XIV, reprinted in THE
DIVINE, supra note 211, at 10.
439
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, To the Rev. Dr. Thomas Amory on Reading His Sermons on Daily
Devotion, in which that Duty is Recommended and Assisted (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED,
supra note 217, at 90–91; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, On Recollection (1773), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 62–64.
440
OTIS, supra note 218, at 123–24; cf. SMITH, THE THEORY, supra note 294, at 56, 165
(describing the centrality of natural human love to the acquisition of human happiness).
441
SMITH, THE THEORY, supra note 294, at 165; cf. OTIS, supra note 218, at 123–24 (describing
the origin of society as a result of the basic, primal attraction of the sexes).
442
See sources cited supra notes 435–440.
443
RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 56, at 175 (“Universal love is an emotion which many
have felt and which many more could feel if the world made it less difficult.”); Peacefulness,
Bertrand Russell – “Love is Wise, Hatred is Foolish” (Message To Future Generations), YOUTUBE
(Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WIoAwxxb-mI; see PHILLIS WHEATLEY, On
Imagination (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 65–68; PHILLIS WHEATLEY,
Thoughts on the Works of Providence (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 43–
50; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, On Recollection (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at
62–64; cf. OTIS, supra note 218, at 126 (“The few Hermits and Misanthropes that have ever existed,
show that those states are unnatural.”).
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This, Otis and Wheatley asserted, was God’s plan for humans—we were
to love each other and through love create societies to secure the happiness of
others.444 Choosing to love others is, in the soft empirical sense, rational or
wise—it is the most likely way that a human can secure the love of others toward
him or herself, which is the source of human happiness.445 Adam Smith testified
to this in his work A Theory of Moral Sentiments, inspiring John Adams and
others.446
In government, the common law is the culmination of ages of
empiricism, of law standing the test of time and being modified or removed
whenever it does not.447 Inspired by Lord Coke, founder James Wilson captured
the common law’s liberal empiricism that confirms reason through experience
rather than through dogma.448 In his famous lectures, Wilson wrote,
The common law of England, says my Lord Coke, is a social
system of jurisprudence: she receives other laws and systems
into a friendly correspondence: she associates to herself those,
who can communicate to her information, or give her advice and
assistance. Does a question arise before her, which properly
ought to be resolved by the law of nations? By the information
received from that law, the question will be decided: for the law
of nations, is, in its full extent, adopted by the common law, and
deemed and treated as a part of the law of the land. Does a
mercantile question occur? It is determined by the law of
merchants. By that law, controversies concerning bills of
exchange, freight, bottomry, and ensurances receive their
decision. That law is indeed a part of the law of nations; but it is
peculiarly appropriated to the subjects before mentioned.
Disputes concerning prizes, shipwrecks, hostages, and
ransombills, are, under the auspices of the common law, settled

444
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, Thoughts on the Works of Providence (1773), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 43–50; PHILLIS WHEATLEY, On Friendship [July 15, 1769],
reprinted in THE COLLECTED, supra note 217, at 136; OTIS, supra note 218, at 63–64, 123–24.
445
SMITH, THE THEORY, supra note 294, at 53, 165, 322; cf. CICERO, DE AMICITIA 14.51, 21.80–
81
(W.A.
Falconer,
trans.,
Harvard
Univ.
Press
1923),
https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/Laelius_de_Amicitia/text*.html
(explaining the role of natural human love in societies of human beings).
446
ADAMS, DISCOURSES, supra note 294, at 26, 61–69; SMITH, THE THEORY, supra note 294, at
53, 165, 322.
447
ELIHU S. RILEY, CORRESPONDENCE OF “FIRST CITIZEN”—CHARLES CARROLL OF
CARROLLTON, AND “ANTILON”—DANIEL DULANY, JR., 1773, at 192 (1902) (“Groundless opinions
are destroyed, but rational judgments, or the judgments of nature, are confirmed by time.” (quoting
and translating CICERO, DE NATURA DEORUM 2.2.5) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g.,
2 WILSON, supra note 198, at 784 (“[A]s the rules of the common law are introduced by experience
and custom; so they may be withdrawn by discontinuance and disuse.”).
448
2 WILSON, supra note 198, at 778.
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and adjudged by the same universal rule of decision. Does a
contract, in litigation, bear a peculiar reference to the local laws
of any particular foreign country? By the local laws of that
foreign country, the common law will direct the contract to be
interpreted and adjusted. Does a cause arise within the
jurisdiction of the admiralty? Within that jurisdiction the civil
law is allowed its proper energy and extent.
But, while she knows and performs what is due to others, the
common law knows also and demands what is due to herself.
She receives her guests with hospitality; but she receives them
with dignity. She liberally dispenses her kindness and
indulgence;—but, at the same time, she sustains, with becoming
and unabating firmness, the preeminent character of gravior
lex.449
Wilson further gravitated toward Coke’s “encomium of the common law,”450
which sang of the superior collective reason that the common law represents, not
only by allowing a discourse where reasonable minds can disagree, but also by
consulting the “many successions of ages,” by which the common law “has been
fined and refined by an infinite number of grave and learned men, and by long
experience grown to such a perfection for the government of this realm . . . no
man ought to be wiser than the law, which is the perfection of reason.”451
In short, common law confirms reason through experience and is an
ancient form of empirical application.452 It comports with the Ciceronian
empiricism championed by Otis and Wheatley in America, and by Beattie and
Reid in Scotland.453 Common law also remains the primary alternative to the
cost/benefit heuristics based on the rationalist dogmas of legal realism and legal
positivism first developed by the Puritans in an attempt to supplant the common
law with a legal code.454
Cost/benefit balancing tests are, therefore, an irrational replacement for
the common law.455 Cost/benefit balancing heuristics are the part of legal realism
and legal positivism that attempted to dress itself in a false empiricism.456 For
449

Id. at 778–79.
Id. at 779 (noting the “encomium of the common law, which I take from my Lord Coke”).
An encomium is like a vindication and is a term of art that was used occasionally during the
founding era. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM BILLINGS 31–32 (Hans Nathan ed.,
1977) (including Billings’ An Encomium on Music that vindicates music).
451
2 WILSON, supra note 198, at 779.
452
Id. at 778–80 (quoting CICERO, PRO CAECINA 26.74–75).
453
Id.; see supra notes 427–447 and accompanying text.
454
See WOOLRYCH, supra note 255, at 271–73, 300.
455
Id.; KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411; Aleinikoff, Constitutional, supra note
22, at 963.
456
Aleinikoff, Constitutional, supra note 22, at 963; HILL, supra note 425, at 171, 273.
450
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example, Bentham’s assertion that we can rationalize experienced utility is not
actually experienced utility, it is rational dogma.457 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s
idea of “experience” is similarly deceptive.458
Balancers, under Bentham’s tutelage, confused scientific discovery
through empiricism with the rational dictates of dogma.459 Experimentation and
results were never followed by these men, rather they were instituted by them to
serve their preexisting agendas.460 They used the language of experience,
empiricism, and science, but what they described under flowing liberal and
progressive themes was nothing short of religion, dogma, and Puritanical
rationalism.461
Rational cost/benefit balancers maintained a complex set of
contradicting value biases, including “anchors,”462 that they developed through
feeling-based intuition.463 To examine Bentham a little closer, he was partial to

457

Perreau-Saussine, supra note 388, at 383; 1 BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 165,
at 1–2; cf. LEWIS, supra note 163, at 261, 266, 272–73 (in the language developed by Kahneman
and Tversky, Benthamism is a theory premised on the inherent capacity for humans to attain
“expected utility” through inherent rationalism).
458
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON, supra note 200, at 1 (“The life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience.”). Holmes’s references to experience are not a reference to empirical
experience, but rather judicial dogmas developed over time. Id.; see, e.g., Kaley v. United States,
571 U.S. 320, 340 (2014) (“So experience . . . confirms that even under Mathews, [the parties]
have no right to revisit the grand jury’s finding.”).
459
See, e.g., id.; Holmes, Jr., Law, supra note 9, at 444 (speaking of science as a way to discern
“the true historic dogma”); Holmes, Jr., The Path, supra note 1, at 458 (defining the law in terms
of “a finite body of dogma which may be mastered within a reasonable time,” without feeling that
the word “dogma” was in any way a bad or contradictory to Holmes’s views).
460
See, e.g., Holmes, Jr., Law, supra note 9, at 444; Perreau-Saussine, supra note 175, at 383.
461
See sources cited supra notes 456–459; see generally THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL
REFORMERS: RACE, EUGENICS, AND AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (2016).
462
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 26–27 (explaining Kahneman and Tversky’s
research that decision-makers “start with some anchor, a number you know, and adjust in the
direction you think appropriate . . . . The bias occurs because the adjustments are typically
insufficient . . . . Even obviously irrelevant anchors creep into the decision-making process.”).
463
Id.; see SCHOFIELD, supra note 13, at 241; 1 BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, supra note 351, at 2–3;
MILL, UTILITARIANISM, supra note 388, at 16, 31, 53 (preferring the “cultivated mind” to
Bentham’s swine philosophy); RAWLS, supra note 392, at 124–25, 136, 154 (“when everything is
tallied up, it may be perfectly clear where the balance of reason lies”); cf. Maryland v. King, 569
U.S. 435, 482 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps the construction of such a genetic
panopticon is wise. But I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would
have been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”); but see SUNSTEIN, THE COST, supra
note 173, at x (ignoring the basic value disagreements in his own camp by saying “the issues that
most divide us are fundamentally about facts rather than values”).
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authoritarian control,464 the surveillance state,465 and the unity of powers.466
Bentham hated the common law and common law judges so much467 that he

464

1 BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, supra note 351, at 3.
Id.
466
Letter from Jeremy Bentham to Andrew Jackson (Apr. 26, 1830), in 11 SMITH COLLEGE
STUDIES IN HISTORY 215 (Sidney Bradshaw Fay & Harold Underwood Faulkner eds., 1926)
[hereinafter Bentham, Anti-Senatica] (reviewing a short letter asking President Jackson to
overthrow the Senate; this writing was occasionally called “Anti-Senatica”); cf. Jeremy Bentham,
Short Review of the Declaration, in JEREMY BENTHAM & JOHN LIND, AN ANSWER TO THE
DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 131–32 (1776) (Bentham’s desire that the United
States adopt a unity of powers accompanied his strong counter-revolutionary views); ARENDT,
supra note 315, at 78. Bentham’s opposition to the U.S. separation of powers was candidly
Cromwellian, in part, because bicameralism (which Bentham distinctly hated) was adopted in
America to avoid Marchamont Needham’s anti-common law, puritanical government of a unity of
powers that ended in the despotism of Oliver Cromwell. Throughout his writings, Bentham almost
appeared to worship Cromwell as the basis of his anti-common law school of thought, now known
as legal positivism, which he succeeded in establishing in France, resulting in the despotism of
Napoleon Bonaparte and the suffering of the French people. Compare Letter from John Adams to
Thomas Boylston Adams (Apr. 7, 1796), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-1102-0128 (“The Dutch are trying over again after the French the Experiment of a Government of a
single assembly. Nedham, as great a Changling as he was, and as great a Villain, has had more
honour done to his weak system than Sir Thomas More, Mr. Harrington or even Plato.”), Letter
from John Adams to Samuel Adams, Sr. (Oct. 18, 1790), in JOHN ADAMS & SAMUEL ADAMS, FOUR
LETTERS 12 (1802), (noting that after humanity suffers under “the Plan of Milton, Nedham or
Turgot,” which was a government of one assembly, it is evident that they prefer “the simple
monarchical form” to a republican form of government as the Puritans demonstrated when they
chose Cromwell who was a kind of absolute monarch), and Letter from James Madison to Jeremy
Bentham (May 8, 1816), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/03-11-02-0019
(disappointing Bentham by denying his vision of a U.S. government without a common law,
writing “with the best plan for converting the common law into a written law, the evil can not be
more than partially cured”), with Letter from Jeremy Bentham to President James Madison (Oct.
30, 1811), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/03-03-02-0595 (expressing disdain
for the English common law upon the brink of the War of 1812, and appearing to misconstrue the
president’s power as absolute or plenary by offering his help to Madison to undo it), and 4
BENTHAM, THE WORKS, supra note 170, at 478 (quoting truncated parts of Madison’s response
several years later in order to flatter Bentham’s codification project, when Madison generally
debunked it in his letter); 4 BENTHAM, THE WORKS, supra note 170, at 501 (appearing to address
his writing “to the Citizens of the several American United States,” Bentham proceeded to celebrate
Napoleon Bonaparte as “the Cromwell of France” and wrote to us with sanguine jubilation:
“Behold what was said in his day by Cromwell! In my eyes, it ranks that wonderful man higher
than anything else I ever read of him:—it will not lower him in yours.”). Unlike Bentham, most
Americans viewed the French Reign of Terror, which ended in the despotism of Napoleon
Bonaparte, as an indication that the French Revolution disappointingly failed where the American
Revolution previously succeeded. See, e.g., 3 MERCY OTIS WARREN, THE HISTORY OF THE RISE,
PROGRESS, AND TERMINATION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 407–09 (1805).
467
Bentham, Anti-Senatica, supra note 466, at 215 (labeling common law judges the “harpies
of the law” for upholding the separation of powers as a guiding principle in government).
465
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likely would have found Stone v. Powell too weak, albeit correct for ignoring
human rights.468
The habeas decision Stone v. Powell was the first case in which the court
extended a Mathews v. Eldridge cost/benefit balancing test.469 In Stone, the court
sidelined a structural error based on the idea that dismissing habeas corpus had
more benefits than costs to the court.470 Justice Powell, writing for the court,
minimized and relativized the actual rights of prisoners so that the court was only
required to respect them if failing to do so created an appearance of injustice.471
Thus, in lieu of actually reviewing the facts and circumstances of a
habeas claim de novo, which is in the court’s power to do,472 the court asserted a
balancing test instead.473 Balancing tests give the habeas petitioner the feeling
that his or her case was reviewed,474 even if the balancing test supplants the full
de novo review required under Crowell v. Benson.475 It also lets the court off the
hook for not implementing a more rigorous process under habeas common law
to confirm that justice was actually done.476

468
3 BENTHAM, THE WORKS, supra note 170, at 435 (“As for the Habeas Corpus Act, better the
statute-book were rid of it. Standing or lying as it does, up one day, down another—it serves but
to swell the list of sham-securities, with which, to keep up the delusion, the pages of our law books
are defiled.”); cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976) (using a cost/benefit balancing test
to deny a habeas writ in a way that Bentham would likely approve, though Bentham may have
cheered more loudly if the Court overruled the entire habeas corpus statute rather than merely
limiting it through cost/benefit balancing).
469
Stone, 428 U.S. at 489. Mathews was decided on the same day Stone was argued, and Stone
applied the same kind of cost/benefit balancing test: “The answer is to be found by weighing the
utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth
Amendment claims.” Id.; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–48 (1976); see Schroeder, The
Dark, supra note 208, at 335–36 (“The Mathews test, first eclipsed by its sister case Stone v.
Powell, eventually outgrew Stone to touch potentially every corner of American law to answer the
question of ‘what process is due.’” (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349)).
470
Stone, 428 U.S. at 494–95.
471
Id. at 493–96 n.35, quoting and following Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963) (emphasizing the
primary goal of the courts was to create the appearance of justice rather than establishing actual
justice, and going so far as to suggest that attempting to actually establish justice in U.S. Courts
would sink the entire system and cause chaos).
472
See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009) (“[T]he claim is reviewed de novo.”).
473
Stone, 428 U.S. at 489.
474
Id.; cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (“We conclude that an evidentiary
hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and that the present
administrative procedures fully comport with due process.”).
475
See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 58 (1932) (“When proceedings are taken against
a person under the military law, and enlistment is denied, the issue has been tried and determined
de novo upon habeas corpus.”).
476
See, e.g., Stone, 428 U.S. at 489; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
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To summarize, cost/benefit balancing tests are a formality that may
violate the abolition of forms in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.477 It
indulges the laziness of judges to crowd U.S. prisons with petitioners who, in the
end, will overwhelm the habeas docket of the federal courts.478 Therefore,
cost/benefit balancing heuristics exemplify Dioguardi v. Durning’s479
memorable statement that “here is another instance of judicial haste which in the
long run makes waste.”480
The cost/benefit formality is almost exactly the opposite of a common
law inquiry.481 Common law requires stare decisis to promote fairness and
predictability by ensuring that like cases are decided similarly.482 It also consults
other legal frameworks, it considers the positive law, it opens review on former
precedents to decide whether they control or whether they may be distinguished,
and it considers fundamental changes to the society in which it operates.483

477

FED. R. CIV. P. 2; cf. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 61–64, 67,
83 (4th ed. 2002) (noting the likely precursor of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2, which was the
informal common law writ of trespass on the case).
478
See Joshua J. Schroeder, The Body Snatchers: How the Writ of Habeas Corpus was Taken
from the People of the United States, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 102–03 (2016) [hereinafter
Schroeder, The Body] (noting that views that tend to discuss nothing “except efficiencies and
cost/benefit balancing analyses” tend to be “the most inefficient and costly of all”).
479
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
480
Id. at 775.
481
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stone, 428 U.S. at 515
(Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Powell Report, supra note 351, at 7–27 (lobbying Congress to make
habeas dismissals speedier and easier without weighing or balancing costs or benefits), adopted by
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214.
482
Kimble v. Marvel Ent., L.L.C., 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (“Stare decisis—in English, the
idea that today’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions—is ‘a foundation stone of the rule
of law.’” (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014))).
483
See supra notes 446–452 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION: THE EYE SEES NOT ITSELF, NOR ITS SELF-INTEREST
Today, the role of human happiness, if any, in the project of defining
right government action remains as contested as it was in 1776.484 The United
States began when Thomas Jefferson wrote that human beings are endowed with
certain inalienable rights including “the pursuit of Happiness,” to check
government power and to limit centralized authority.485 By great contrast,
Thomas Hobbes proposed that absolute kings could depend upon a maxim that
“felicity . . . consisteth not in having prospered, but in prospering,” to maximize
despotic power with well-placed gifts of property, titles, and wealth.486
Hobbes theorized that human beings were perpetually in pursuit of
happiness or felicity, and that they never rested, because happiness required the
continual acquisition of things.487 To lay hold of absolute power, a ruler must
arrest this perpetual motion in humanity by honoring and dishonoring individuals
according to their value.488 Thus, Hobbes believed that human lives should be
evaluated in terms of money, so he proposed the first modern utilitarian system
of rulers weighing costs versus benefits for the purpose of maximizing
government power.489
In order to reduce human lives to dollar amounts, Hobbes objectified
love itself.490 In bold disagreement with William Shakespeare, who famously

484

See, e.g., Kahneman & Deaton, supra note 321, at 16489 (examining whether humans even
pursue happiness per se); cf. Adrian Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 31,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-goodconstitutionalism/609037/ [hereinafter Vermeule, Beyond] (proposing that conservatives abandon
originalism and adopt a Hobbesian system of “common-good constitutionalism,” that exercises
power to define the nation’s perception of its own happiness, because perceptions “may change
over time anyway, as the law teaches, habituates, and re-forms them”).
485
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
486
THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND POLITIC: HUMAN NATURE & DE
CORPORE POLITICO 30 (1640), paraphrased by RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 233, at 550;
HOBBES, supra note 232, at 37–38, 62 (defining felicity as “continuall prospering”); cf. Donald
Rutherford, In Pursuit of Happiness: Hobbes’s New Science of Ethics, 31 PHIL. TOPICS 369, 378–
89 (2003) (describing Hobbes’s conception of felicity or happiness); Vermeule, Beyond, supra
note 484 (proposing the United States adopt a Hobbesian system).
487
HOBBES, supra note 232, at 62–63 (“Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one
object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later.”).
488
Id.
489
Id. at 55–56; MILTON, supra note 12, at ls. 865–68; see Christopher N. Warren, When SelfPreservation Bids: Approaching Milton, Hobbes, and Dissent, 37 ENG. LIT. RENAISSANCE 118,
119–20 (2007) (“Milton and Hobbes have unexpectedly similar positions.”).
490
HOBBES, supra note 232, at 31–33, 52, 64 (“[T]o love, and to feare, is to value.”).
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defined love as “an ever-fixed mark,”491 Hobbes posited that love was fungible
in terms of happiness.492 With the implicit endorsement of that “grounded
maxim” of cost/benefit balancing tests in John Milton’s anti-sex, misogynistic,
Puritan propaganda Samson Agonistes, Hobbes’ objectification of love was
intended to collapse the prospect of attaining absolute government powers into a
mere matter of wealth management.493
Hobbes’s breakdown of the why and how of cost/benefit balancing is the
way most of the modern cost/benefit balancers discussed in this article see the
world.494 Out of this Hobbesian cynicism sprang unscrupulous men like former
professor John C. Eastman.495 Even as Congress investigated Eastman for his
role as an architect of the attempted coup d’état of January 6, 2021, Eastman was
able to file several amicus briefs that the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to
follow.496
491
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet 116, in SHAKESPEARE’S SONNETS 63 (1609). Preemptively
defining love in such a way that if Hobbes is right about love being fungible, then love does not
exist at all, because love’s steadfastness is definitional for Shakespeare, i.e., “Love’s not Time’s
fool.” Id.
492
HOBBES, supra note 232, at 55–56, 62–63; cf. sources cited supra note 428 (noting Paine,
Smith, and Adams’ disagreements with the Hobbesian formulation of love).
493
HOBBES, supra note 232, at 118–19 (discussing the generation of Leviathan, “that Mortall
God, to which we owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence”); MILTON, supra note 12,
at ls. 865–68 (noting “that grounded maxim / So rife and celebrated in the mouths / Of wisest men;
that to the public good / Private respects must yield”); cf. Warren, supra note 489, at 119–20 (noting
the similarities and possible alliance between Hobbes and Milton).
494
HOBBES, supra note 232, at 55–56; see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 235 (reviewing Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule’s book Law and Leviathan); Randy E. Barnett, Common-Good
Constitutionalism Reveals the Dangers of Any Non-originalist Approach to the Constitution, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/dangers-any-nonoriginalist-approach-constitution/609382/. Barnett criticized Vermeule’s anti-originalist
conservatism because it practically reiterated Milton’s pro-government balancing test ideology that
“to the public good / Private respects must yield,” which was the basis of Cromwellian despotism
in England. Id.; Vermeule, Beyond, supra note 474; MILTON, supra note 12, at ls. 865–68.
495
See William Saletan, John Eastman’s Phony “Plenary Authority” Theory, THE BULWARK
(June 22, 2022, 12:49 PM), https://www.thebulwark.com/john-eastmans-phony-plenary-authoritytheory/; Schroeder, We Will, supra note 56, at 38, 42–43 (noting that plenary power ideology was
based upon Hobbes’ Leviathan).
496
Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-00099, 2022 WL 894256, at *20–21, *24–25, *26–27
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (“Dr. Eastman and President Trump launched a campaign to overturn a
democratic election, an action unprecedented in American history. Their campaign was not
confined to the ivory tower—it was a coup in search of a legal theory. The plan spurred violent
attacks on the seat of our nation’s government, led to the deaths of several law enforcement
officers, and deepened public distrust in our political process.”); see also Brief for the Claremont
Inst. Ctr. for Const. Juris. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 5, NYSRPA v. Bruen, 142
S. Ct. 333 (2022) (No. 20–843) (quoting HOBBES, supra note 232, at 94), apparently followed by
NYSRPA v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2131 (2022); Brief for the Claremont Inst. Ctr. for Const.
Juris. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, 12, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (No. 19–1392) (“Janus provides some guidance for when stare decisis
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Social media giants also played a central role in the storming of the
Capitol Building on January 6, 2021.497 In the time immediately preceding the
attempted coup d’état, noiseless algorithms maximized Twitter and Facebook’s
profits as well as the political polarization of the United States to the point of
tearing it at the seams.498 Dave Eggers’ The Circle came to pass in America,499
and in response Frances Haugen warned Congress that “Facebook wants you to
get caught up in a long, drawn out debate over the minutiae of different
legislative approaches.”500
Yet, shortly after the Capitol was besieged,501 and after Facebook helped
dictator Rodrigo Duterte install himself as the ruler of the Philippines,502

should not bind future courts.”), apparently followed by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2257–58, 2264–65, 2268, 2271 (2022) (overruling Roe and Casey’s
interest-balancing test with Janus’ anti-stare decisis balancing test). Eastman’s influence over
Dobbs can also be observed by the repudiation of his “one-way ratchet problem” in the dissent:
Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2332 (Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting) (“[L]ogic and principle
are not one-way ratchets.”); John C. Eastman, Stare Decisis: Conservatism’s One–Way Ratchet
Problem, in COURTS AND THE CULTURE WARS 133 (Bradley C. S. Watson ed., 2002) (cited in
Eastman’s Dobbs amicus). One of the precedents in Eastman’s direct line of fire is the principle he
tried to end on January 6, 2021, of “one person, one vote.” Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381
(1963); Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2347 (Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting) (“Rescinding
an individual right in its entirety and conferring it on the State, an action the Court takes today for
the first time in history, affects all who have relied on our constitutional system of government and
its structure of individual liberties protected from state oversight.”); id. at 2301 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (explaining, as one of the five votes necessary to overrule Roe, his understanding of
the majority’s reasoning: “Because the Due Process Clause does not secure any substantive rights,
it does not secure a right to abortion . . . . For that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider all
of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and
Obergefell.”), referring to id. at 2280–81 (majority opinion) (noting that the five Janus factors
applied in Dobbs should be applied to “[e]ach precedent” separately, one-by-one to re-determine
whether stare decisis should apply to previous cases).
497
Musadiq Bidar, House January 6 Panel Subpoenas Social Media Companies After
‘Inadequate
Responses’,
CBS
NEWS
(Jan.
13,
2022,
7:20
PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/house-january-6-committee-social-media-subpoenas/.
498
Billy Perrigo, How Facebook Forced a Reckoning by Shutting Down the Team That Put
People Ahead of Profits, TIME (Oct. 7, 2021, 11:35 AM), https://time.com/6104899/facebookreckoning-frances-haugen/; cf. THE SOCIAL DILEMMA (Netflix 2020) (generally explaining the
noiseless algorithms used by Facebook).
499
See generally DAVE EGGERS, THE CIRCLE (2013).
500
Vera Bergengruen, Congress Can’t Agree on How to Reform Big Tech. Frances Haugen
Says That’s What Facebook Wants, TIME (Dec. 1, 2021, 5:30 PM),
https://time.com/6125089/frances-haugen-congress-tech-reform/.
501
Kat Lansdorf et al., A Timeline of How the Jan. 6 Attack Unfolded—Including Who Said
What and When, NPR (Jan. 5, 2022, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/atimeline-of-how-the-jan-6-attack-unfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when.
502
See Lauren Etter, What Happens When the Government Uses Facebook as a Weapon?,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Dec.
7,
2017,
1:00
AM),
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Kahneman and Sunstein went ahead and published a book to encourage the
adoption of more noiseless algorithms.503 Kahneman and Sunstein want us to get
caught up in the minutiae.504 Against this travesty, Frances Haugen has spoken:
“Please don’t fall into that trap. Time is of the essence.”505
“Noise is a problem,” Kahneman and Sunstein agreed,506 but so are
507
delays. Who needs their government to approach the visage of absolute reason
before justice can be dispensed?508 Who defines justice as fairness to the
exclusion of mercy?509 It is the Hobbesian Man;510 he is desirous of a noiseless
system to arrogate power to himself—and, knowing this, the American
Revolutionaries thoughtfully established a noisy system of separated powers to
stop him.511
Kahneman and Tversky’s research supports the Shakespearean wisdom
that “the eye sees not itself,”512 which inspired the American Revolution.513 We

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-12-07/how-rodrigo-duterte-turned-facebookinto-a-weapon-with-a-little-help-from-facebook.
503
KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74, at 377; Sunstein, Governing, supra note 189, at 5.
504
See supra notes 501–503 and accompanying text.
505
Bergengruen, supra note 500.
506
KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74, at 364.
507
Bergengruen, supra note 500; Justice Delayed: The Human Cost of Regulatory Paralysis,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Federal Rights and Agency Action of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 26 (2013) (statement of Peg Seminario, Director of
Safety and Health for the AFL–CIO).
508
RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 56, at 23; RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 233, at xxii;
cf. Sarah E. Spengeman, Saint Augustine and Hannah Arendt on Love of the World 302, 394 (June
2014)
(Ph.D.
dissertation,
University
of
Notre
Dame)
(ND
Curate),
https://curate.nd.edu/downloads/und:q811kh06s9f (observing the self-serving rationalizations
copped by those who advocated for totalitarianism).
509
Compare KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74, at 340, SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, supra note 235,
at 143, and RAWLS, supra note 392, at 17, with HOBBES, supra note 232, at frontispiece.
510
HOBBES, supra note 232, at 81–83, 231 (showing that tyranny and fairness can go hand in
hand).
511
Spengeman, supra note 508, at 302, 306; see HOBBES, supra note 232, at frontispiece
(advocating a unity of powers in one man); U.S. CONST. arts. I–III (separating powers into three
departments); cf. Jacobson, supra note 234, at 1–2 (describing the meaning behind the frontispiece
of Hobbes’s Leviathan).
512
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2, l. 58.
513
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 463 (1793) (quoting Thomas Reid’s paraphrase of
Shakespeare from page viii of the dedication of An Inquiry into the Human Mind); PHILLIS
WHEATLEY, To the University of Cambridge in New-England (1773), reprinted in THE COLLECTED,
supra note 208, at 15–16 (advising her fellow American patriots to “[s]uppress the deadly serpent
in its egg”) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 2, sc. 1, l. 32); MERCY OTIS
WARREN, To Mrs. Montague, Author of “Observations on the Genius and Writings of
Shakespeare,” in POEMS, DRAMATIC AND MISCELLANEOUS. BY MRS. M. WARREN (1790) (noting
that through Shakespeare “Britain taught us to be free”); Letter from Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis
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who live in the shockwaves of the January 6, 2021 attempted coup d’état know
it is hubristic to keep trusting in the cost/benefit analyses that enabled social
media giants to create perfect pandemonium.514 Humans cannot accurately
balance costs and benefits, and it is embarrassing to see the courts keep trying on
the emperor’s new clothes.515
Balancing costs and benefits is not an empirical process; it originated
from utilitarian rationalism.516 In the same way Bentham’s Panopticon was
engineered to make people feel watched, cost/benefit balancing was engineered
to make people feel heard.517 It is a public relations ploy aimed at engineering
consent for a paternalistic government rather than actually weighing and
balancing evidence like a scientist with the aim of arriving at the truth.518
Even before Kahneman and Tversky’s research, those who used
cost/benefit heuristics were more interested in social control while seeming
empirical, rather than actually being empirical.519 As cost/benefit balancers do
Warren (May 14, 1787), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-08-02-0019
(commending Elizabeth Montagu’s book An Essay on the Writings and Genius of Shakespeare to
Mercy’s attention); Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 2-10, 1776),
https://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=L17760302aa
(quoting
WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 4, sc. 3, ls. 216–22) (using the pen-name Portia the wife of
Brutus, Abigail wrote to her husband, from time to time, quoting Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar); cf.
Michael Dobson, Fairly Brave New World: Shakespeare, The American Colonies, and the
American Revolution, in 23 RENAISSANCE DRAMA 189, 196 (Jeffrey Masten & William N. West
eds., 1992) (“[P]aeans to Brutus scatter the parricidal rhetoric of John Adams, Josiah Quincy, and
others.”); but see KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74, at 340, expressing disagreement with WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1, ls. 184–97 (arguing that justice should be
tempered with mercy).
514
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 163, at 411; WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act
1, sc. 2, ls. 51–52; Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 453–54, 463.
515
See, e.g., Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 341 (2014) (after donning the emperor’s
clothes, the Court expected the American people to accept this banal holding: “the answer is:
whatever the grand jury decides”).
516
Perreau-Saussine, supra note 175, at 356 (“With rigorously ordered reasoning, Bentham
sought to undermine not simply corrupt traditions, but customary thinking itself as inherently
corrupting in any large, complex society . . . .”); SCHOFIELD, supra note 13, at 74–76, 126–27, 241.
517
See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
518
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 166–68, 312, 331 (defending cost/benefit balancing
tests as the ideal way for paternalistic governments to govern); see Sunstein, Governing, supra
note 189, at 5; cf. Bernays, supra note 371, at 113–14 (claiming the constitutional right of public
relations counsels to manipulate the American public, as if our constitutional system was
indestructible); 1 BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, supra note 351, at 3 (rationalizing putting potentially all
of society in prisons as a method of manipulating the masses to believe in the omnipotence and
omniscience of the ruler); MILTON, supra note 12, at ls. 865–68 (demonstrating how Dalila
rationalized betraying her husband Samson to painful humiliation and death through a cost/benefit
balancing test).
519
See, e.g., Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit, supra note 377, at 23 (attempting to take account of
empiricists by inviting them to add their knowledge to the overall cost/benefit analysis, but not
engaging in empiricism of any sort).
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not seem dissuaded by Kahneman and Tversky’s research, it may be inferred that
these balancers know they support an irrational theory.520 They know their
systems are falsely empirical, falsely rational, and falsely deferent to common
law.521
The post-Kahneman and Tversky balancers even appear to associate
with Kahneman to get his permission for them to continue their cost/benefit
empire unchecked by Kahneman and Tversky’s research.522 This is a classic
cost/benefit balancer strategy: to invite the empiricist to the table, get their
apparent go ahead, and then ignore the actual empirical evidence.523 This ploy
appears to exist ultimately to justify the supplanting of the empirically driven
common law.524
They know that if they can convince a large enough portion of the legal
community that weighing costs and benefits is best, they can defer to the court’s
application of common law rights indefinitely.525 They already convinced
immigration experts to spend years waiting for the courts to decide whether to
extend Zadvydas v. Davis relief to asylum seekers.526 While delayed to decide
cost/benefit minutiae, immigrants languished in detention facilities.527
For several years, immigrant common law rights have been sidelined in
violation of the U.S. Constitution.528 Relief under Boumeidene’s Suspension
Clause analysis remained dormant, while judges balanced away the rights of

520
Sunstein, Governing, supra note 189, at 5 (admitting Kahneman teaches that wherever
humans make judgements there is noise, but failing to apply this logic to his own theories, which
Sunstein appears to believe are utopian in a style strikingly similar to that of Jeremy Bentham); see
generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE (2006);
Himmelfarb, supra note 405.
521
See supra notes 514–515 and accompanying text; cf. KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note 74, at
48–49, 367 (continuing their cost/benefit enterprise as if it did comport with Kahneman’s research
triggers their “internal signal of judgment completion” a positive feeling that is “unrelated to any
outside information”).
522
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 166–68, 312, 331; KAHNEMAN, NOISE, supra note
74, at 333–34, 340–41 (“Consider the case of Woodson v. North Carolina, in which the US
Supreme Court held that a mandatory death sentence was unconstitutional not because it was too
brutal but because it was a rule. The whole point of the mandatory death sentence was to ensure
against noise—to say that under specified circumstances, murderers would have to be put to death.”
(disagreeing with Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976))).
523
Cf. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit, supra note 377, at 23 (demonstrating how scientific
knowledge is meant to be subsumed by cost/benefit balancing tests).
524
Compare id., with Perreau-Saussine, supra note 175, at 356 (describing Bentham’s central
disagreement with common law authority, along with any established authority).
525
See supra notes 279, 289 and accompanying text (explaining how balancing tests inspired
by Hamdi caused Boumediene to go dormant for years).
526
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
527
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
528
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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foreign nationals on an ad hoc basis.529 Now that Zadvydas was nullified so that
due process balancing may be denied to immigrants as well,530 there is only one
response to jurists who did not make use of Boumediene when they could:
“Justice delayed is justice denied!”531

529

See supra notes 279, 289 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
531
Salahi v. Obama, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2010), vacated and remanded, 625 F.3d 745
(D.C. Cir. 2010). “Justice delayed is justice denied” is an ancient maxim adopted by several
distinguished Americans: David Josiah Brewer, Justice Brewer Again on Appeals, 27 LIT. DIGEST
608, 609 (1903); Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963),
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html (“We must come to see with
the distinguished jurist of yesterday that ‘justice too long delayed is justice denied.’”); WILLIAM
PENN, SOME FRUITS OF SOLITUDE 86 (1905).
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